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Abstract
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality
measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes
as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each coalition of nodes is determined by
certain graph properties. Next, the centrality of any individual node is determined by a chosen
game-theoretic solution concept (notably, the Shapley value) in the same way as the payoff
of a player in a cooperative game. On one hand, the advantage of game-theoretic centrality
measures is that nodes are ranked not only according to their individual roles but also according
to how they contribute to the role played by all possible subsets of nodes. On the other hand,
the disadvantage is that the game-theoretic solution concepts are typically computationally
challenging. The main contribution of this dissertation is that we show that a wide variety
of game-theoretic solution concepts on networks can be computed in polynomial time.
Our focus is on centralities based on the Shapley value and its various extensions, such as
the Semivalues and Coalitional Semivalues. Furthermore, we prove #P-hardness of computing
the Shapley value in connectivity games and propose an algorithm to compute it. Finally, we
analyse computational properties of generalized version of cooperative games in which order of
player matters. We propose a new representation for such games, called generalized marginal
contribution networks, that allows for polynomial computation in the size of the representation
of two dedicated extensions of the Shapley value to this class of games.
Keywords: the Shapley value, the Owen value, Semivalues, social networks, centrality
measures
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Streszczenie
W niniejszej rozprawie autor porusza problem złoz˙onos´ci obliczeniowej teoriogrowych
centralnos´ci. W teoriogrowym podejs´ciu do analizy sieci traktujemy wierzchołki jako graczy
w koalicyjnej grze, w której wartos´c´ koalicji wierzchołków wynika ze struktury sieci. W
takiej grze waz˙nos´c´ kaz˙dego wierzchołka moz˙e byc´ okres´lona przez dowolne rozwia˛zanie gry
koalicyjnej (w szczególnos´ci przez wartos´c´ Shapleya). Z jednej strony zaleta˛ takiego podejs´cia
do centralnos´ci jest fakt, z˙e ranking wierzchołków wynika nie tylko z indywidualnej roli
kaz˙dego wierzchołka, lecz takz˙e z tego, ile dany wierzchołek wnosi do roli kaz˙dego podzbioru
wierzchołków w grafie. Jednakz˙e z drugiej strony liczenie rozwia˛zan´ gier koalicyjnych
jest bardzo trudne. Główna˛ kontrybucja˛ tej rozprawy jest pokazanie, jak liczyc´ w czasie
wielomianowym teoriogrowe centralnos´ci dla wielu róz˙nych rozwia˛zan´ gier koalicyjnych.
W tej pracy autor skupia sie˛ na szybkim liczeniu teoriogrowych centralnos´ci opartych
na wartos´ci Shapleya i jej róz˙nych rozszerzen´. W szczególnos´ci analizuje on obliczeniowe
własnos´ci Półwartos´ci, be˛da˛ce uogólnieniem wartos´ci Shapleya, i koalicyje Półwartos´ci, be˛da˛ce
uogólnieniem wartos´ci Owena. Dodaktowo, autor dowodzi #P-trudnos´ci liczenia wartos´ci
Shapleya w grach spójnos´ciowych i proponuje szybki algorytm radza˛cy sobie z tym problemem.
Na zakon´czenie, w pracy analizowane sa˛ uogólnione gry koalicyjne, w których kolenos´c´ graczy
wyznacza wartos´c´ koalicji. Autor proponuje nowa˛, zwie˛zła˛ reprezentacje˛ tych gier, która
pozwala na obliczanie w czasie wielomianowym ze wzgle˛du na wielkos´c´ reprezentacji dwóch
dedytkowanych tym grom rozszerzen´ wartos´ci Shapley.
Słowa kluczowe: wartos´c´ Shapleya, wartos´c´ Owena, Półwartos´ci, sieci społecznos´ciowe,
miary centralnos´ci
6
Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1. Publications and Author’s Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1. Coalitional Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2. The Shapley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3. Semivalues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4. Marginal Contribution Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5. Read-once Marginal Contribution Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6. Graph Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7. Centrality Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.8. Community Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1. Centrality Measures and Their Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2. Game-theoretic Apporach to Centrality Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3. Computational Aspects of Coalitional Games – Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4. Polynomial Algorithms for Game-theoretic Centrality Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1. Why Use Game-Theoretic Centrality Measures? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2. General Definition of Game-Theoretic Network Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3. The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.1. Shapley Value-Based Degree Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.2. Shapley Value-Based k-influence Degree Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3.3. Shapley Value-Based dcutoff -distance Degree Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.4. Shapley Value-Based Closeness Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3.5. Shapley Value-Based Wcutoff -influence Degree Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4. Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.1. Approximation Methods for the Shapley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.2. Simulation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.3. Data Used in Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4.4. Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5. Efficient Algorithms for a Game-Theoretic Measure of Betweenness Centrality . . . . . . 65
7
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2. The Overview of Computational Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3. The New Centrality and Its Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.3.1. Motivating Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.3.2. The Shapley Value-based Betweenness Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3.3. Semivalue-based Betweenness Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.4. A Look at Marginal Contribution for the Shapley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3.5. A Look at Marginal Contribution for the Semivalue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4. Algorithms to Compute the Shapley Value and Semivalue based Betweenness Centralities 81
5.4.1. The Framework for Unweigthed Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.4.2. The Algorithm for the Shapley Value-based Betweenness Centrality for
Unweighted Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.4.3. The Algorithm for the Semivalue-based Betweenness Centrality for
Unweighted Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.4.4. The Framework for Weighted Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4.5. The Algorithm for Shapley Value-based Betweenness Centrality in Weighted
Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4.6. The Algorithm for Semivalue-based Betweenness Centrality in Weighted Graphs 90
5.5. Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.5.1. Evaluating our Centrality Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.5.2. Evaluating our Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6. A Centrality Measure for Networks With Community Structure Based on a
Generalization of the Owen Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2. Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.2.1. The Coalitional Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.2.2. The Owen Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.3. The Coalitional Semivalue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4. The New Centrality Measure and Its Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.5. Computational Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.5.1. Weighted Degree Centrality Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.5.2. The Marginal Contribution Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.5.3. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.6. Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7. Computational Analysis of a Connectivity Game on Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8
7.3. Connectivity Games for Terrorist Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.4. Computational Analysis & Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.4.1. Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.4.2. Analysis of Marginal Contribitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.4.3. The Basic Algorithm for Connectivity Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.4.4. The Faster Algorithm for Connectivity Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.4.5. Approximation algorithm for connectivity games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.5. Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
8. The Marginal Contribution Networks for Generalized Coalitional Games . . . . . . . . . 134
8.1. Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
8.1.1. The Generalized Coalitional Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
8.1.2. The Nowak and Radzik Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
8.1.3. The Sánchez and Bergantiños Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.2. Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.2.1. Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.2.2. Computing the Nowak-Radzik Value with Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets . . 141
8.2.3. Computing the Sánchez-Bergantiños Value with Generalized Read-Once
MC-Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.3. Computing Generalized Game-Theoretic Betweenness Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
9. Summary and Potential Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Appendix A. Main Notation Used in the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Appendix B. The Recursive Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
9

1. Introduction
The Shapley value is arguably the most well-known normative payoff division scheme (solution
concept) in cooperative game theory [Shapley, 1953]. One of its interesting applications is
to measure importance (or centrality) of nodes in networks. Unfortunately, although such
game-theoretic approach to centrality is often more advantageous than the classical measures,
the Shapley value as well as other, related solution concepts from cooperative game-theory
are computationally challenging. In particular, they typically require to consider all marginal
contributions that n players in the cooperative game could make to all 2n coalitions (subsets of
players). Clearly, applying such a direct approach to compute game-theoretic solution concepts
on networks would be prohibitive even for very small systems.
The main thesis of this dissertation is that it is possible to compute various measures
based on game-theoretic solution concepts in polynomial time. This includes, among others,
game-theoretic extensions of three most well-known classical centrality measures: degree,
closeness and betweenness. Polynomial running time in our algorithms is achieved by
probabilistic analysis of marginal contributions of players to coalitions and taking advantage
of the network topology.
Networks underpin the number of real-life domains of our everyday live: from the quite
obvious examples of computer networks, communications networks, or road networks to the
more hidden networks like protein networks, internet network, or social networks. The studies
of the structure of real-life networks were undertaken by many scientists resulting with a number
of astonishing breakthroughs. Discovered and explained by Albert et al. [2000] the scale-free
nature of many real-life networks were undoubtedly one of those. The other was done by Watts
and Strogatz [1998] who proposed the model inspired by the network phenomenon of the Six
Degrees of Separation. Another significant breakthrough was done much earlier by Freeman
[1979] who provided the conceptual classification of centrality measures—functions evaluating
the importance of nodes in the network. More specifically, Freeman distinguished three
basic concepts upon which various centrality measures are built: the distance between nodes
(closeness centralities), the number of shortest paths between nodes (betweenness centralities),
and direct connections to other nodes (degree centralities).
Due to a wide variety of applications of centrality measures, analyzing and developing
them is one of the major research topics in the network science. For instance, identifying
key nodes in network can be used to study network vulnerability [Holme et al., 2002], to
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build recommendation systems [Liu et al., 2013], to identify the focal hubs in a road network
[Schultes and Sanders, 2007], to point the most critical functional entities in a protein network
[Jeong et al., 2001], or to find the most influential people in a social network [Kempe et al.,
2003].
The common feature of the standard centrality measures introduced by Freeman [1979] is
that they assess the importance of a node by focusing only on the role that a node plays by
itself. However, in many applications such an approach is inadequate due to existence synergies
that may occur if the functioning of nodes is considered in groups.1 In order to capture such
synergies Everett and Borgatti [1999] introduced the concept of group centrality. Its idea is
broadly the same as the one of standard centrality, but now the focus is on the functioning of a
given group of nodes, rather than individual nodes. In particular, Everett and Borgatti [1999]
extended three Freeman’s measures to group degree centrality, group closeness centrality, and
group betweenness centrality.
However, while the concept of group centrality addresses the issue of quantifying synergy
among nodes in a particular group, there is still another fundamental problem to be solved. In
particular, it is unclear how to rank individual nodes given an exponential number of potential
groups of nodes they may belong to. In other words, we need to answer the question: how
to rank individual nodes based on their group centralities? Here, the coalitional game theory
comes into play.
In particular, the coalitional (or cooperative) game theory is a part of game theory in which
individual players are allowed to form coalitions with an aim to increase their profits. Now,
assuming that players have all decided to cooperate (i.e. to form the grand coalition), one of
the fundamental problems in coalitional game theory is how to divide the payoff achieved by
cooperation? The most popular answer to this question was offered by L.S. Shapley [Shapley,
1953]—the 2012 Noble Prize Laureate—who proposed to consider marginal contributions
of players to all coalitions they could potential belong to. He proved that there exists the
unique payoff division scheme, now called the Shapley value, that satisfies the following four
fairness axioms: Efficiency—the whole available payoff is distributed among players; the Null
Player—the player that cannot contribute anything should receive zero; Symmetry—two players
whose contributions to any coalition are always the same should be given the same payoff; and
Additivity—the payoff division scheme should be additive.
The alternative axiomatizations of the Shapley value have been studied by numerous authors
in the literature. Unfortunately, while this value has many interesting properties, computing the
Sahpley value is often #P-complete [Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994]. This obstacle will be
overcome in this thesis in the context of game-theoretic centrality.
1 Intuitively, synergy can be fought of as a value added from group performance. Note that synergy can be
also negative and, in such a case, it is called antergy. For an overview of various concepts of synergy see the work
by Rahwan et al. [2014].
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Now we have all necessary tools to introduce game-theoretic centrality measures. In a
nutshell, the idea behind them is to treat nodes as players in a coalitional game, where the
value of each coalition of nodes is determined by a group centrality. In such settings, the value
of each individual node can be determined by cooperative game solution such as the Shapley
value. In other words, in order to provide the ranking of individual nodes that accounts for group
centrality measure, we use the Shapley value that evaluates (fairly in a certain sense) marginal
contributions of each node to all groups it could potentially belong to. The key advantage of
such an approach is that nodes are ranked not only according to their individual roles in the
network but also according to how they contribute to the role played by all possible subsets of
nodes.
Unfortunately, as already mentioned, potential downside of game-theoretic solution
concepts is that they are, in general, computationally challenging. However, in this dissertation,
we show that this is not always true in the network context, i.e., we are able to compute the
Shapley value and the related solution concepts in polynomial time for various centrality-related
games on networks.
Our contributions in this dissertation can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we compute on
networks in polynomial time the Semivalues [Dubey et al., 1981] which are the generalization
of the Shapley value and offer more flexibility to define any particular game-theoretic network
centrality. Secondly, we propose polynomial-time algorithm on networks for the Owen value
[Owen, 1977] that is the most important solution concept to games with coalitional structure,
and the Coalitional Semivalue our extension of the Owen value. Finally, we propose the new
representation of generalized coalitional games, the games in which the permutations of players
are considered. Our representation allows to compute Nowak-Radzik value [Nowak and Radzik,
1994] and Sánchez-Bergantiños value [Sánchez and Bergantiños, 1999]. The polynomial time
algorithms for the last two values are still unknown, but we propose algorithms that significantly
reduce computational complexity of the problem. We also show how to use our representation
on networks.
1.1. Publications and Author’s Contribution
The results covered by this thesis were published in four international journals and presented
on the four top conferences from Artificial Intelligence. Additionally, they gathered attention
of scientific community what resulted in the number of citations.
— Chapter 4 is mostly based on the work Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value
for Game-theoretic Network Centrality published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research (JAIR) [Michalak, Aaditha, Szczepan´ski, Ravindran, and Jennings, 2013a].
The main two contributions presented in this chapter are: developing efficient algorithms
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for computing Shapley value-based degree and closeness centralities (together with their
various extensions), and providing theoretical, as well as experimental analysis of the
introduced algorithms. The contribution of the author of this dissertation mostly covers
the experimental part of this article. More specifically, Algorithms 1-5 were developed by
Karthik Aaditha, and partianlly formalized by the author of this thesis. More specifically,
Propositions 4.1 and 2 and proof of correctness for Algorithms 1 and 3 are the contribution
of the author. Additionally, Algorithms 6-10 (for the Monte Carlo sampling of the game
theoretic-centrality measures) were developed by the author of this dissertation.
— Chapter 5 is based on two publications: A New Approach to Betweenness Centrality Based
on the Shapley Value [Szczepan´ski, Michalak, and Rahwan, 2012] published in Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2012) and Efficient Algorithms for Game-Theoretic Betweenness Centrality
published in Artificial Intelligence Journal (AI) [Szczepan´ski, Michalak, and Rahwan,
2016]. All the technical content, i.e., algorithms, experiments and theorems are exclusive
contributions of the author of this thesis.
— Chapter 6 is based on two publications: A Centrality Measure for Networks With Community
Structure Based on a Generalization of the Owen Value [Szczepan´ski, Michalak, and
Wooldridge, 2014] published in Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2014) and A New Approach to Measure Social Capital
using Game-Theoretic Techniques [Michalak, Moretti, Namarayan, Skibski, Szczepan´ski,
Rahwan, and Wooldridge, 2015b] published in ACM SIGecom Exchanges. All algorithms,
experiments and theorems were developed by the author of this thesis.
— Chapter 7 is based on the publication Computational Analysis of Connectivity Games
with Application to Investigation of Terrorist Networks [Michalak, Rahwan, Szczepan´ski,
Skibski, Narayanam, Wooldridge, and Jennings, 2013b] published in Proceedings of the
23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013). The
contribution presented in this chapter is threefold, it formally proves that computing the
Shapley value in connectivity games in NP-hard, it develops faster exact algorithm for
connectivity games, and it develops one approximation algorithm for these family of games.
The complexity proof consists of two theorems: Theorem 4 developed by the author with
help of Colin McQuillan and Theorem 5, which was developed exclusively by the author
of this dissertation. Algorithm 20 is a joint work done by the author, Tomasz Michalak and
Talal Rahwan, and finally Algorithm 21 was developed by the author together with Oskar
Skibski.
— The final Chapter 8 is based on the second part of the publication Implementation
and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games [Michalak,
Szczepan´ski, Rahwan, Chrobak, Brânzei, Wooldridge, and Jennings, 2014] published
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in journal ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (ACM TEAC). The
technical content in the whole chapter is an exclusive contribution of the author.
Some parts of the above chapters and additionally Chapter 2 (including definitions
and formalization) are also based on the article Efficient Computation of Semivalues for
Game-Theoretic Network Centrality [Szczepan´ski, Tarkowski, Michalak, Harrenstein, and
Wooldridge, 2015b] published in Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI 2015).
2. Preliminaries
In this chapter we present the basic notation and definitions from both graph theory and game
theory that will be used throughout the thesis.
Firstly, we introduce coalitional games (also known as cooperative games), where we
focus on the key solution concepts and their computational aspects. In particular, we define
the Shapley value—the most popular normative solution concept to cooperative games. We
also introduce a parametrized generalization to the Shapley value called the Semivalue. Since
the standard model (or representation) of cooperative games, i.e. the characteristic function,
is computationally challenging, we discuss an alternative representation, called the Marginal
Contribution Networks. For certain games, this representation allows for computing the Shapley
value in polynomial time in the number of agents.
Secondly, we define the basic notation of a graph and introduce elementary concepts related
to social network analysis such as: centralities and communities.
2.1. Coalitional Games
Game Theory consists of two broad areas: non-cooperative (or strategic) games and cooperative
(or coalitional) games. The first class of games is one in which players make decisions
independently. In the second class, groups of players, called coalitions, are allowed to form
profitable coalitions [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994].
Definition 1 (Coalitional game). A coalitional game consists of a set of players (or agents)
A “ ta1, a2, . . . , a|A|u, and the characteristic function ν : 2A Ñ R, which assigns to each
coalition of playersC Ď A a real value (or payoff) indicating its performance, where νpHq “ 0.
Thus, the coalitional game g in the characteristic function form is a pair g “ pA, νq.
In such defined game the number of all coalitions equals 2|A|—the number of all subsets
of A. The set of all coalitional games will be denoted by V , so we can write pA, νq P V , or
sometimes we simplify notation and write ν P V . The coalition of all players A is called grand
coalition.
Example 1. Let us consider the game where players collect cards with famous rock stars. Each
card has its own value, which could be doubled if only player possesses all cards from the set.
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The game consists of two sets of cards K “ tk1, k2u M “ tm1,m2,m3u, and four players
A “ ta1, a2, a3, a4u who have the following cards:
a1 ÐÑ k1,m3
a2 ÐÑ k2
a3 ÐÑ m1
a4 ÐÑ m2,m3
Assuming that each card has individually value 1 the characteristic function describing this
game g1 “ pA, ν1q is:
ν1pHq “ 0
ν1pta1uq “ ν1pta2uq “ ν1pta3uq “ ν1pta4uq “ 1
ν1pta2, a3uq “ 2
ν1pta1, a3uq “ ν1pta2, a4uq “ 3
ν1pta1, a4uq “ 4
ν1pta1, a2uq “ 5
ν1pta3, a4uq “ ν1pta1, a2, a3uq “ 6
ν1pta2, a3, a4uq “ ν1pta1, a2, a4uq “ 7
ν1pta1, a3, a4uq “ 8
ν1pAq “ 11
Player a3 has one card m1, so individually its value is ν1pta3uq “ 1. The player a4 has
two cards from the same set m2,m3 and playing alone he can receive ν1pta4uq “ 2. Now, if
these two players cooperate, they will have all cards from the same set, what makes them more
valuable. Playing together they will receive ν1pta3, a4uq “ 6, so they have a big incentive to
cooperate.
Form the above example we see that the assumption ν1pHq “ 0 is natural, because the empty
coalition without players cannot obtain any profits. Additionally, the characteristic function in
this example incites players to collaborate, because joining new members to coalition can only
improve its performance. This property of characteristic function is called superadditivity and
may cause the forming of the grand coalition.
Definition 2 (Superadditivity). The characteristic function in the game pA, vq is superadditive
if only the following expression holds:
@
C1,C2ĎA
C1XC2“H
vpC1 Y C2q ě vpC1q ` vpC2q
The property strongly connected to superadditivity is called monotonicity.
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Definition 3 (Monotonicity). The characteristic function in the game pA, vq jest monotonic if
only the following expression holds:
@
C1ĎC2ĎA
vpC2q ě vpC1q
Caulier [2009] showed that for the games with non-negative characteristic function the
superadditivity implies monotonicity. However, in general the implication in neither direction
holds.
When the game is superadditive, or monotonic the grand coalition, i.e., the coalition of all
the players in the game, has the highest value and, therefore, is formed. One of the fundamental
questions in cooperative game theory is then how to divide the payoff of the grand coalition
(νpAq) among the players and the most popular normative solution to that problem is the
Shapley value.
2.2. The Shapley Value
In principle, there may be an infinite number of divisions of the value of grand coalition among
players, however, we are interested in those that meet certain desirable criteria. In order to
present these criteria we introduce the notion of marginal contribution.
Definition 4 (Marginal contribution). The marginal contribution of player ai P A to the
coalition C Ď Aztaiu is:
MCpC, aiq “ νpC Y taiuq ´ νpCq (2.1)
Now, let us consider four fairness properties that a given division scheme should meet. We
denote by φipA, νq the payoff received by a player ai in game pA, νq.
Symmetry payoffs do not depend on the players’ names.
That is, φpA, pipνqq “ pipφqpA, vq for every game ν and permutation pi P ΠpAq.
Null Player players that make no contribution should receive nothing.
In other words,
`@C Ď A,MCpC, aiq “ 0˘ ñ `φipA, νq “ 0˘.
Efficiency the entire payoff of each coalition should be distributed among its members.
That is,
ř
aiPA φipAq “ νpAq.
Additivity given three games, g1 “ pA, ν1q, g2 “ pA, ν2q and g3 “ pA, ν3q,
where ν1pCq “ ν2pCq ` ν3pCq for all C Ď A, the payoff of a player in g1
should be the sum of his payoff in g2 and in g3.
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The Symmetry property implies that two players that contribute the same value to all coalitions
should be given the same payoff. More formally:
`@CĎAztai,aju,MCpC, aiq “ MCpC, ajq˘ ñ `φipA, νq “ φjpA, νq˘ (2.2)
The Efficiency property assures that the whole available payoff is distributed among players.
The Null Player property indicates that player that can not contribute anything should receive
value 0. The Additivity property says that if players anticipate in two separate games then their
importance in the game consisting of these two games, is the sum of the importance in these
two subgames. Interestingly, there exist only one division scheme that satisfies the above four
criteria—Shapley value.
Example 2. Let us consider the coalitional game g2 “ pA, vq, in which three players A “
ta1, a2, a3u collect apples from trees. Each player posses a stand allowing him to collect apples
from the top of the trees. Additionally, on two stands of the same height it is possible to put third
stand. Now, let us introduce the function s : A Ñ N evaluating the high of each stand that a
given player have:
spaiq “
$’’&’’%
20 if i “ 1
40 if i “ 2
20 if i “ 3
The characteristic function ν2 in this game is defined as follows:
ν2pCq “
$’’&’’%
0 if C “ H
60 ˚ 10 if C “ A
max
aiPC
tspaiqu ˚ 10 otherwise.
The players a1 and a3 contributes the same value to each coalition, so based on the Symmetry
property they should have the same payoff. We also know that the Efficiency property implies
that the whole gain 600 should be distributed among all players. Based on these two information
we obtain two equations:
φ1 “ φ2
φ1 ` φ2 “ φ3 “ 600
At this point we haven’t enough information to solve the above equation. In order to do it, we
need to use Additivity and Null Player properties.
The solution of the above game should satisfy the four fairness properties. To this end,
Shapley [1953] proposed to evaluate the role of each player in the game proportionally to a
weighted average marginal contribution of this player to all possible coalitions. Formally:
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Definition 5 (Shapley value). In a coalitional game pA, νq the Shapley value for a player ai is
given by:
φSVi pA, νq “
ÿ
CĎAztaiu
|C|!p|A| ´ |C| ´ 1q!
A!
pvpC Y taiuq ´ vpCqq (2.3)
Importantly, the Noble prize winner L. S. Shapley [Shapley, 1953] showed that the vector φSV
is the only solution concept satisfying properties p1q ´ p4q.
Furthermore, if the characteristic function is superadditive than Shapley value satisfies one
additional property:
Individual Rationality:
ÿ
aiPA
φSVi pνq ě νptaiuq
Individual Rationality indicates that each player has no incentive to play alone. If he do
so, he will receive the payoff no greater than the payoff obtained during his collaboration with
others.
The set of all players A will be sometimes considered as a ordered list (|A|-tuple) A “
pa1, a2, . . . , a|A|q in order to use the notion of the permutation of all players pi P ΠpAq.
The important fact about the Shapley value is that for a given player ai P A in the game
pA, νq it is the expected marginal contribution of this player to the set of players Ppipaiq that
precede ai in a random permutation pi P ΠpAq of all players in the game.
Definition 6 (Shapley value as an expected value). In a coalitional game pA, νq the Shapley
value for a player ai is given by:
φSVi pA, νq “ ErMCpPpipaiq, aiqs “ 1|A|!
ÿ
piPΠpAq
MCpPpipaiq, aiq (2.4)
The equivalence between Definition 5 and Definition 6 can be easily derived by using a
simple combinatorial fact: the number of permutations ofA in which the set of players occurring
before i-th player equals Ppipaiq is exactly |Ppipaiq|!p|A| ´ 1´ |Ppipaiq|q!.
φSVi pvq “ 1|A|!
´
MCpPpi1paiq, aiq `MCpPpi2paiq, aiq ` . . .`MCpPpin!paiq, aiq
¯
“ 1|A|!
´ p|H|!qp|A|´1q!hkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj
pMCpH, aiq ` . . .`MCpH, aiqq` . . .`
|C|!p|A|´1´|C|q!hkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj
pMCpC, aiq ` . . .`MCpC, aiqq` . . .
. . .`
p|A|´1q!p|A|´1´p|A|´1qq!hkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj
pMCpAztaiu, aiq ` . . .`MCpAztaiu, aiqq
¯
“ 1|A|!
´
p|A| ´ 1q!pMCpH, aiqq ` . . .` |C|!p|A| ´ 1´ |C|q!pMCpC, aiqq ` . . .
. . .` p|A| ´ 1q!pMCpAztaiu, aiqq
¯
“ 1|A|!
ÿ
CĎAztaiu
|C|!p|A| ´ |C| ´ 1q! MCpC, aiq
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Using the Definition 6 we can compute the Shapley value for the game in Example 2.
Example 3. We will consider all permutations of the set A from the game g2 defined in
Example 2. For each permutation we will compute the marginal contribution of the agent a2 to
the set Ppipa2q.
a1, a2, a3 MCpta1u, a2q “ ν2pta1, a2uq ´ ν2pta1uq “ 200
a1, a3, a2 MCpta1, a3u, a2q “ 400
a2, a1, a3 MCpH, a2q “ 400
a2, a3, a1 MCpH, a2q “ 400
a3, a1, a2 MCpta1, a3u, a2q “ 400
a3, a2, a1 MCpta3u, a2q “ 200
Thus, for the game g2 we have:
φSV2 “ 200`400`400`400`400`2006! “ 33313
φSV1 “ 13313
φSV3 “ 13313
Generally, using equation (2.3) computing Shapley value requires iterating through 2|A|
subsets of A, and using equation (2.4) requires iterating through all |A|! permutations of A.
Furthermore, computing the Shapley value has been shown to be NP-Hard (or even worse,
#P-Complete) for many specific classes of games [Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994, Nagamochi
et al., 1997].
Therefore, many new succinctly representations were proposed in the literature. The most
popular we introduce in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5.
2.3. Semivalues
The Shapley value is designed to divide payoff, which is equivalent to evaluating the power
of agents in cooperative game. However, if we focus only on the power index of players,
we can drop the Efficiency axiom. Semivalues introduced by Dubey et al. [1981] represent
an important class of power indexes, among which only Shapley value satisfies Efficiency.
To define Semivalues, we will use the notion of marginal contribution of the player i to the
coalition C introduced in Definition 4. Let β : t0, 1, . . . , |A| ´ 1u Ñ r0, 1s be a function such
that
ř|N |´1
k“0 βpkq “ 1. Intuitively, when we calculate the expected marginal contribution of a
node, βpkq will be the probability that a coalition of size k is chosen for this node to join. This
is why βpkq is defined on values ranging from 0 to |N |´1. Note that the function β is a discrete
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probability distribution. Since a player ai cannot join a coalition that it is already in, we only
need to look at coalitions not containing ai.
Definition 7 (Semivalue). Given β and a coalitional game pA, νq the Semivalue for a player ai
is given by:
φSEMIi pA, νq “
ÿ
0ďkă|V |
βpkqECkrMCpCk, iqs, (2.5)
where Ck is the random variable of all possible coalitions of size k drawn with uniform
probability form the set Aztaiu, and ECkr¨s is the expected value operator for the random
variable Ck.
The Shapley value (Definition 5) and the Banzhaf index of power [Banzhaf, 1965] are two
prominent and well-known examples of Semivalues. They are defined by β-functions βShapley
and βBanzhaf , respectively:
βShapleypkq “ 1|A| and β
Banzhaf pkq “
`|A|´1
k
˘
2|A|´1
.
All Semivalues satisfy Symmetry, Null player and Additivity axioms and except for the
Shapley value, all these solutions violate the Efficiency axiom, which makes them of limited use
as fair cost sharing values. However, they are widely used as indicators of power in cooperative
games [Monderer and Samet, 2002].
2.4. Marginal Contribution Networks
The size of the representation of coalitional games in the characteristic function form is
exponential in the number of agents and consequently computing Shapley value for such games
is generally hard. In order to overcome this limitation the researchers look for for more concise
representations. One of the most interesting and very intuitive techniques for representing
coalitional games was introduced by Ieong and Shoham [2005]. The authors proposed marginal
contribution nets (MC-Nets). This representation has a number of desirable properties: it is fully
expressive, concise for many characteristic function games of interest, and facilitates a very
efficient technique for computing the Shapley value. More specifically, in such representation
we can compute the Shapley value in the linear time in respect to the size of a representation.
Let us introduce the syntax of Boolean formulas:
A :“ ai |  ai i P t1 . . . nu,
F :“ pFq | F ^ F | F _ F | F ‘ F | A ,
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where each literal ai represents the agent in the game. In other words, this formula is a binary
rooted tree with positive or negative literals on leafs and internal nodes labeled with one of the
following logical connectives: conjunction (^), disjunction (_) and exclusive disjunction (‘).
Definition 8 (General Marginal Contribution Network). The coalitional game in the form of
General Marginal Contribution Network is a pair pA,Rq, where A is a set of players, and R is
the set of rules. Rules are of the form of F Ñ V , where F is a Boolean formula.
Ieong and Shoham [2005] obtained positive computational results for Marginal Contribution
Network, where literals are connected only by conjunction (^).
Definition 9 (Marginal Contribution Network). The coalitional game in the form of Marginal
Contribution Network is a pair pA,R˚q, where A is a set of players, and R˚ is the set of rules.
Rules are of the form of F˚ Ñ V , where F˚ is a conjunction of positive or negative literals.
A coalition C is said to meet a given formula F˚ if and only if F˚ evaluates to true when
the values of all Boolean variables that correspond to players in C are set to true, and the
values of all Boolean variables that correspond to players not in C are set to false. We write
C |ù F˚ to mean that C meets F˚. More formally:
C |ù F˚ ðñ @aiPF˚ai P C and @ aiPF˚ai R C
In MC-Nets, if coalition C does not meet any rule then its value is 0. Otherwise, the value of C
is the sum of every V from the rules of which the F˚ are met by C. More formally:
vpCq “
ÿ
R˚QpF˚ÑV qÑV : C|ùF˚
V .
Ieong and Shoham showed that, given an MC-Net representation in which rules are made only
of conjunctions of positive and/or negative literals, the Shapley value can be computed in time
linear in the number of rules. Taking advantage of the additivity property of the Shapley value,
every basic rule can be considered separately as a game on its own. Thus, we need to compute
the Shapley value for a single rule, and based on this we will be able to compute the Shapley
value for the entire game.
Theorem 1. [Ieong and Shoham, 2005] In coalitional game pA,R˚q in whichR˚ consists of a
single rule F˚ Ñ V , where p is the number of positive literals and n is the number of negative
ones, the Shapley value for the player ai P F˚ is:
φSVi “ Vp`p`n
n
˘ ,
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and for a player  aj P N the Shapley value is:
φSVj “ ´Vn`p`n
p
˘ .
Proof. From the Symmetry axiom we know that all players ai P F˚ have the same Shapley
value, because they are indistinguishable. This observation also applies to all players aj P F˚.
In this proof we will use Definition 6. We want to count the number of permutations such that
for the given player ai P F˚ the MCpPpipaiq, aiqq ‰ 0. To satisfy this condition all players
corresponding to positive literals from F˚ must appear before ai and all players corresponding
to negative literals from F˚ after him. Now, we will construct such permutations:
— Let us choose p ` n positions in the sequence of all elements from A. We can do this in` |A|
p`n
˘
ways.
— Than, in the first p chosen positions place all players corresponding to positive literals and in
the last n place all players corresponding to negative literals . The number of such line-ups
is pp´ 1q!n!.
— The remaining players can be arranged in p|A| ´ pp` nqq! ways.
Thus, we have:
φSVi “ 1|A|!
ř
piPΠpAq MCpPpipaiq, aiq
“ 1|A|!
` |A|
p`n
˘pp´ 1q!n!p|A| ´ pp` nqq!V
“ pp´1q!n!pp`nq! V
“ V
ppp`nn q
The proof for aj P N is analogous.

Now, let us consider the game g2 from Example 2 and transform its representation from
characteristic function form to Marginal Contribution Nets. Next, we will compute the Shapley
value based on the above theorem.
Example 4. Firstly, we define the set of rulesR˚ that corresponds to the characteristic function
ν2 form the game g2.
r1 : a2 Ñ 400
r2 : a1 ^ a2 Ñ 200
r3 : a3 ^ a1 ^ a2 Ñ 200
r4 : a1 ^ a2 ^ a3 Ñ 200
Secondly, in order to compute ν2pta1, a2, a3uq we need to iterate through all rules that
this coalition meets. We see that ta1, a2, a3u |ù a2 and ta1, a2, a3u |ù a1 ^ a2 ^ a3, so
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ν2pta1, a2, a3uq “ 400 ` 200 “ 600. In the same manner we can compute the value of any
other coalition. Now, let us consider the Shapley value vector for each game defined by a single
rule.
r1 : p0, 4001p11q , 0q “ p0, 400, 0q
r2 : p 2001p21q ,
´200
1p21q , 0q “ p100,´100, 0q
r3 : p´2002p31q ,
´200
2p31q ,
200
1p32qq “ p´33
1
3
,´331
3
, 662
3
q
r4 : p 2003p30q ,
200
3p30q ,
200
3p30qq “ p66
2
3
, 662
3
, 662
3
q
We sum up all vectors, and we obtain the final solution of this game:
φSV1 “ 0` 100´ 3313 ` 6623 “ 13313
φSV2 “ 400´ 100´ 3313 ` 6623 “ 33313
φSV3 “ 0` 0` 6623 ` 6623 “ 13313
To conclude the above example, we have obtain the same results as in Example 2 but in
order to compute the Shapley value for each player we have performed less operation than
when iterating through all permutations. However, creating rules only with conjunctions is not
an effective way for many games. Thus, in the next section we will introduce more effective
representation of the coalitional games.
2.5. Read-once Marginal Contribution Networks
Many coalitional games can be represented more succinct than with Marginal Contribution
Networks (Definition 8). Elkind et al. 2009a defined a class of rules, called read-once MC-Net
rules, which are considerably more succinct than basic rules, while enjoying similarly attractive
computational properties. The syntax of read-once Boolean formulas is the same as in General
Marginal Contribution Networks, but each literal ai can only appear once. In other words, this
formula is also a binary rooted tree with positive or negative literals on leafs and internal nodes
labeled with one of the following logical connectives: conjunction (^), disjunction (_) and
exclusive disjunction (‘).
Definition 10 (Read-once Marginal Contribution Network). The coalitional game in the
form of Read-once Marginal Contribution Network is a pair pA,Rq, whereA is a set of players,
and R is the set of rules. Rules are of the form of F Ñ V , where F is read-once Boolean
formulas.
Elkind et al. [2009a] proved that, in General Marginal Contribution Networks, where each
literal can appear in a formula many times, the problem of computing the Shapley value is
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intractable (i.e., NP-hard). However, for the read-once Boolean formulas the authors presented
a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the Shapley value.
In Chapter 8 we extend the positive results obtained by Elkind et al. [2009a] to generalized
coalitional games.
2.6. Graph Theory
The notion of a graph (or a network) will play a the key role in this dissertation. These
mathematical entities models many real-life problems from different disciplines, such as
biology, chemistry, or sociology [Barabási, 2003].
Definition 11 (Graph). The simple graph G is a pair pV,Eq, where V “ tv1, v2, . . . v|V |u is
the set of nodes (or vertices), and E “ te1, e2, . . . e|E|u is the set of edges (or links). Edges
e “ pvi, vjq are a two-elements sets of nodes from V .
In the same manner, but with different definition of edge, we define the directed graph.
Definition 12 (Directed graph). The directed graph G is a pair pV,Eq, where V “
tv1, v2, . . . v|V |u is the set of node, and E “ te1, e2, . . . e|E|u is the set of edges. Edges
e “ pvi, vjq are a two-elements ordered pairs of nodes from V .
In such graphs we say that an edge pvi, vjq is directed from the node vi to the node vj .
Definition 13 (Weighted graph). The weighted graph G “ pV,E, λq is a simple/directed
graph, with a function λpv, uq : E Ñ R that evaluates each edge. The value λpeq is called
the wight of an edge e.
A path pst from node s to node t in a graph G is an ordered set pv0, v1, . . . , vnq such
that v0 “ s and vn “ t and pvi, vi`1q P E for all i with 1 ď i ă n. We define the set
of neighbours of a node v and a subset C of nodes by Npviq “ tvj : pvi, vjq P Eu and
NpCq “ ŤviPC NpviqzC, respectively. We refer to the degree of a node v by degpvq “ |Npvq|,
and the degree of a setC as degpCq “ |NpCq|. The distance from a node s to a node t is denoted
by distps, tq and is defined as the size of the shortest path between s and t. The distance between
a node v and a subset of nodes C Ď V is denoted by distpC, vq “ minuPC distpu, vq.
For a further comprehensive introduction to graph theory the reader is kindly referred to the
work by Cormen 2001.
2.7. Centrality Measures
One of the important aspects of research on networks is to determine which nodes and edges
are more critical (or central) to the functioning of the entire network than others. For example,
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one may want to identify the focal hubs in a road network [Schultes and Sanders, 2007], the
most critical functional entities in a protein network [Jeong et al., 2001], or the most influential
people in a social network [Kempe et al., 2003]. To this end, various centrality metrics, such
as degree, closeness, eigenvalue or betweenness, have been extensively studied in the literature.1
Definition 14 (Centrality). For a given graphG “ pV,Eq the classic (also standard) centrality
is a function c : V Ñ R that for each node v P V it determines the importance of this node
measured in real value.
Generally speaking, centrality analysis aims to create a consistent ranking of nodes within
a network. To this end, centrality measures assign a score to each node that in some way
corresponds to the importance of that node given a particular application. Since “importance”
depends on the context of the problem at hand, many different centrality measures have been
developed. The three well-known and widely applied measures introduced by Freeman [1979]
are: degree centrality, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality.
Definition 15 (Degree centrality). For a given graphG “ pV,Eq degree centrality is a function
cd : V Ñ R:
cdpvq “ degpvq
where degpvq is a degree of the node v.
The intuition standing behind this measure is that it reflects the activity of a given node. This
activity can be expressed as a number of friends in social portal, or number of articles published
together with other peers in science collaboration network.
Definition 16 (Betweenness centrality). For a given graphG “ pV,Eq betweenness centrality
is a function cb : V Ñ R:
cbpvq “
ÿ
s‰v‰t
σstpvq
σst
where σst is the number of shortest paths between s and t (if s “ t then σst “ 1), and σstpvq
is the number of shortest paths between s and t passing through a node v (if v P ts, tu then
σstpvq “ 0).2
This measure and its different variants is generally used to indicate the most important nodes
in the process of controlling information flow. For instance it can be used to determine the most
important routers in computer network.
Definition 17 (Closeness centrality). For a given graph G “ pV,Eq closeness centrality is a
function cc : V Ñ R:
ccpvq “
ÿ
s‰v
dps, vq
1 Koschützki et al. [2005] presented an overview of the most important centrality metrics.
2 To deal with unconnected graphs it is assumed that 00 “ 0.
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Figure 2.1: Sample network of 13 nodes
where distps, vq is a distance between nodes s and v.
This centrality has two aspects: one that evaluates the most important nodes in the process of
discrimination of information, and one that evaluates the most independent nodes. For instance,
if we want to construct an efficient network of communication in our company, the CEO should
be in the middle of this structure that his orders would immediately hit the targets. On the
other hand, the person with the lowest closeness centrality is the most independent person,
because the information coming to him from others requires the smallest number of brokers. For
unconnected networks this measure is sometimes presented as a sum of fractions:
ř
s‰v
1
dps,vq .
In the sample network in Figure 2.1, nodes v1 and v2 have degree 5 and, if judged by degree
centrality, these are the most important nodes within the entire network (cdpv1q “ cdpv2q “ 5).
Conversely, closeness centrality focuses on distances among nodes and gives high value to the
nodes that are close to all other nodes. With this measure, node v8 in Figure 2.1 is ranked top
with lowest value ccpv8q “ 22. The last measure—betweenness centrality—considers shortest
paths (i.e., paths that use the minimal number of links) between any two nodes in the network.
The more shortest paths the node belongs to, the more important it is. With this measure,
cbpv2q “ 32 and the node v2 in Figure 2.1 is more important than all the other nodes (including
v1 and v8, which are chosen by other measures as the most important node). Clearly, all these
measures expose different characteristics of a node. Consider, for instance, an epidemiology
application, where the aim is to identify those people (i.e., nodes) in the social network who
have the biggest influence on the spread of the disease and should become a focal point of any
prevention or emergency measures. Here, degree centrality ranks top nodes with the biggest
immediate sphere of influence—their infection would lead to the highest number of adjacent
nodes being exposed to the disease. On the other hand, closeness centrality identifies those
nodes whose infection would lead to the fastest spread of the disease throughout the society.
Finally, betweenness centrality reveals the nodes that play a crucial role in passing the disease
from one person in a network to another.
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2.8. Community Structures
Apart from centrality measures, the other important aspect of networks extensively studied in
literature is their community structure. Intuitively, a community (also called a cluster) is a group
of nodes in a network such that there are comparatively many edges among the nodes within
the group and fewer with nodes outside the group. The communities can be non-overlapping,
which mean that node can belong to only one community, and overlapping. In this dissertation
we focus on non-overlapping communities. The graph divided into communities forms a
community structure.
Definition 18 (Community structure). For a given graphG “ pV,Eq the community structure
CS “ tC1, C2, . . . , Cmu is the partition of the set V , which implies thatH R CS , řCPCS C “ V
and @C1,C2PCSC1 ‰ C2 ùñ C1 X C2 “ H.
Community detection is a key research topic in network analysis [Fortunato, 2010]. It is
relevant to many fields, where graph representations are common, including sociology [Girvan
and Newman, 2002], biology [van Laarhoven and Marchiori, 2012] and computer science
[Misra et al., 2012]. Community detection raises various conceptual question. One such
question is how to evaluate a given division of a network into communities. One of the
prominent method of doing this was introduced by Newman [2006] and is called modularity.
Definition 19 (Modularity). For a given graph G “ pV,Eq and community structure CS “
tC1, C2, . . . , Cmu the modularity is:
QpG,CS q “
ÿ
CPCS
ˆ |EpCq|
|E| ´
´#degpCq
2|E|
¯2˙
, (2.6)
where EpCq “ tpu, vq P E : u, v P Cu, and #degpCq “ řvPC degpvq.
The first term of the above equation is the fraction of edges inside community C and
the second term, in contrast, is the expected fraction of edges in that community under the
assumption that edges were located at random in the network, in which the degrees of nodes
remains unchanged in respect to the original graph.
3. Related Work
In this dissertation we are concerned with computational aspects of game-theoretic centrality
measures. Hence, there are three main bodies of related literature: on centrality measures
(Section 3.1), on game-theoretic centrality measures (Section 3.2), and on computational
aspects of coalitional games (Section 3.3). The related work on the more specific subjects
will be presented in the chapters corresponding to these topics.
3.1. Centrality Measures and Their Classification
Centrality measures constitute one of the main research directions in the literature on network
analysis. In his classic work, Freeman [1979] proposed and formalized three different concepts
of centrality: (i) degree centrality is based on being directly connected to other nodes;
(ii) closeness centrality is based on being close to all other nodes; and (iii) betweenness
centrality is based on lying between other nodes. Importantly, these three centralities are
build upon three conceptually different properties extracted from networks: connections,
distances and geodesics, respectively, and all three can be easily used as a basic ground
for various extensions. To name only the few, Newman [2004] proposed weighted degree
centrality, a appropriate measure of degree for weighted networks, Brandes [2008] introduced
distance-scaled betweenness centrality, and Boldi and Vigna [2013] harmonic centrality, the
extension of closeness one.
The fourth classical measure is eigenvector centrality, which is based on the idea that
connections to more important nodes should be valued more than otherwise equal connections
to less important nodes [Bonacich, 1972]. One of the most known extension of this measure
was proposed by Brin and Page [1998], who proposed famous PageRank metric
The topics closely related to centralities are that of the percolation on complex networks and
social capital. Regarding percolation, Callaway et al. [2000] studied different models of nodes
failures, where each element of the graph have some probability of being disabled. Such studies
gives answer to the problem how a given network is vulnerable to a random node or edge failure.
Here the centralities can be used to determine the most important nodes to protect. Such studies
were done by Holme et al. [2002], who compared degree and betweenness centralities. He
postulated that betweenness centrality is a good basis for strategies of protecting nodes against
random nodes failures.
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The ”social capital” term is much wider than ”centrality” and is is used to describe both “the
value of an individual’s social relationships” [Burt, 1992] and “a quality of groups” [Everett
and Borgatti, 1999] within the society. Borgatti et al. [1998] propose to classify social capital
along two dimensions. The first is whether it concerns individual actor or a group, or whether
we focus on internal or external links (see Table 3.1).
Type of Focus
Type of Node internal external
Individual
(A) (B)
—- standard centrlities [Freeman, 1979]
Group
(C) (D)
centralisation [Freeman, 1979] group centralities [Everett and Borgatti, 1999]
Table 3.1: Classification by Borgatti et al. [1998] of different conceptions (forms) of social
capital (including different centralities), with examples of such measures.
This classification distinguishes three fields of social capital studies (or centrality): (A) in
this category are examined the internal properties of autonomous actors and this is not part
of the studies on social capital nor social networks analysis; (B) in this field the individual
actor is examined in the context of its relations to external world and most standard centralities
belong to this category; (C) in this category the group of actors are studied in the context
of internal relations among them; (D) the last type of social capital is engaged in studying
group of actors and their relationships with external world. For all types of social capital many
different measures have been proposed (see Table 3.1) and most of them the literature refers to
as centralities. Although the three categories of social capital are considered separately, there
are cases where they influence each other. For instance, in situations where actors are divided
into groups, the role of each individual strictly depends on the role of the entire group and the
role of the group simply depends on its members.
Social capital is related to social networks describing people and their relationships.
Centrality measures can be used to analyze any kind of networks.
3.2. Game-theoretic Apporach to Centrality Measures
Game-theoretic centrality is an extension of standard centrality based on cooperative game
theory. The basic idea behind game-theoretic centrality is to consider the nodes of the network
to be a players in a cooperative game, where the payoffs of coalitions are derived from the
network topology. Such an analogy between graph and game theory allows to use various
game-theoretic solution concepts as a centrality measure of individual nodes.1
1 See the next chapter for more details.
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The first author to introduce game-theoretic centrality were Grofman and Owen [1982], who
used the Banzhaf index of power [Banzhaf, 1965]. This is a widely-used solution concept that
quantifies the power of a player by counting the number of coalitions in which this player is a
swing player—a player whose addition to the coalition changes it from being unsuccessful (e.g.,
in achieving some goal) to being successful. Grofman and Owen mapped a simple coalitional
game, a coalitional game where every coalition has a value of 1 or 0, onto a directed graph by
considering paths in the graph to be coalitions. Here, a swing player is a node that is crucial
to maintain communication among the nodes in the path. Then, Grofman and Owen’s Banzhaf
index-based centrality says that the more times a node is a swing node within all possible paths
of nodes, the more important this node is in the entire network.
The game-theoretic centrality were reinvented by Gómez et al. [2003], who proposed a
slightly different approach. Instead of restricting themselves to simple coalitional games, the
authors study arbitrary games where a coalition’s value can be any real number. In this context,
the authors propose a centrality measure based on the two prominent solution concepts: the
Shapley value [Shapley, 1953] and the Myerson value [Myerson, 1977].
The first value is arguably the best normative solution concept known to date, and was
discussed in Section 2.2. The Myerson value is based on graph-restricted games, where the
underlying assumption is that only connected coalitions (i.e., the group of nodes that between
any pair exists a path passing through only members of this group) can communicate and create
any value added. Myerson assumed that the value of disconnected coalition would simply be the
sum of the values of its connected components. A celebrated result of Myerson for this setting is
a dedicated solution concept—closely related to the Shapley value—called the Myerson value.
In fact, it is the Shapley value, but evaluated for the characteristic function sensible to coalitions
connectivity, as was described above.
Taking Shapley value and Myerson value, Gómez et al. [2003] defined the centrality of
a node vi to be the difference between the Shapley value of vi (which is independent of the
network connectedness) and the Myerson value of vi (which takes the network connectedness
into consideration). Thus, by interpreting the Shapley value as a power index in a coalitional
game, Gómez et al.’s Shapley/Myerson-based centrality measure represents the increase (or
decrease) in vi’s power due to its position in the network.
This direction of research took also del Pozo et al. [2011], who proposed a measure for
directed graphs, based on generalised coalitional games [Nowak and Radzik, 1994], where the
value of a coalition is influenced by the sequence in which the players have joined it. More
specifically, the authors adapted these games to networks in the spirit of Myerson and then
based their measure on a parametric family of solution concepts that include two extensions
of the Shapley value to generalised coalitional games: one by Nowak and Radzik [1994] and
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the other by Sánchez and Bergantiños [1999]. In a similar spirit, Amer et al. [2007] defined a
game-theoretic centrality measure called accessibility in oriented networks.
A computational study of game-theoretic centrality measures based on connectivity games
on networks (inspired by Myerson) was done in Chapter 7. We showed that the efficient
computation of the Shapley value is impossible even in the case of a very simple definition
of the connectivity game on graph. We also proposed algorithm that significantly improve
the computation of such game-theoretic centrality measures. We need to mention that our
algorithm was further improved by Skibski et al. [2014] and modified and applied to analyze
social networks by Narayanam et al. [2014].
All the above works are inspired in one way or the other by the graph-restricted games in
the spirit of Myerson [1977], where the value of a group of nodes is mainly determined by
connectedness of this group.
This dissertation contributes to a parallel stream of literature in which coalitions of nodes
are not graph-restricted, i.e., their values do not depend directly on whether they are connected
or not. The origins of this approach can be traced back to the concept of group centrality
introduced by Everett and Borgatti [1999] which takes into account synergies among nodes.
By computing group centrality for every possible group of nodes (not necessarily connected)
we obtain a well-defined coalitional game. Next, one can apply a solution concept, such as the
Shapley value or the Banzhaf index, to evaluate each individual nodes. Such evaluation attribute
synergies to individual nodes, that were captured by group centrality measure.
The measure that captured the ability of nodes to dominate other nodes in directed networks
was proposed by van den Brink and Borm [2002]. The authors do not refer to their measure as
centrality, but from the social network analysis perspective it is. van den Brink and Gilles [2000]
continue this line of research by analysing these measures more deeply and, more importantly,
by providing an axiomatic approach to them. These are the first works to use general Shapley
value approach to game-theoretic centralities.
This second line of research was also used by Suri and Narahari [2010] in the interesting
application of influence propagation in networks. Specifically, the authors constructed a
coalitional game by assigning to coalitions payoffs equal to their group degree. Then, the
authors used the Shapley value to approximate the solution of the top k-node problem, i.e.,
the problem of identifying the k most influential nodes in the network. This approach was
followed up by Adamczewski et al. [2014], who studied different versions of group degree.
3.3. Computational Aspects of Coalitional Games – Representations
Let us now turn our attention to the computational issues. In more detail, the computational
challenges related to the game-theoretic solution concepts that are tackled in this dissertation
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have been extensively studied in the literature on algorithmic aspects of coalitional games. Since
the path-breaking work by Deng and Papadimitriou [1994], a considerable attention has been
paid to developing more efficient representations of games. Such representation can be divided
into two main categories [Wooldridge and Dunne, 2006].
The first category, to which also this dissertation indirectly contributes, models the
characteristic function using specific combinatorial structures such as graphs. This line of
research include works by Deng and Papadimitriou [1994], Greco et al. [2009], Wooldridge
and Dunne [2006], and the representations discussed by Aziz and de Keijzer [2011]. Such
representations are guaranteed to be succinct, however they can express only certain games. In
our case, the characteristic function is the function of the group betweenness centrality.
In the second category of representations the emphasis is placed on full expressiveness, often
at the expense of succinctness. These representations include MC-Nets [Ieong and Shoham,
2005], its read-once extension [Elkind et al., 2009b], Synergy Coalition Groups [Conitzer and
Sandholm, 2006], the Decision-Diagrams-based representations [Aadithya et al., 2011, Sakurai
et al., 2011], the vector-based representation [Tran-Thanh et al., 2013], and the representation
for graph-restricted weighted voting games [Skibski et al., 2015] .
We note that even for some succinctly representable games, computing the Shapley value
and other game-theoretic solution concepts can be challenging (NP-Hard or even #P-Complete).
This is the case with weighted voting games [Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994], threshold network
flow games [Bachrach and Rosenschein, 2009] and minimum spanning tree games [Nagamochi
et al., 1997]. Also Aziz et al. [2009] proved negative results for the Shapley-Shubik power
index for the spanning connectivity games on multigraphs, and Bachrach et al. [2008] for the
Banzhaf index for certain class of connectivity games.
Perhaps the most widely known positive results are those aforementioned due to Deng and
Papadimitriou [1994] and Ieong and Shoham [2005]. In particular, Deng and Papadimitriou
proposed a representation based on graphs, weighted edges of which represent the marginal
contribution of both adjacent nodes (agents) to any coalition they belong to. While this
representation is clearly not fully expressive, the Shapley value can be computed in time linear
in the size of the graph. The representation of Ieong and Shoham [2005] consists of a finite set
of logical rules of the following form: Boolean Expression Ñ Real Number, where agents are
represented by atomic boolean variables (see Definition 9). The value of a coalition is equal to
the sum of the Real Numbers in those rules whose that are satisfied by the coalition. Unlike
the representation by Deng and Papadimitriou, the representation by Ieong and Shoham is fully
expressive and, for certain types of Boolean Expressions, it allows for the Shapley value to be
computed in time linear in the size of the representation.
The number of authors proposed alternative representations of coalitional games: coalitional
skill games [Bachrach and Rosenschein, 2008] or synergy coalitional groups [Aadithya et al.,
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2011], which allow for representing input compactly for certain games and admit algorithms
(e.g. for computing the Shapley value) that run in polynomial time in the size of such a compact
input. Finally, one can find in the literature the representation of the extension of coalitional
games to games with externalities [Michalak et al., 2009, 2010].
4. Polynomial Algorithms for Game-theoretic
Centrality Measures
The Shapley value has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks.
However, although this approach has a variety of real-world applications (including social and
organisational networks, biological networks and communication networks), its computational
properties have not been widely studied. To date, the only practicable approach to compute
Shapley value-based centrality has been via Monte Carlo simulations which are computationally
expensive and not guaranteed to give an exact answer. Against this background, in this
chapter we present the study of the computational aspects of the Shapley value for network
centralities. Specifically, we develop exact analytical formulae for Shapley value-based
centrality in both weighted and unweighted networks and develop efficient (polynomial time)
and exact algorithms based on them. We empirically evaluate these algorithms on two real-life
examples (an infrastructure network representing the topology of the Western States Power Grid
and a collaboration network from the field of astrophysics) and demonstrate that they deliver
significant speedups over the Monte Carlo approach. For instance, in the case of unweighted
networks our algorithms are able to return the exact solution about 1600 times faster than the
Monte Carlo approximation, even if we allow for a generous 10% error margin for the latter
method.
Against this background, in this chapter we present the study of the computational aspects
of the Shapley value for network centralities. Specifically, we develop exact analytical formulae
for Shapley value-based centrality in both weighted and unweighted networks and develop
efficient (polynomial time) and exact algorithms based on them. We empirically evaluate these
algorithms on two real-life examples (an infrastructure network representing the topology of
the Western States Power Grid and a collaboration network from the field of astrophysics) and
demonstrate that they deliver significant speedups over the Monte Carlo approach. For instance,
in the case of unweighted networks our algorithms are able to return the exact solution about
1600 times faster than the Monte Carlo approximation, even if we allow for a generous 10%
error margin for the latter method.
The contribution of the author of this dissertation mostly covers the experimental part of this
article. More specifically, Algorithms 1-5 were developed by Karthik Aaditha, and formalized
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together with the author of this thesis. The Propositions 1 and 2 were proved by the author of
this thesis. Also Algorithms 6-10 were developed by the author of this thesis.
4.1. Why Use Game-Theoretic Centrality Measures?
In many network applications, it is important to chose which nodes and edges are the most
important. To this end, the concept of centrality (see Section 2.7), which aims to quantify
the importance of individual nodes/edges, has been extensively studied in the literature
[Koschützki et al., 2005, Brandes and Erlebach, 2005].
v1 v7 v2
v4
v5
v6
v8
v9
v10
v3
Figure 4.1: Sample network of 10 nodes
Generally speaking, centrality analysis aims to create a consistent ranking of nodes within
a network. To this end, centrality measures assign a score to each node that in some way
corresponds to the importance of that node given a particular application. Since “importance”
depends on the context of the problem at hand, many different centrality measures have been
developed. Three of the most well-known that were introduced in Section 2.7: degree centrality,
closeness centrality and betweenness centrality. Recall that we refer to these measures as
classic/standard centralities (Definition 14).
The common feature of all standard measures is that they assess the importance of a node
by focusing only on the role that a node plays by itself. However, in many applications such
an approach is inadequate because of synergies that may occur if the functioning of nodes is
considered in groups. Referring to Figure 4.1 and epidemiology example, a vaccination of
individual node v6 (or v7 or v8) would not prevent the spread of the disease from the left to the
right part of the network (or vice versa). However, the simultaneous vaccination of v6, v7 and
v8 would achieve this goal. Thus, in this particular context, nodes v6, v7 and v8 do not play any
significant role individually, but together they do. To quantify the importance of such groups of
nodes, the notion of group centrality was introduced by Everett and Borgatti [1999]. Intuitively,
group centrality works broadly the same way as standard centrality, but now the focus is on the
functioning of a given group of nodes, rather than individual nodes. For instance, in Figure 4.1,
the group degree centrality of tv1, v2u is 7 as they both have 7 distinct adjacent nodes.
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Although the concept of group centrality addresses the issue of synergy between the
functions is played by various nodes, it suffers from a fundamental deficiency. It focuses on
particular, a priori determined, groups of nodes and it is not clear how to construct a consistent
ranking of individual nodes using such group results. Specifically, should the nodes from the
most valuable group be ranked top? Or should the most important nodes be those which belong
to the group with the highest average value per node? Or should we focus on the nodes which
contribute most to every coalition they join? In fact, there are very many possibilities to choose
from.
A framework that does address this issue is the game theoretic network centrality measure.
In more detail, it allows the consistent ranking of individual nodes to be computed in a way that
accounts for various possible synergies occurring within possible groups of nodes [Grofman
and Owen, 1982, Gómez et al., 2003]. Specifically, the concept builds upon cooperative game
theory—a part of game theory in which agents (or players) are allowed to form coalitions
in order to increase their payoffs in the game. Now, one of the fundamental questions in
cooperative game theory is how to distribute the surplus achieved by cooperation among the
agents. To this end, Shapley proposed to remunerate agents with payoffs that correspond to
their individual marginal contributions to the game (Definition 5). In more detail, for a given
agent, such an individual marginal contribution is measured as the weighted average marginal
increase in the payoff of any coalition that this agent could potentially join. Shapley famously
proved that his concept—known since then as the Shapley value—is the only division scheme
that meets certain desirable normative properties. Given this, the key idea of the game theoretic
network centrality is to define a cooperative game over a network in which agents are the
nodes, coalitions are the groups of nodes, and payoffs of coalitions are defined so as to meet
requirements of a given application. This means that the Shapley value of each agent in such a
game can then be interpreted as a centrality measure because it represents the average marginal
contribution made by each node to every coalition of the other nodes.1. In other words, the
Shapley value answers the question of how to construct a consistent ranking of individual nodes
once groups of nodes have been evaluated.
In more detail, the Shapley value-based approach to centrality is, on one hand, much more
sophisticated than the conventional measures, as it accounts for any group of nodes from which
the Shapley value derives a consistent ranking of individual nodes. On the other hand, it confers
a high degree of flexibility as the cooperative game over a network can be defined in a variety
of ways. This means that many different versions of Shapley value-based centrality can be
developed depending on the particular application under consideration, as well as on the features
of the network to be analyzed. As a prominent example, in which a specific Shapley value-based
1 We note that other division schemes or power indices from cooperative game theory can also serve as a good
solution.
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centrality measure is developed that is crafted to a particular application, consider the work of
Suri and Narahari [2010] who study the problem of selecting the top-k nodes in a social network.
This problem is relevant in all those applications where the key issue is to choose a group of
nodes that together have the biggest influence on the entire network. These include, for example,
the analysis of co-authorship networks, the diffusion of information, and viral marketing. As a
new approach to this problem, Suri and Narahari define a cooperative game in which the value
of any group of nodes is equal to the number of nodes within, and adjacent to, the group. In
other words, it is assumed that the agents’ sphere of influence reaches the immediate neighbors
of the group. Whereas the definition of the game is a natural extension of the (group) degree
centrality discussed above, the Shapley value of nodes in this game constitutes a new centrality
metric that is, arguably, qualitatively better than standard degree centrality as far as the node’s
influence is concerned. The intuition behind it is visible even in our small network in Figure
4.1. In terms of influence, node v1 is more important than v2, because it is the only node that is
connected to v4 and v5. Without v1 it is impossible to influence v3 and v4, while each neighbor of
v2 is accessible from some other node. Thus, unlike standard degree centrality, which evaluates
v1 and v2 equally, the centrality based on the Shapley value of the game defined bySuri and
Narahari recognizes this difference in influence and assigns a higher value to v1 than to v2.
Unfortunately, despite the advantages of Shapley value-based centrality over conventional
approaches, efficient algorithms to compute it have not yet been developed. Indeed, given a
network GpV,Eq, where V is the set of nodes and E the set of edges, using the original Shapley
value formula involves computing the marginal contribution of every node to every coalition
which is Op2|V |q. Such an exponential computation is clearly prohibitive for bigger networks
(of, e.g, 100 or 1000 nodes). For such networks, the only feasible approach currently outlined in
the literature is Monte-Carlo sampling [Suri and Narahari, 2010, Castro et al., 2009]. However,
this method is not only inexact, but can be also very time-consuming (see Section 4.4).
The computational challenges are hard to overcome, but fortunately in this dissertation
we develop the number of algorithms allowing to compute game-theoretic centralities in
polynomial time.
4.2. General Definition of Game-Theoretic Network Centrality
In this section we provide the formal definitions of group centralities and game-theoretic
network centralities.
In order to formalize the game-theoretic network centrality firstly we need to define the
group centralities. These measured introduced by Everett and Borgatti [1999] are the natural
extension of standard centralities (Section 2.7) to evaluate group of nodes. Everett and Borgatti
introduced three requirements that group centrality should meet. Firstly, these metrics should
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be build upon existing concepts of centralities. Secondly, the group centrality applied to the
group containing a single individual should yield the same result as standard centrality of this
individual. Finally, the group centrality must stem from the relationships between individuals,
not between groups. In other words, the value of the group C Ď V of nodes is an intrinsic
property of this group and its relationships, and the other group of nodes has no impact on it as
long as the relationships of C are not changed.
Definition 20 (Group centrality). For a given graph G “ pV,Eq the group centrality is a
function cg : 2V Ñ R that for each subset of nodes C Ď V determines the importance of this
group measured in real value.
Now, the extension of degree, centrality (Definition 15) is:
Definition 21 (Group degree centrality). For a given graph G “ pV,Eq and a group of nodes
C Ď V group degree centrality is a function cgd : 2V Ñ R:
cgdpCq “ degpCq
where degpCq is a degree of the set C (see Section 2.6).
The extension of betweenness centrality (Definition 16) is:
Definition 22 (Group betweenness centrality). The group betweenness centrality of the set of
nodes C Ď V is defined as a function cgb : 2V Ñ R such that:
cgbpCq “
ÿ
sRC
tRC
σstpCq
σst
,
where σstpCq is the number of shortest paths from s to t passing through at least one vertex in
C (if s P C or t P C then σstpSq “ 0), and σst is the number of all shortest paths between s
and t.
Eventually, the extension of closeness centrality (Definition 17) is defined as follows:
Definition 23 (Group closeness centrality). For a given graph G “ pV,Eq and a group of
nodes C Ď V closeness centrality is a function cgc : 2V Ñ R:
cgcpCq “
ÿ
sRC
dpC, sq
where distpC, sq is a distance between group C and node s (see Section 2.6).
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In this dissertation, we will be looking at cooperative games on graphs, with the set of
players V for some pV,Eq “ G P G , where G is an infinite set of all graphs.2 A coalition
of players C will simply be any subset of C Ď V . The characteristic function, νG P VG, will
be any function νG : 2V pGq Ñ R, but in this work we focus on the group centralities, so
we have νG “ cg. For the purposes of defining a cooperative game on any network, we will
systematically associate characteristic functions with graphs through representation functions.
Definition 24 (Representation function). A representation function is a function ψ : G Ñ VG
that maps every graph G “ pV,Eq onto a cooperative game pN, νGq P VG with N “ V .
Now, solution concepts like Shapley value can be used in the network setting by applying
them to the characteristic function that a network represents.
Definition 25 (Game-theoretic centrality measure). Formally, we define a game-theoretic
centrality measure as a pair pψ, φq consisting of a representation function ψ and a solution
concept φ.
Example 5. Let us consider a game-theoretic centrality measure pψB, φSV q. We say that ψB
is a representation function since it associates a coalitional game with any graph G “ pV,Eq,
i.e. every graph represents a cooperative game. We have ψBpGq “ pV, νGq, where V is the
set of nodes and νG : 2V Ñ R is the characteristic function. Let νG be the ranking of groups
of nodes in G based on group betweenness centrality. In other words, ψB is simply the group
betweenness cgb centrality for any graph. For a specific graph G, the importance of each node
u P V according to pψB, φSV q is evaluated by the Shapley value of the game ψBpGq, i.e.
φSV pνGq. Since we started off with a well-known centrality measure (betweenness centrality)
and applied a game-theoretic solution concept to it (the Shapley value), we call the resulting
centrality measure a game-theoretic extension of betweenness centrality, or the Shapley-value
based betweenness centrality.
The algorithms presented in the next section are designed for the generalization of the
following two game-theoretic centralities.
Definition 26 (Shapley-value based degree centrality). Shapley-value based degree centrality
is a pair pψD, φSV q consisting of a representation function ψDpGq “ cgd that maps each graph
to the game with group degree centrality and a Shapleu value solution concept φSV .
Definition 27 (Shapley-value based closeness centrality). Shapley-value based closeness
centrality is a pair pψC , φSV q consisting of a representation function ψCpGq “ cgc that
maps each graph to the game with group closeness centrality and a Shapleu value solution
concept φSV .
2 The graphs can be simple, weighted, or directed, it will depend on the context.
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4.3. The Algorithms
In this section, we present five characteristic function formulations, each designed to convey
a specific centrality notion. These games are a generalizations of Shapley-value based degree
centrality and Shapley-value based closeness centrality.
We need to clarify one important aspect of group centralities. From the Definitions 21
and 23 we see that for each graph G “ pV,Eq we have cgdpV q “ cgcpV q “ 0. However,
in the four games g1,g2, g3 and g5 being under consideration in this chapter we slightly modify
Definition 21 and assume that for each coalitionC Ď V group degree centrality is: cgdpCq`|C|.
This assumptions were made in order to catch the intuition that the value of coalition C is in
fact the size of the ’sphere of influence’ made by this coalition on the network. The coalition
C is expected to make influence on all its members. So, the five games analyzed in this section
are:
g1 In this game the value of coalition C is a function of its own size and of the number of
nodes that are immediately reachable from C. It is simply the Shapley-value based degree
centrality.
g2 In this game the value of coalition C is a function of its own size and of the number of nodes
that are immediately reachable in at least k different ways from C. This game is inspired
by Bikhchandani et al. [1992] and is an instance of the general threshold model introduced
by Kempe et al. [2005]. It has a natural interpretation: an agent “becomes influenced” (with
ideas, information, marketing message, etc.) only if at least k of his neighbors have already
become influenced.
g3 This game concerns weighted graphs (unlike g1 and g2). Here, the value of coalition C
depends on its size and on the set of all nodes within a cutoff distance of C, as measured by
the shortest path lengths on the weighted graph.
g4 This game generalizes g3 by allowing the value of C to be an arbitrary non-increasing
function fp.q of the distance between C and the other nodes in the network. The intuition
here is that the coalition has more influence on closer nodes than on those further away—a
property that cannot be expressed with the standard closeness centrality. Thus, g4 is the
Shapley-value based closeness centrality.
g5 The last game is an extension of g2 to the case of weighted networks. Here, the value of C
depends on the adjacent nodes that are connected to the coalition with weighted edges whose
sum exceeds a given threshold wcutoff (recall that in g2 this threshold is defined simply by
the integer k). Whereas in g3 and g4 weights on edges are interpreted as distance, in g5 they
should be interpreted as a power of influence.
The relationships among all five games are graphically presented in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Euler diagram showing the relationships among all five games considered in this
chapter. Specifically, game g2 generalizes g1; g3 generalizes g1 and is further generalized by
g4; g5 generalizes g2. Finally, we note that there are certain instances of games that can be
represented as g3, g4 and g5.
The computation of the Shapley value for each of the above five games (see Table 4.1 for an
overview) is the main focus of the paper by Michalak et al. [2013a]. In this dissertation we skip
the technical part of constructing algorithms, and instead of this, for each game we present the
extensive evaluation.
4.3.1. Shapley Value-Based Degree Centrality
Let GpV,Eq be an unweighted, undirected network. The characteristic function is defined as:
ψ1pGqpCq “ ν1pCq “ νgdpCq ` |C|
.
The above game was applied by Suri and Narahari [2010] to find out influential nodes in
social networks and it was shown to deliver very promising results concerning the target set
selection problem (see Kempe et al. [2003]). It is therefore desired to compute the Shapley
values of all nodes for this game. We shall now present an exact algorithm for this computation
rather than obtaining results through Monte Carlo simulation as was done by Suri and Narahari.
In more detail, to evaluate the Shapley value of node v, consider all possible permutations
of the nodes in which v would make a positive marginal contribution to the coalition of nodes
occurring before itself. Let the set of nodes occurring before node v in a random permutation of
nodes be denoted Ppipvq. Let the neighbours of node v in the graph GpV,Eq be denoted Npvq
and the degree of node v be denoted degpvq.
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Game Graph Value of a coalition C, i.e., νpCq Complexity Accuracy
g1 UW νpCq is the number of nodes in C and Op|V | ` |E|q exact
those immediately reachable from C
g2 UW νpCq is the number of nodes in C and Op|V | ` |E|q exact
those immediately reachable from C,
but via at least k different edges
g3 W νpCq is the number of nodes in C and Op|V ||E| ` |V |2log|V |q exact
those not further than dcutoff away
g4 W νpCq is the sum of fp.q’s — the non- Op|V ||E| ` |V |2log|V |q exact
-increasing functions of the distance
between C and other nodes
g5 W νpCq is the number of nodes in C and Op|V ||E|q approx.
those directly connected to C via edges „ 5-10%
which sum of weights exceeds Wcutoff
Table 4.1: Games considered in this dissertation and our results (UW denotes unweighted
graphs and W weighted).
The key question to ask is: what is the necessary and sufficient condition for node v to
marginally contribute node u P Npvq Y tvu to fringepPpipvqq? Clearly, this happens if and only
if neither u nor any of its neighbours are present in Ppipvq. Formally, pNpuqYtvuqXPpipvq “ H.
Now we are going to show that the above condition holds with probability 1
1`degpuq .
Proposition 1. The probability that in a random permutation none of the vertices from Npuq Y
tuu occurs before v, where v and u are neighbours, is 1
1`degpuq .
Proof. We need to count the number of permutations that satisfy:
@nPpNpvqYtuuqpipvq ă pipnq. (4.1)
To this end:
— Let us choose |pNpuq Y tuu| positions in the sequence of all elements from V . We can do
this in
` |V |
1`degpuq
˘
ways.
— Then, in the last degpuq chosen positions, place all elements from pNpuq Y tuuqztvu.
Directly before these, place the element v. The number of such line-ups is pdegpuqq!.
— The remaining elements can be arrange in p|V | ´ p1` degpuqq! different ways.
All in all, the number of permutations satisfying condition (4.1) is:
` |V |
1`degpuq
˘pdegpuqq!p|V | ´ p1` degpuqq! “ |V |!
1`degpuq ;
thus, the probability that one of such permutations is randomly chosen is 1
1`degpuq . 
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Algorithm 1: Computing the Shapley value for Game 1
Input: Unweighted graph GpV,Eq
Output: Shapley values of all nodes in V for game g1
1 foreach v P V do
2 φSVv “ 11`degpvq ;
3 foreach u P Npvq do
4 φSVv ` “ 11`degpuq ;
5 end
6 end
7 return φSV ;
It is possible to derive some intuition from the above algorithm. If a node has a high
degree, the number of terms in its Shapley value summation above is also high. But the terms
themselves will be inversely related to the degree of neighboring nodes. This gives the intuition
that a node will have high centrality not only when its degree is high, but also whenever its
degree tends to be higher in comparison to the degree of its neighboring nodes. In other words,
power comes from being connected to those who are powerless, a fact that is well-recognized
by the centrality literature [Bonacich, 1987]. Following the same reasoning, we can also easily
predict how dynamic changes to the network, such as adding or removing an edge, would
influence the Shapley value.3 Adding an edge between a powerful and a powerless node will
add even more power to the former and will decrease the power of the latter. Naturally, removing
an edge would have the reverse effect.
Algorithm 1 cycles through all nodes and through their neighbours, so its running time is
Op|V | ` |E|q.
Finally, we note that Algorithm 1 can be adopted to directed graphs with a couple of simple
modifications. Specifically, in order to capture how many nodes we can access a given node
from, the degree of a node should be replaced with indegree. Furthermore, a set of neighbours
of a given node v should consist of those nodes to which an edge is directed from v.
4.3.2. Shapley Value-Based k-influence Degree Centrality
We now consider a more general game formulation for an unweighted graphGpV,Eq, where the
value of a coalition includes the number of agents that are either in the coalition or are adjacent
to at least k agents who are in the coalition. Formally, we consider game g2 characterised by
ν2 : 2
V pGq Ñ R, where
3 Many real-life networks are in fact dynamic and the challenge of developing fast streaming algorithms has
recently attracted considerable attention in the literature [Lee et al., 2012].
45
Algorithm 2: Computing the Shapley value for Game 2
Input: Unweighted graph GpV,Eq, positive integer k
Output: Shapley value of all nodes in V for game g2
1 foreach v P V do
2 φSVv “ minp1, k1`degpvqq;
3 foreach u P Npvq do
4 φSVv ` “ maxp0, degpuq´k`1degpuqp1`degpuqqq;
5 end
6 end
7 return φSV ;
ψ2pGqpCq “ ν2pCq “
$&%0 if C “ H|tv : v P C (or) |Npvq X C| ě ku| otherwise.
The second game is an instance of the General Threshold Model that has been widely studied
in the literature [Kempe et al., 2005, Granovetter, 1978]. Intuitively, in this model each node can
become active if a monotone activation function reaches some threshold. The instance of this
problem has been proposed by Goyal et al. [2010], where the authors introduced a method of
learning influence probabilities in social networks (from users’ action logs). However, in many
realistic situations much less information is available about a network so it is not possible to
assess specific probabilities with which individual nodes become active. Consequently, much
simpler models are studied. Bikhchandani et al. [1992], for instance, “consider a teenager
deciding whether or not to try drugs. A strong motivation for trying out drugs is the fact
that friends are doing so. Conversely, seeing friends reject drugs could help persuade the
teenager to stay clean”. This situation is modelled by the second game; the threshold for each
node is k and the activation function is fpSq “ |S|. Another example is viral marketing or
innovation diffusion analysis. Again, in this application, it is often assumed that an agent will
“be influenced” only if at least k of his neighbors have already been convinced by Valente
[1996]. Note that this game reduces to game g1 for k “ 1.
Although this game is a generalization of game g1, it can still be solved to obtain the Shapley
values of all nodes in Op|V | ` |E|q time, as formalised by Algorithm 2.
An even more general formulation of the game is possible by allowing k to be a function
of the agent, i.e., each node v P V is assigned its own unique attribute kpvq. This translates to
an application of the form: agent i is convinced if and only if at least kv of his neighbors are
convinced, which is a frequently used model in the literature [Valente, 1996].
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The above argument does not use the fact that k is constant across all nodes. So this
generalized formulation can be solved by a simple modification to the original Shapley value
expression:
SV pvq “ kpvq
1` degpvq `
ÿ
uPNpvq
1` degpuq ´ kpuq
degpuqp1` degpuqq .
The above equation (which is also implementable in Op|V | ` |E|q time) assumes that
kpvq ď 1`degpvq for all nodes v P V . This condition can be assumed without loss of generality
because all cases can still be modelled (we set kpvq “ 1 ` degpvq for the extreme case where
node v is never convinced no matter how many of its neighbors are already convinced).
Finally, we note that Algorithm 2 can be adapted to a case of directed graphs along the same
lines as Algorithm 1.
4.3.3. Shapley Value-Based dcutoff -distance Degree Centrality
Hitherto, our games have been confined to unweighted networks. But in many applications, it is
necessary to model real-world networks as weighted graphs. For example, in the co-authorship
network mentioned in the introduction, each edge is often assigned a weight proportional to the
number of joint publications the corresponding authors have produced [Newman, 2001].
This subsection extends game g1 to the case of weighted networks. Whereas game g1
equates νpCq to the number of nodes located within one hop of some node inC, our formulation
in this subsection equates νpCq to the number of nodes located within a distance dcutoff of some
node in C. Here, distance between two nodes is measured as the length of the shortest path
between the nodes in the given weighted graph G “ pV,E, λq (see Definition 13)
Formally, we define game g3, where for each coalition C Ď V pGq,
ψ3pGqpCq “ ν3pCq “
$&%0 if C “ H|tv : distpC, uq ď dcutoff u| otherwise.
Clearly, g3 can be used in all the settings where g1 is applicable; for instance, in the
diffusion of information in social networks or to analyse research collaboration networks [Suri
and Narahari, 2010]. Moreover, as a more general game, g3 provides additional modelling
opportunities. For instance, Suri and Narahari suggest that a “more intelligent” way for sieving
nodes in the neighbourhood would improve their algorithm for solving the target selection
problem (top-k problem). Now, g3 allows us to define a different cutoff distance for each node
in Suri and Narahari’s setting. Furthermore, g3 is a specific case of the more general model g4
which will be discussed in next subsection.
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Algorithm 3: Computing the Shapley value for Game 3
Input: Weighted graph G “ pV,E, λq, dcutoff ą 0
Output: Shapley value of all nodes in G for game g3
1 foreach v P V pGq do
2 DistanceVector D = Dijkstra(v,G);
3 extNeighbors(v) =H; extDegree(v) = 0;
4 foreach u P V pGq such that u ‰ v do
5 if Dpuq ď dcutoff then
6 extNeighbors(v).push(u);
7 extDegree(v)++;
8 end
9 end
10 end
11 foreach v P V pGq do
12 φSVv “ 11`extDegreepvq ;
13 foreach u P extNeighborspvq do
14 φSVv ` “ 11`extDegreepuq ;
15 end
16 end
17 return φSV ;
Before we propose an algorithm, we need to introduce some extra notation. Define the
extended neighborhood Npv, dcutoff q “ tu ‰ v : distpv, uq ď dcutoff u, i.e., the set of all nodes
whose distance from v is at most dcutoff . Denote the size of NGpv, dcutoff q by degpv, dcutoff q.
Algorithm 3 works as follows: for each node v in the network GpV,Eq, the extended
neighborhood Npv, dcutoff q and its size degpv, dcutoff q are first computed using Dijkstra’s
algorithm in Op|E| ` |V |log|V |q time [Cormen, 2001]. The results are then used to compute
Shapley value, which takes maximum time Op|V |2q. In practice this step runs much faster
because the worst case situation only occurs when every node is reachable from every other
node within dcutoff . Overall the complexity is Op|V ||E| ` |V |2log|V |q.
Furthermore, to deal with directed graphs we need to redefine the notion of extDegree and
extNeighbors for a given node u in Algorithm 3. The former will be the number of vertices
from which the distance to u is smaller than, or equal to, dcutoff . The latter will be the set of
nodes whose distance from u is at most dcutoff .
Finally, we make the observation that the the above algorithm does not depend on dcutoff
being constant across all nodes. Indeed, each node v P V pGq may be assigned its own unique
value dcutoff pvq, where νpCq would be the number of agents v who are within a distance
dcutoff pvq from C. For this case, the above proof gives:
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φSVv “
ÿ
u:distpv,uq
ďdcutoff puq
1
1` degpu, dcutoff puqq .
4.3.4. Shapley Value-Based Closeness Centrality
This subsection further generalizes game g3, again taking motivation from real-life network
problems. In game g3, all agents at distances dagent ď dcutoff contributed equally to the value of
a coalition. However, this assumption may not always hold true because in some applications
we intuitively expect agents closer to a coalition to contribute more to its value. For instance,
we expect a Facebook user to exert more influence over his immediate circle of friends than over
“friends of friends”, even though both may satisfy the dcutoff criterion. Similarly, we expect a
virus-affected computer to infect a neighboring computer more quickly than a computer two
hops away.
In general, we expect that an agent at distance d from a coalition would contribute fpdq to
its value, where fp.q is a positive valued decreasing function of its argument. More formally,
we define game g4, where the value of a coalition C is given by:
ψ4pGqpCq “ ν4pCq “
$&%0 if C “ Hř
vPV fpdistpC, vqq otherwise.
In the case of Shapley value-based closeness centrality, the key question to ask is: what is
the expected value of the marginal contribution of v through node u ‰ v to the value of coalition
Ppipvq? Let this marginal contribution be denoted MCpv, uq. Clearly:
MCpv, uq “
$&%0 if distpv, uq ě distpu, Ppipvqqfpdistpv, uqq ´ fpdistpu, Ppipvqqq otherwise.
Let Du “ td1, d2...d|V |´1u be the distances of node u from all other nodes in the network,
sorted in increasing order. Let the nodes corresponding to these distances be tw1, w2...w|V |´1u,
respectively. Let kvu` 1 be the number of nodes (out of these |V | ´ 1) whose distances to u are
ď distancepv, uq. Let wkvu`1 “ v (i.e., among all nodes that have the same distance from u as
v, v is placed last in the increasing order).
We use literal wi to mean wi P Ppipvq and the literal wi to mean wi R Ppipvq. Define a
sequence of boolean variables pk “ u^ w1 ^ w2 ^ ...^ wk for each 0 ď k ď |V | ´ 1. Finally
denote expressions of the form MCpv, u|F q to mean the marginal contribution of v to Ppipvq
through u given that the coalition Ppipvq satisfies the boolean expression F .
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MCpv, u|pkvu`1 ^ wkvu`2q “ fpdkvu`1q ´ fpdkvu`2q,
MCpv, u|pkvu`2 ^ wkvu`3q “ fpdkvu`1q ´ fpdkvu`3q,
...
...
...
MCpv, u|p|V |´2 ^ w|V |´1q “ fpdkvu`1q ´ fpd|V |´1q,
MCpv, u|p|V |´1q “ fpdkvu`1q.
With this notation, we obtain expressions forMCpv, uq by splitting over the above mutually
exclusive and exhaustive (i.e., covering all possible non-zero marginal contributions) cases.
Now, we need to determine the probability of Prppk ^ wk`1q.
Proposition 2. The probability that in a random permutation none of the nodes from
tvj, w1, . . . , wku occur before vi and the node wk`1 occurs before vi is 1pk`1qpk`2q .
Proof. Let us count the number of permutations that satisfy:
@vPtvj ,w1,...,wkupipvq ă pipvq ^ pipv ă pipwk`1q. (4.2)
To this end:
— Let us choose |tvj, w1, . . . , wku Y tuu Y twk`1u| positions in the sequence of all elements
from V . We can do this in
` |V |
k`3
˘
ways.
— Then, in the last k ` 1 chosen positions, we place all elements from tvj, w1, . . . , wku.
Directly before these, we place the element v, and then vertex wk`1 . The number of such
line-ups is pk ` 1q!.
— The remaining elements can be arrange in p|V | ´ pk ` 3q! different ways.
Thus, the number of permutations satisfying (4.2) is:
` |V |
k`3
˘pk ` 1q!p|V | ´ pk ` 3qq! “ |V |!pk`1qpk`2q ,
and the probability that one of such permutations is randomly chosen is 1pk`1qpk`2q . 
With the above proposition we find that:
Prppk ^ wk`1q 1pk ` 1qpk ` 2q @ 1` kvu ď k ď |V | ´ 2.
Using the MCpv, uq equations and the probabilities Prppk ^ wk`1q:
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Algorithm 4: Computing the Shapley value for Game 4
Input: Weighted graph G “ pV,E, λq, function f : R` Ñ R`
Output: Shapley value of all nodes in G for game g4
1 Initialise: @v P V pGq set φSVv “ 0;
2 foreach v P V pGq do
3 [Distances D, Nodes w] = Dijkstra(v,G);
4 sum = 0; index = |V|-1; prevDistance = -1, prevSV = -1;
5 while index > 0 do
6 if D(index) == prevDistance then
7 currSV = prevSV;
8 else
9 currSV = fpDpindexqq
1`index ´ sum;
10 end
11 node = w(index);
12 φSVnode` “ currSV ;
13 sum += fpDpindexqq
indexp1`indexq ;
14 prevDistance = D(index), prevSV = currSV;
15 index--;
16 end
17 φSVv ` “ fp0q ´ sum;
18 end
19 return φSV ;
ErMCpv, uqs “
« |V |´2ÿ
k“1`kvu
fpdistancepv, uqq ´ fpdk`1q
pk ` 1qpk ` 2q
ff
` fpdistancepv, uqq|V |
“ fpdistancepv, uqq
kvu ` 2 ´
|V |´2ÿ
k“kvu`1
fpdk`1q
pk ` 1qpk ` 2q .
In Algorithm 4 we use Dv “ td1, d2...d|V |´1u as a vector of distances from node v to all
other nodes in the network, sorted in increasing order. Also, the vector w “ tw1, w2...w|V |´1u
represents nodes corresponding to these distances, respectively. For each vertex v, a vector
of distances to every other vertex is first computed using Dijkstra’s algorithm [Cormen, 2001].
This yields a vectorDv that is already sorted in increasing order. This vector is then traversed in
reverse to compute the Shapley value of the appropriate node w. After the traversal, the Shapley
value of v itself is updated. This process is repeated for all nodes v so that at the end of the
algorithm, the Shapley value is computed exactly in Op|V ||E| ` |V |2log|V |q time.
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Our final observation is that Algorithm 4 works also for directed graphs as long as we use
the appropriate version of Dijkstra’s algorithm (see, e.g., Cormen [2001]).
4.3.5. Shapley Value-Based Wcutoff -influence Degree Centrality
In this subsection, we generalize game g2 for the case of weighted networks. Given a positive
weighted network G “ pV,E, λq and a value Wcutoff pvq for every node v P V , we first define
λpv, Cq “ řuPC λpv, uq for every coalition C, where λpv, uq is the weight of the edge between
nodes v and u (or 0 if there is no such edge). With this notation, we define game g5 by the
characteristic function:
ν5pCq “
$&%0 if C “ Hsizeptv : v P C porq λpv, Cq ě Wcutoff pvquq otherwise.
The formulation above has applications in, for instance, the analysis of information
diffusion, adoption of innovations, and viral marketing. Indeed, many cascade models of
such phenomena on weighted graphs have been proposed [Granovetter, 1978, Kempe et al.,
2003, Young, 2005] which work by assuming that an agent will change state from “inactive”
to “active” if and only if the sum of the weights to all active neighbors is at least equal to an
agent-specific cutoff.
Although we have not been able to come up with an exact formula for the Shapley value
in this game4, our analysis yields an approximate formula which was found to be accurate in
practice.
We will need the following additional notation:
— let the weights of edges between v and each of the nodes in Npvq be λv “
tλpv, uq, λ1, λ2...λdegpvq´1u in that order;
— let αv be the sum of all the weights in λv and βv be the sum of the squares of all the weights
in λv; and finally
— let Xvut be the sum of a t-subset of λvztλpv, uqu drawn uniformly at random from the set of
all such possible t-subsets.
While in each graph it holds that
ř
vPV degpvq ď 2|E|, Algorithm 5 implements an Op|V |`ř
vPV
ř
uPNpvq degpuqq ď Op|V | ` |V ||E|q “ Op|V ||E|q solution to compute the Shapley value
for all agents in game g5 using the above approximation. Furthermore, we make the following
observation: for small degpuq, one might as well use the brute force computation to determine
Shapley value in Op2degpuq´1q time.
4 Computing the Shapley value for this game involves determining whether the sum of weights on specific
edges, adjacent to a random coalition, exceeds the threshold. This problem seems to be at least as hard as computing
the Shapley value in weighted voting games, which is #P-Complete [Elkind et al., 2009b].
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Algorithm 5: Computing the Shapley value for Game 5
Input: Weighted network G “ pV,E, λq, cutoffs Wcutoff pvq for each v P V
Output: Shapley value of all nodes in G for game g5
1 foreach v P V do
2 compute and store αi and βi;
3 end
4 foreach v P V do
5 φSVv “ 0;
6 foreach m in 0 to degpvq do
7 compute µ “ µpXvvm q, σ “ σpXvvm q, p “ PrtN pµ, σ2q ă Wcutoff pvqu;
8 φSVv ` “ p1`degpvq ;
9 end
10 foreach u P Npvq do
11 p = 0;
12 foreach m in 0 to degpuq ´ 1 do
13 compute µ “ µpXvum q, σ “ σpXvum q and z = Zvum ;
14 p += z degpuq´m
degpuqpdegpuq`1q ;
15 end
16 φSVv ` “ p;
17 end
18 end
19 return φSV ;
As far as directed graphs are concerned, in all calculations in Algorithm 5 we have to
consider the indegree of a node instead of degree. Furthermore, the set of neighbours of a
node u should be defined as the set of nodes v connected with directed edge pu, vq.
4.4. Simulations
In this section we evaluate the time performance of our exact algorithms for games g1 to g4 and
our approximation algorithm for game g5. In more detail, we compare our exact algorithms to
the method of approximating the Shapley value via Monte Carlo sampling which has been the
only feasible approach to compute game-theoretic network centrality available to date in the
literature. In this section we evaluate the time performance of our exact algorithms for games
g1 to g4 and our approximation algorithm for game g5. In more detail, we compare our exact
algorithms to the method of approximating the Shapley value via Monte Carlo sampling which
has been the only feasible approach to compute game-theoretic network centrality available to
date in the literature. First, we provide a detailed description of the simulation setup; then,
we present data sets and the simulation results. In the remainder of this section we first we
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comment on Monte Carlo sampling. Next, we provide a detailed description of the simulation
setup. Finally, we present data sets and the simulation results.
4.4.1. Approximation Methods for the Shapley Value
In this section, we discuss different approximation techniques to compute the Shapley value
from the literature. Generally speaking, they can be divided into three groups—each referring
to a specific subclass of coalitional games under consideration:
1. First, let us consider the method proposed by Fatima et al. [2007] and elaborated further by
Fatima et al. [2008]. This approach concerns weighted voting games. In these games, each
player has a certain number of votes (or in other words, a weight). A coalition is “winning” if
the number of votes in this coalition exceeds some specific threshold, or “losing” otherwise.
Fatima et al. propose the following method to approximate the Shapley value in weighted
voting games. Instead of finding marginal contributions of players to all 2n coalitions, the
authors consider only n randomly-selected coalitions, one of each size (i.e., from 1 to n).
Only for these n coalitions are the player’s expected marginal contributions calculated and
the average of these contributions yields an approximation of the Shapley value. Whereas
Fatima et al. method is certainly attractive, it is only applicable to games in which the value
of a coalition depends on the sum of associated weights being in some bounds. This is not
the case for our games g1 to g4.5
2. Another method was proposed by Bachrach et al. [2008] in the context of simple coalitional
games 6 in which the characteristic function is binary—i.e., each coalition has a value of
either zero or one. For these games, Bachrach et al. extend the approach suggested by Mann
and Shapley 1960 and provide more rigorous statistical analysis. In particular, Mann and
Shapley described the Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the Shapley value from a random
sample of coalitions. Bachrach at al. use this technique to compute the Banzhaf power index
and then they suggested using a random sample of permutations of all players in order to
compute the Shapley-Shubik index for simple coalitional games.7 The computation of the
confidence interval, which is crucial in such an approach, hinges upon the binary form of
the characteristic function for simple coalitional games. This method is more general than
the one proposed by Fatima et al. [2007]—as weighted voting games are a subset of simple
coalitional games—but still it cannot be effectively used for our games g1 to g4, where the
characteristic functions are not binary.
5 Recall that our approximation algorithm for g5 builds upon Fatima et al. method. This is because in this
game the marginal contribution of each node depends on the weights assigned to its incident edges.
6 Note that weighted voting games are simple coalitional games.
7 The Shapley-Shubik index is a very well-known application of the Shapley value that evaluates the power
of individuals in voting [Shapley and Shubik, 1954].
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Algorithm 6: Monte Carlo method to approximate the Shapley value
Input:
˛ Characteristic function v, maximum iteration maxIter
Output: Aproximation of Shapley value for game v
1 for v P V do
2 φSVv “ 0 ;
3 end
4 for i “ 1 to maxIter do
5 shuffle(V );
6 Marginal Contribution block
7 P =H ;
8 for v P V do
9 φSVv ` “ νpP Y tvuq ´ νpP q ;
10 P “ P Y tvu ;
11 end
12
13 end
14 for v P V do
15 φSVv “ φ
SV
v
maxIter
;
16 end
17 return φSVv ;
3. Unlike the first two methods, the last method described by Castro et al. [2009] can be
efficiently applied to all coalitional games in characteristic function game form, assuming
that the worth of every coalition can be computed in polynomial time. Here, approximating
the Shapley value involves generating permutations of all players and computing the
marginal contribution of each player to the set of players occurring before it. The solution
precision increases (statistically) with every new permutation analysed. Furthermore, the
authors show how to estimate the appropriate size of a permutation sample in order to
guarantee a low error. Given its broad applicability, this method is used in our simulations
as a comparison benchmark.
4.4.2. Simulation Setup
In more detail, in a preliminary step, we test what is the maximum number of Monte Carlo
iterations that can be performed in a reasonable time for any given game. This maximum
number of iterations, denoted maxIter, becomes an input to Algorithm 6 for Monte Carlo
sampling. In this algorithm, in each one of the maxIter iterations, a random permutation of
all nodes is generated. Then, using a characteristic function from the set ν P tν1, ν2, ν3, ν4, ν5u,
it calculates the marginal contribution of each node to the set P of nodes occurring before a
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given node in a random permutation.8 Finally, the algorithm divides the aggregated sum of all
contributions for each node by the number of iterations performed. The time complexity of
this algorithm is OpmaxIter ˚ conq, where con denotes the number of operations necessary for
computing the Marginal Contribution block. This block is specifically tailored to the particular
form of the characteristic function of each of the games g1 to g5. In particular, for game g1
(see Algorithm 6), it is constructed as follows. Recall that, in this game, node vi makes a
positive contribution to coalition P through itself and through some adjacent node u under two
conditions. Firstly, neither vi nor u are in P . Secondly, there is no edge from P to vi or u. To
check for these conditions in Algorithm 6 we store those nodes that have already contributed to
the value of coalition P in an array called: Counted. For each node vi, the algorithm iterates
through the set of its neighbours and for each adjacent node it checks whether this adjacent node
is counted in the array Counted. If not, the marginal contribution of the node vi is increased by
one.
Algorithm 7: Marginal Contribution block of Algorithm 6 for g2
CountedÐ false ;
EdgesÐ 0 ;
foreach v P V pGq do
foreach u P NGpvq Y tvu do
Edges[u]++ ;
if !Counted[u] and ( Edges[u] ě k[u] or u “ v ) then
φSVv Ð φSVv ` 1;
Counted[u] = true ;
end
end
end
Algorithm 8: Marginal Contribution block of Algorithm 6 for g3
CountedÐ false ;
foreach v P V pGq do
foreach u P extNeighborspvq Y tvu do
if !Counted[u] then
φSVv Ð φSVv ` 1;
Counted[u] = true ;
end
end
end
For the rest of the games considered in this chapter the Marginal Contribution block of
Algorithm 6 takes a slightly different form. We have explained the functioning of this block for
g1. Now, we discuss this block for the remaining four games. In particular:
8 Recall that the characteristic functions v1, v2, . . . , v5 correspond to games g1, g2, . . . , g5, respectively.
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Algorithm 9: Marginal Contribution block of Algorithm 6 for g4
distÐ infinity ;
foreach v P V pGq do
foreach u P V pGq do
if D[u] < dist[u] then
φSVv Ð φSVv ` fpDrusq ´ fpdistrusq;
dist[u] = D[u] ;
end
end
φSVv Ð φSVv ` fpdistrusq ´ fp0q;
dist[v] = 0 ;
end
Algorithm 10: Marginal Contribution block of Algorithm 6 for g5
CountedÐ false ;
WeightsÐ 0 ;
foreach v P V pGq do
foreach u P NGpvq Y tvu do
weights[u]+= λpv, uq;
if !Counted[u] and ( weights[u] ěWcutoff puq or u “ v ) then
φSVv Ð φSVv ` 1;
Counted[u] = true ;
end
end
end
g2: Here, node v makes a positive contribution to a coalition P both through itself and through
some adjacent node u also under two conditions. Firstly, neither v nor u are in P . Secondly,
there is less than k edges from P to v and there is exactly k ´ 1 edges from P to u. In
order to check the first condition in Algorithm 7 we use the array Counted, and to check the
second one, we use the array Edges. For each node vi, the algorithm iterates through the
set of its neighbours and for each adjacent node it checks whether this adjacent node meets
these two conditions. If so, then the marginal contribution of the node v is increased by one.
g3{4: In Marginal Contribution blocks for games g3 and g4 (Algorithms 8 and 9), all the values
that are dependent on the distance (extNeighbours and D) are calculated using Dijkstra’s
algorithm and stored in memory. These pre-computations allow us to significantly speed
up Monte Carlo methods. Now, in g3 node v makes a positive contribution to coalition P
through itself and through some adjacent node u under two conditions. Firstly, neither v
nor u are in P . Secondly, there is no edge length of dcutoff from P to v or u. To check
for these conditions in Algorithm 8 we again use the array Counted. For each node v, the
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algorithm iterates through the set of its extended neighbours and for each of them it checks
whether this neighbour meets the conditions. If so, the marginal contribution of the node v
is increased by one. In game g4, node v makes a positive contribution to coalition P through
each node (including itself) that is closer to vi than to P . In Algorithm 9 we use array Dist
to store distances from coalition P to all nodes in the graph and arrayD to store all distances
from v to all other nodes. For each node vi, the algorithm iterates through all nodes in the
graph, and for each node u, if the distance from v to u is smaller than from P to u, the
algorithm computes the marginal contribution as fpDrusq´fpDistrusq. The value Distrus
is then updated to Drus—this is a new distance from P to u.
g5: In game g5, which is an extension of g2 to weighted graphs, node v makes a positive
contribution to coalition P (both through itself and through some adjacent node u) under
two conditions. Firstly, neither v nor u are in P . Secondly, the sum of weights on edges
from P to v is less than Wcutoff pviq and the sum of weights on edges from P to u is greater
than, or equal to, Wcutoff puq ´ λpv, uq and smaller than Wcutoff pviq ` λpv, uq. In order to
check the first condition in Algorithm 10 we use the arrayCounted, and to check the second
one, we use the array Weights. For each node vi, the algorithm iterates through the set of
its neighbours and for each adjacent node it checks whether this adjacent node meets these
two conditions. If so, then the marginal contribution of the node v is increased by one.
Some details of how Algorithm 6 is applied to generate the Shapley value approximations
for games g1 to g4, for which we propose exact polynomial solutions, differ from g5, for which
we developed an approximate solution. Specifically, for games g1 to g4:
1. We use the exact algorithm proposed in this chapter to compute the Shapley value.
2. Then, we run Monte Carlo simulations 30 times.9 In every run:
— We perform maxIter Monte Carlo iterations.
— After every five iterations, we compare the approximation of the Shapley value obtained
via Monte Carlo simulation with the exact Shapley value obtained with our algorithm.
— We record the algorithm’s runtime and the error, where the error is defined as the
maximum discrepancy between the actual Shapley value and the Monte Carlo-based
approximation of the Shapley value.
3. Finally, we compute the confidence interval using all iterations (0.95% confidence level).10
In the case of game g5 we cannot determine the exact Shapley value for larger networks.
Therefore, we performed two levels of simulation: one level on small networks and one level
on large networks. Specifically:
9 For the purpose of comparison to our method, it suffices to use 30 iterations, as the standard errors converge
significantly to indicate the magnitude of the cost of using the Monte Carlo method.
10 Since for g4 each Monte Carlo iteration is relatively time consuming, we run it only once; thus, no
confidence interval is generated, i.e., the third step is omitted.
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1. For small networks, we generate 30 random instances of weighted complete graphs with
6 nodes (denoted K6) and the same number of graphs with 12 nodes (denoted K12) with
weights drawn from a uniform distribution Up0, 1q. Then, for each graph and each of the
two parameters Wcutoff pvq “ 14αpvq and Wcutoff pvq “ 34αpvq:11
— We compute the exact Shapley value using formula (6).
— Then, we run our approximation algorithm and determine the error in our approximation.
— Finally, we run 2000 and 6000 Monte Carlo iterations for K6 and K12, respectively.
2. For large networks, we again generate 30 random instances of weighted complete graphs,
but now with 1000 nodes (we denote them K1000). Then, for each graph and each of the
three parameters Wcutoff pvq “ 14αpvq, Wcutoff pvq “ 24αpvq, and Wcutoff pvq “ 34αpvq):
— We run our approximation algorithm for the Shapley value.
— Then, we run the fixed number (200000) of Monte Carlo iterations.
— Finally, we compute how the Monte Carlo solution converges to the results of our
approximation algorithm.
Having described the simulation setup, we will now discuss the data sets and, finally, the
simulation results.
4.4.3. Data Used in Simulations
We consider two networks that have already been well-studied in the literature. Specifically,
for games g1 ´ g3 we present simulations on an undirected, unweighted network representing
the topology of the Western States Power Grid (WSPG).12 This network (which has 4940 nodes
and 6594 edges) has been studied in many contexts before (see, for instance, Watts and Strogatz
[1998]) and is freely available online (see, e.g., http://networkdata.ics.uci.edu/
data.php?id=107). For games g3 ´ g5 (played on weighted networks), we used the
network of astrophysics collaborations (abbreviated henceforth APhC) between Jan 1, 1995 and
December 31, 1999. This network (which has 16705 nodes and 121251 edges) is also freely
available online (see, e.g., http://networkdata.ics.uci.edu/ data.php?id=13)
and has been used in previous studies like Newman [2001].
4.4.4. Simulation Results
The results presented in this section show that our exact algorithms are, in general, much
faster then the Monte Carlo sampling, and this is the case even if we allow for generous error
tolerance. Furthermore, requiring smaller Monte Carlo errors makes the Monte Carlo runtime
exponentially slower than our exact solution.
11 Recall that αj is the sum of all the weights in Wj as defined in Section 4.3.5.
12 Note that with the distance threshold dcutoff replaced with a hop threshold kcutoff , game g3 can be played
on an unweighted network.
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Figure 4.3: g1, WSPG (UW)
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Figure 4.4: g2, k “ 2, WSPG (UW)
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Figure 4.5: g2, ki “ degi2 , WSPG (UW)
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Figure 4.6: g2, ki “ 34 degi, WSPG (UW)
In more detail, the simulation results for game g1 are shown in Figure 4.3. The dotted line
shows the performance of our exact algorithm which needs 0.43ms to compute the Shapley
value. In contrast, generating any reasonable Monte Carlo result takes a substantially longer
time (the solid line shows the average and the shaded area depicts the confidence interval for
Monte Carlo simulations). In particular, it takes on average more than 200ms to achieve a 20%
error and more than 2000ms are required to guarantee a 5% error (which is more than 4600
times slower than our exact algorithm).
Figures 4.4 - 4.6 concern game g2 for different values of k (k “ 2, ki “ degi2 , and ki “ 34 degi,
respectively, where degi is the degree of node vi).13 The advantage of our exact algorithm over
Monte Carlo simulation is again exponential.
Replacing the distance threshold dcutoff with a hop threshold kcutoff enables game g3 to be
played on an unweighted network. Thus, similarly to games g1 and g2, we test it on the Western
States Power Grid. The results are shown on Figures 4.7 and 4.8 for kcutoff being equal to 2
and 3, respectively. The third game is clearly more computationally challenging than g1 and g2
(note that the vertical axis is in seconds instead of milliseconds). Now, our exact algorithm takes
13 Recall that in g2 the meaning of parameter k is as follows: the value of coalition C depends on the number
of nodes in the network with at least k neighbours in C.
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Figure 4.7: g3, kcutoff “ 2, WSPG (UW)
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Figure 4.8: g3, kcutoff “ 3, WSPG (UW)
about 13s to complete. The much lower speedups of the exact methods with respect to Monte
Carlo approach stem from the fact that both algorithms have to start with Dijkstra’s algorithm.
Although this algorithm has to be run only once in both cases it takes more than 12.5s for
the considered network. This means that the exact solution is slower by orders of magnitude
(compared to games g1 and g2). The Monte Carlo approach is also slower, but this slowdown is
much less significant in relative terms.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the performance of the algorithms for game g3 on the astrophysics
collaboration network that, unlike the Western States Power Grid, is a weighted network.
We observe that increasing the value of dcutoff (here from dcutoff “ davg8 to dcutoff “ davg4 )
significantly worsens the performance of the Monte Carlo-based algorithm. This is because
the increasing number of nodes that have to be taken into account while computing marginal
contributions (see the inner loop in Algorithm 8) is not only more time consuming, but also
increases the Monte Carlo error.
For game g4 the performance of algorithms is shown in Figures 4.11 - 4.13 (for fpdq “ 11`d ,
fpdq “ 1
1`d2 and fpdq “ e´d, respectively). Whereas the Monte Carlo methods for the first
three games are able to achieve a reasonable error bound in seconds or minutes, for the fourth
game it takes more than 40 hours to approach 50% error. This is because the inner loop of the
Marginal Contribution block (see Algorithm 9) iterates over all nodes in the network. Due to
the time consuming performance we run the simulations only once. Interestingly, we observe
that the error of the Monte Carlo method sometimes increases slightly when more iterations
are performed. This confirms that the error of the Monte Carlo method to approximate the
Shapley value proposed in Castro et al. [2009] is only statistically decreasing in time. Certain
new randomly chosen permutations can actually increase the error.
Figures 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 present comparisons of our approximation algorithm for
game g5 against Monte Carlo sampling for small networks (for which the exact Shapley value
can be computed from the Definition 5)). In these figures, the horizontal dotted line shows the
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Figure 4.9: g3, dcutoff “ davg8 , APhC (W)
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Figure 4.10: g3, dcutoff “ davg4 , APhC (W)
running time of our solution, while the vertical dotted line shows its average approximation
error with the shaded area being the confidence interval. As previously, the solid line shows the
average, and the shaded area depicts the confidence interval for the Monte Carlo simulations.
We see in Figures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 that the approximation error in our proposed algorithm
is well-contained for small networks. Specifically, for K6 it is about 10%; whereas for the
bigger network K12 it is about 5%. However, we notice that, for higher values of Wcutoff , the
Monte Carlo method may slightly outperform our solution. See in Figure 4.15 how the average
approximation error of the Monte Carlo sampling achieved in 0.38ms is lower than the average
error achieved by our method. Already for K12 this effect does not occur (see Figure 4.17).
For large networks, where the exact Shapley value cannot be obtained, we are naturally
unable to compute exact approximation error. We believe that this error may be higher than the
values obtained forK6 andK12. However, the mixed strategy, that we discussed in Section 4.3.5
and that uses our approximation only for large degree vertices, should work towards containing
the error within practical tolerance bounds. As far as we believe that Monte Carlo gives good
results, from Figure 4.18, we can infer that our approximation solution for large networks gives
good results (within 5%) and is at least two times faster than the Monte Carlo algorithm.
To summarise, our exact solutions outperform Monte Carlo simulations even if relatively
wide error margins are allowed. However, this is not always the case for our approximation
algorithm for game g5. Furthermore, it should be underlined that if the centrality metrics under
consideration cannot be described with any of the games g1 to g4 for which exact algorithms are
now available, then Monte Carlo simulations are still a viable option.
4.5. Conclusions
The key finding of this chapter is that the Shapley value for many centrality-related cooperative
games of interest played on networks can be solved analytically. In particular, we proposed
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Figure 4.11: g4, fpdq “ 11`d , APhC (W)
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Figure 4.12: g4, fpdq “ 11`d2 , APhC (W)
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Figure 4.13: g4, fpdq “ e´d, APhC (W)
the polynomial time algorithms for computing Shapley value-based degree and closeness
cnetralities. The resulting algorithms are not only error-free, but also run in polynomial time
(see Table 4.1) and, in practice, are much faster than Monte Carlo methods. Approximate
closed-form expressions and algorithms can also be constructed for some classes of games
played on weighted networks. Simulation results show that these algorithms are acceptable for
a range of situations involving big networks.
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Figure 4.14: g5, Wcutoff “ 14αi, K6 (W)
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Figure 4.15: g5, Wcutoff “ 34αi, K6 (W),
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Figure 4.16: g5, Wcutoff “ 14αi, K12 (W)
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Figure 4.17: g5, Wcutoff “ 34αi, K12 (W)
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5. Efficient Algorithms for a Game-Theoretic
Measure of Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality is a measure of the potential of individual nodes to control information
flow in a network. In this chapter, we extend the standard definition of betweenness centrality
and propose a family of game-theoretic measures based on Semivalues—a large family of
solution concepts from cooperative game theory that include, among others, the Shapley
value and the Banzhaf power index. The key advantage of the game-theoretic betweenness
centrality over the standard measure is the ability to rank nodes while taking into account any
synergies that may exist in different groups of nodes. We develop polynomial time algorithms to
compute the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality in general, and the Shapley value-based
betweenness centrality in particular, both in weighted and unweighted graphs. Interestingly,
for the unweighted case, our algorithm for computing the Shapley value-based centrality has
the same complexity as the best known algorithm due to Brandes [2001] for computing the
standard betweenness centrality. The new measures are evaluated in simulated scenario where
simultaneous node failures occur. Compared to the standard measure, the ranking obtained by
our measures reflects more accurately the influence that different nodes have on the functionality
of the network. Finally, we empirically evaluate our algorithms on weighted and unweighted
random scale-free graphs, and on two real network: an email communication network, and the
neural system of C. elegans. This evaluation shows that our algorithms are significantly faster
than the fastest alternative from the literature.
All algorithms, experiments and theorems presented in this chapter are an exclusive
contribution of the author of this thesis.
5.1. Introduction
Betweenness centrality is a measure of control introduced independently by Anthonisse [1971]
and Freeman [1979], which aims to determine the importance of a given node in the context
of network flow. More specifically, in its standard form, betweenness centrality considers all
shortest paths that pass through the node. The more shortest paths go through the node, the
more important is the role of this node in the network.
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v1
v2
v3
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: The example demonstrating that classical centrality measures do not provide any
insight into synergies among the nodes. In network (a), betweenness centrality identifies v1
as the most important node. Indeed, v1 controls all 28 shortest paths between other nodes.
Similarly, in network (b), nodes v2 and v3 are central as they control 26 shortest paths each.
Now, let us consider v2 and v3 as a group tv2, v3u. In terms of network flow, the role of
this group in network (b) is exactly the same as the role of v1 in network (a). However, it is
unknown how the role of this group could be derived from the classical betweenness centrality
(of both individual nodes). For instance, one natural approach to quantify the role of a group
of nodes would be to sum up their individual centralities. But, for tv2, v3u, this would yield
26 ` 26 “ 52 ą 28 which clearly exaggerates their joint value. Another simple approach
would be to average the classical centrality v2 and v3 [Everett and Borgatti, 1999]. This would
however understate the role of tv2, v3u since 26`262 “ 26 ă 28. Now, the group betweenness
centrality assigns to tv2, v3u value of 28. Thus, unlike classical betweenness centrality, the
group betweenness centrality is able to capture the negative synergy between v2 and v3.
Betweenness centrality (Definition 16) is one of the classical measures of centrality in
network analysis, with the other measures being degree centrality, closeness centrality, and
eigenvector centrality (see Section 2.7). Several applications of betweenness centrality have
been considered in the literature [Puzis et al., 2007b, Dolev et al., 2010]. It has also been
implemented in numerous software tools for network analysis [Brandes, 2008]. Furthermore, a
variety of extensions of betweenness centrality have been proposed in order to suit the needs of
particular applications. For instance, a well-known community detection algorithm by Girvan
and Newman [2002] is based on edge betweenness centrality.
One of the characteristics of betweenness centrality, as well as the other classical centrality
measures, is that it focuses on the role played by each node individually. However, such an
approach can be inadequate if there exist non-negligible positive or negative synergies between
nodes when their role is considered in groups. Simply put, classical centrality measures are not
able to account for such synergies.
To address this problem, Everett and Borgatti [1999] introduced group centrality (see
Definition 22). While group centrality measures have the advantage of taking synergies into
account, these measures have their own shortcomings. Specifically, they produce a ranking of an
exponential number of groups, which is hard to maintain in memory, and hard to reason about,
as it is not obvious how to extract meaningful conclusions from so many groups. What would
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be more manageable is to produce a ranking of the nodes themselves, based on the ranking of
all possible groups. The answer to it was given in the previous chapter where game-theoretic
centrality measures was introduced (Definition 25).
A potential downside of game-theoretic network centralities is that many methods from
cooperative game theory are computationally challenging. For instance, given a coalitional
game defined over a network of |V | nodes, a straight-forward computation of the Shapley
value requires considering all possible 2|V | coalitions (i.e., groups) of nodes. This is clearly
prohibitive for networks with hundreds, or even tens, of nodes. Indeed, it has been shown that
in some cases the exponential number of computations cannot be avoided, i.e., it is impossible
to compute particular game-theoretic network centralities in time polynomial in the size of the
network.
Fortunately, the positive computational results have been given in the previous chapter
where we analysed various game-theoretic extensions of degree and closeness centrality and
showed that sometimes it is possible to leverage the fact that the synergies in coalitions depend
on the topology of the network. As a result, it was showed that some game-theoretic centrality
measures are indeed computable in polynomial time.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned positive results concerned solely the extensions of
degree and closeness centralities which are, in general, computationally less challenging than
betweenness centrality. In fact, no game-theoretic extension of betweenness centrality has been
developed to date.
In this chapter, we fill the above gap in the literature by proposing and analysing
the computational aspects of the game-theoretic betweenness centrality. This is the first
game-theoretic centrality that is based on Semivalues—a family of generalisations of the
Shapley value that offer a wider spectrum of ways in which the role of nodes within various
groups can be evaluated.
As our main contribution, we propose polynomial time algorithms to compute both the
Shapley value-based and Semivalue-based betweenness centralities, for weighted graphs as
well as unweighted graphs. Surprisingly, as shown in Table 5.1, for the unweighted case, our
algorithm for computing the Shapley value-based centrality has the same complexity as the best
known algorithm due to Brandes [2001] for computing the standard betweenness centrality,
i.e., Op|V ||E|q, where V is the set of nodes and E set of edges in the network. Moreover, for
Semivalues which are, in general, more computationally challenging than the Shapley value,
the running time of our algorithm is Op|V |2|E|q (for the unweighted graphs).
We consider three applications of the new centrality measures. The first one concerns
the protection of computer network against Spyware—the malicious computer programs, the
second example is about the issue of measuring systemic importance of financial institutions
[European Central Bank, 2010]. Under certain assumptions, the Shapley value- and the
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Semivalue-based centrality measures turn out to be the exact solution to this problem. In the
third application we simulate simultaneous node failures in a network. Following Albert et al.
[2000] and Holme et al. [2002], among others, we quantify the functionality of the network
based on the average inverse geodesic measure. The simulation results show that compared to
the standard measure, the cardinal ranking obtained by our measures reflects more accurately
the influence that different nodes have on the network functionality.
5.2. The Overview of Computational Results
The literature review on centralities and game-theoretic centrality in particular, was already
presented in Chapter 3. Now, we discuss the computational properties of the classical
betweenness centrality. In particular, the fastest known dedicated algorithm to compute it is
due to Brandes [2001]. The algorithm works in Op|V ||E|q time for unweighted graphs, and
in Op|V ||E| ` |V |2 logp|V |qq time for weighted graphs, where V is the set of nodes and E set
of edges in the network. Furthermore, group betweenness centrality for a pre-defined group of
nodes can be computed in Op|V ||E|q time as shown by Brandes [2008]. Puzis et al. [2007b]
developed an algorithm to compute group betweenness centrality of a given subset S. The
algorithm starts with a preprocessing step (which alone takes Op|V |3q time), and then computes
group betweenness centrality in Op|S|3q time.
Centrality Unweighted Graphs Weighted Graphs
standard Op|V ||E|q Op|V ||E| ` |V |2 logp|V |qq
betweenness Brandes [2001] Brandes [2001]
group Op|V ||E|q Op|V ||E| ` |V |2 logp|V |qq
betweenness Brandes [2008] Brandes [2008]
Shapley value-based Op|V ||E|q Op|V |2|E|q ` |V |2log|V |
betweenness this dissertation this dissertation
Semivalue-based Op|V |2|E|q Op|V |3|E|q ` |V |3log|V |
betweenness this dissertation this dissertation
Table 5.1: Summary of the computational results obtained in this chapter.
Table 5.1 summarises the above complexity results (for betweenness centrality and
group betweenness centrality) as well as our computational results (for Shapley-based and
Semivalue-based betweenness centralities). As can be seen, our algorithms also run in
polynomial time, both for unweighted and weighted graphs. Observe that our algorithm for
computing the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality for unweighted graphs has the
same complexity as the aforementioned algorithm by Brandes [2001] for standard betweenness
centrality, which is surprising given the much more complicated nature of our measure.
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5.3. The New Centrality and Its Properties
In this section we introduce a family of game-theoretic betweeneness centrality measures
and discuss their basic properties. We start in Section 5.3.1 with a few motivating scenarios
that demonstrate the need for a more involved centrality measure than standard betweenness
centrality. Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 introduce our Shapley value-based and Semivalue-based
betweenness centralities, respectively. Finally, sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 analyse the marginal
contributions of nodes, in the context of the Shapley value-based and Semivalue-based
betweenness centralities, respectively.
5.3.1. Motivating Scenarios
We will consider three motivating scenarios: protect computer network against malicious
programs (Section 5.3.1), ranking institutions in a financial system according to their systemic
importance (Section 5.3.1), and analysing network vulnerability (Section 5.3.1).
Detecting Intrusion in a Network
One of the scenarios on detecting intrusion in a network considered in the literature is distributed
network intrusion detection [Valdes and Skinner, 2001]. In a nutshell, the aim here is to filter
the content of a network by installing some anti-spyware software on a chosen set of k nodes.
Now, assuming that the majority of the network flow is transmitted through shortest paths, and
ignoring the capacities of cables and routers, the best choice is to install the anti-spyware on
the set of nodes S Ď V, |S| “ k whose group betweenness centrality cgbpSq (Definition 22)
is maximal. Unfortunately, the problem is NP-hard; nonetheless, there exists approximation
algorithms to solve it [Puzis et al., 2007a].
The solution to the above problem can be used to guide the efforts to protect the most
important nodes against a potential spyware attack. However, how to choose the optimal points
to protect if we have limited resources and do not known in advance the size of the attack?
To model such a situation, let us consider the following scenario. Suppose that nodes in a
communication network have been exposed to the possibility of a random spyware infection.
The more shortest paths there are that pass through the infected group, the worse it is for the
network, because the malicious software may control or monitor the flow. Furthermore, suppose
that neither the subset of infected nodes is known nor the size of the attack (i.e., the number of
infected nodes). Assuming that the administrators’ resources are limited and that the malicious
software can be located at any workstation, a decision has to be made on which node to examine
first. In other words, we need to identify a node that makes the biggest contribution to the
spyware’s ability to monitor the flow going through the infected nodes. Hence, we formalize
this problem as follows:
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Problem 1. Given a discrete probability distribution D : t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu Ñ r0, 1s and a random
subset S : |S| „ D, which node v P V in the graph G “ pV,Eq maximizes the expression:
cgbpSq ´ cgbpSztvuq.
Now if it was known that exactly one node has been affected by the spyware attack (|S| “ 1)
and that the single target was chosen uniformly at random, then the standard betweenness
centrality would solve the above problem; the node with the highest such centrality is the
solution. However, if there is a possibility that multiple nodes have been infected (|S| ą 1),
then the standard betweenness centrality becomes insufficient. This is because betweenness
centrality of a group of nodes is not necessarily equal to the sum of betweenness centralities
of individual nodes within this group (see Figure 5.2 for an example). In other words, the
following does not necessarily hold for every S Ď V :
cgbpSq “
ÿ
vPV
cbpvq.
Hence, a node v P V that maximizes the expression cgbpSq ´ cgbpSztvuq for some S Ď V does
not have to be the one with the highest standard betweenness centrality.
In this chapter we propose the polynomial-time exact solution to Problem 1 for a family of
probability distributions of choosing the set S.
Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions
The crisis of year 2007 and 2008 clearly showed the need for more stringent supervision of
financial systems. As a result, a number of systemic risk monitoring and supervisory bodies
have been created worldwide: the Financial Stability Oversight Council (USA), the European
Systemic Risk Board and the Financial Stability Board. Furthermore, new prudential policies
and regulations were laid out. Most notably, the Basel III accords aim at introducing micro- and
macro-prudential regulations such as stricter capital reserve ratios, increased audit transparency
and more thorough risk management by banks and other financial institutions.
At a discretion of supervising authorities, systemically important institutions may be asked
to follow additional macro-prudential policies including a combination of capital surcharges,
contingent capital and bail-in debt. As stated in the Financial Stability Board’s interim report to
G20 leaders, “Financial institutions should be subject to requirements commensurate with the
risks they pose to the financial system” [Financial Stability Board, 2010].
In this context, betweenness is considered to be the most suitable centrality to measure
systemic importance of institutions in the financial system [European Central Bank, 2010]. In
more detail, it has the following natural interpretation: “the betweenness of a bankA connecting
pairs of nodes in the network is a measure of the dependence of these other banks from A to
transfer the loans.” [Gabrieli, 2011]. As a result, the higher betweenness centrality of an
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institution is, the more attention and scrutiny it requires. It is feared that in the worst case, even
one of the institution with the highest betweenness centrality may be able to bring down the
entire system, due to contagion of illiquidity [Freixas et al., 2000].
However, imposing additional capital requirements on financial institutions according to
their standard betweenness centrality ignores the fact that financial crises are often ignited not
by factors specific to a particular bank but by (combinations of) factors that simultaneously
affect possibly many banks in the system. The infamous financial crises of 2009 started with
the collapse of the subprime residential mortgage market in the United States and then spread
to the rest of the world, due to the exposure to American real estate assets via a complex array
of financial derivatives. As a result, many financial institutions in various countries asked for
urgent state interventions [Laeven and Valencia, 2010].
Consequently, it would be desirable to extend betweenness centrality so that it quantifies
the betweenness of an individual institution but taking into account its role in various groups of
institutions, as they can be affected simultaneously. We formalize this problem as follows:
Problem 2. Given graph G “ pV,Eq, what is the (cardinal) ranking of nodes that reflects the
marginal contribution of an individual node to group betweenness centrality of a random subset
of nodes S : |S| „ D, i.e., cgbpSq ´ cgbpSztvuq, where D : t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu Ñ r0, 1s is a discrete
probability distribution.
This problem extends the Problem 1 in the way, that we consider the whole cardinal ranking
of nodes, instead of looking only for the most important individual. In this chapter, we propose
the polynomial-time exact solution to Problem 2 for a family of probability distributions D of
choosing set S.
Analysis of Network Vulnerability
One of the extensive research directions on betweenness centrality involves the analysis of
network vulnerability [Bompard et al., 2010, Holme et al., 2002]. The aim is to identify
(and possibly protect) the most critical nodes, whose removal degrades the functionality of
the network the most. In this context, a standard measure used to assess the condition of the
network is called the average inverse geodesic measure which, essentially, is a sum of inverse
distances between any pair of nodes in the network [Holme et al., 2002, Albert et al., 2000].
Formally:
IGMpV,Eq “
ÿ
vPV
ÿ
v‰uPV
1
dpv, uq
where dpu, vq is the distance, i.e., the length of the shortest path, between nodes u and v
[Freeman, 1979].
In order to formalize the problem of network vulnerability, let us first note that it is possible
to reformulate Problem 1 by assuming that we are looking for a set of nodes C Ď V of a
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v2
v3
v1
Figure 5.2: In the above sample network, both v1 and v2 are ranked equally by standard
betweenness centrality; cbpv1q “ cbpv2q “ 98. Indeed, either v1 or v2 control the same number
of shortest paths in this network. However, if we consider the role of nodes played within
various groups—as is the case in our scenario where financial difficulties may affect multiple
institutions simultaneously—then v1 and v2 should not be evaluated equally. To see why this
is the case, let us consider nodes v2 and v3. A significant percentage of the shortest paths
controlled by v2 are also controlled by v3. Consequently, the ability to control financial flows
by the group of banks tv2, v3u is smaller than by the group tv1, v3u. As a result, v1 is more
systemically important than v2.
pre-defined size |C| “ c. This set should maximize the expression: cgbpSq ´ cgbpSzCq, where
S is a random subset of nodes S Ď V such that l ď |S| ď k.
Now, we define the problem of network vulnerability as follows:
Problem 3. Given a discrete probability distribution D : t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu Ñ r0, 1s and a random
subset S : |S| „ D, which set of nodes C Ď V of a given size |C| “ c in the graph G “ pV,Eq
maximizes the expression: IGMpV zSq ´ IGMpV zpSzCqq.
where IGM stands for the average inverse geodesic measure.
To date, standard betweenness centrality has been advocated as an effective approximation
that solves Problem 3 [Holme et al., 2002]. However, in Section 5.5, we experimentally show
that the game-theoretic betweenness centrality achieves consistently better results than standard
betweenness centrality.
5.3.2. The Shapley Value-based Betweenness Centrality
In this subsection we will define group betweeness centrality. Firstly, recall that in our approach,
we cast a network into the combinatorial structure of a coalitional game. That is, we consider
all subsets of the set of nodes V pGq and we define a function that assigns to every such subset
a numerical value; this value is in fact the subset’s group betweenness centrality. Formally,
borrowing notation from coalitional games, we define a tuple pV pGq, νq, where function ν :
2V pGq Ñ R assigns to each S Ď V pGq the value cgbpSq, and νpHq “ 0. This means that ν
returns the group betweenness centrality of any given subset of nodes. Now since pV pGq, νq
has the same combinatorial structure as that of a coalitional game, we can use the Shapley
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value to quantify the importance of nodes based on the impact their membership makes on
group betweenness centrality. In other words, we obtain a measure of centrality of individual
nodes which aggregates information about their role in group betweenness centrality across
various groups. Formally, the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality measure is defined
as follows:
Definition 28 (Shapley value-based betweenness centrality measure). Shapley-value based
betweenness centrality is a pair pψB, φSV q consisting of a representation function ψBpGq “ cgb
that maps each graph to the game with group betweenness centrality and a Shapleu value
solution concept φSV .
Example 6. Consider again nodes v1 and v2 from Figure 5.2. Here:
φSV1 pV pGq, ψBpGqq “ 18.2 and φSV2 pV pGq, ψBpGqq “ 16.0833.
Unlike the standard betweenness centrality, the ranking produced by our Shapley-value based
betweenness centrality reflects the fact that node v2 has many common shortest paths with v3,
while v1 does not.
Intuitively, the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality measure represents the load
placed on a given node, taking into account the role it plays in all possible groups of nodes
in the network. Moreover, the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality satisfies the same
properties as the Shapley value (see Section 2.2). Let us translate them to the network context:
1. Symmetry—any two symmetric nodes vi and vj are assigned the same centrality, where
symmetry refers here to the fact that the two nodes can be interchanged in any group of nodes
without affecting the group’s betweenness. Formally, if vpS Y tviuq “ vpS Y tvjuq @S Ď
V ztvi, vju, then: φSVi “ φSVj ;
2. Marginality—if a node’s contribution to the group betweenness centrality of each subset of
nodes in network G “ pV,Eq is no less than its contribution to the same subset in another
network G1 “ pV,E 1q, then its centrality in the former network should be no less than in
the latter one. Formally, for every pair of networks, G “ pV,Eq and G1 “ pV,E 1q, and
functions νG and νG1 , defined as in equation (22), and for every node vi P V , if
νGpS Y tviuq ´ νGpSq ě νG1pS Y tviuq ´ νG1pSq, @S Ď V ztviu,
then φSVv in G is not smaller than φ
SV
v in G
1.
3. Efficiency—this property simply says that the sum of the Shapley value-based betweenness
centralities for all the nodes in the network is normalised to 0, i.e.,
ř
viPV φ
SV
i “ 0.1
1 Note that the group betweenness centrality of the entire network, i.e., of the group S “ V , equals 0.
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Naturally, it is also possible to normalize the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality
so it ranges from 0 to 1. To this end, one should use φ
SV
i
2 maxviPV cbpviq `
1
2
. This is because
@viPV @CĎV pcgbpC Y tviuq ´ cgbpCqq ď cbpviq.
Observe that the new centrality solves Problem 1 and Problem 2 exactly for a particular
probability distribution PD.
Proposition 3. The Shapley value-based betweenness centrality is the exact solution to
Problem 1 and Problem 2 in a particular case in which each set S Ď V of size |S| “ k ą 0 is
chosen with probability 1|V |p|V |k q .
Proof. To show it, it is enough to rewrite formula (2.3) as follows:
φSVi pV, νq “ 1|V |
ÿ
1ďkď|V |
1`|V |´1
k´1
˘ ÿ
SĎV|S|“k
viPS
pνpSq ´ νpSztviuqq (5.1)
The inner sum in the above equation runs through all subsets of nodes containing vi of a given
size k, and
`|V |´1
k´1
˘
is the number of such subsets. The first fraction implies that the size
k P t1, . . . , nu is chosen uniformly at random. The second fraction implies that out of all
subsets of size k, one is chosen uniformly at random. 
Formula (5.1) has the following interpretation in the context of measuring systemic
importance of financial institutions:
1. Fraction 1|V | means that the probability that the financial crises starts with a group of financial
institutions of size |S| “ k is the same for any k (where k P t1, . . . , |V |u). We will denote
this probability PDpV, kq.
2. Fraction 1p|V |´1k´1 q means that the probability that each particular k-sized subset of institutions
containing vi bankrupts is the same.
While the latter implication seems natural, the former implication seems to be a special
case. Arguably, it does not seem natural to assume that the probability of a single institution
bankruptcy is exactly the same as the probability of having all institutions bankrupted
(especially if the network is very large). To relax this assumption, we need to change the
fraction 1|V | in equation (5.1). However, this fraction is inherent in the Shapley value. As such,
modifying it requires adopting Semivalues as a centrality measure. In the next section, we show
how this can be done.
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5.3.3. Semivalue-based Betweenness Centrality
Recall that a Semivalues defined in equation (2.5) generalises the Shapley value by allowing
for different sequences of weights p|S| for each set S. Building upon Semivalues, we will now
introduce a centrality measure that generalizes the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality.
Definition 29 (Semivalue-based betweenness centrality measure). Semivalue-based
betweenness centrality measure is a pair pψB, φSEMI q consisting of a representation function
ψBpGq “ cgb that maps each graph to the game with group betweenness centrality and a
Semivalue φSEMI .
We observe that the above family of Semivalue-based betweenness centrality measures
inherits from Semivalues the properties of symmetry and marginality. Naturally, particular
centralities may satisfy additional properties inherited from the corresponding solution concepts
in coalitional games. For instance, it is not difficult to see that, similarly to the Banzhaf
index [Casajus, 2011], the Banzhaf index-based betweenness centrality measure satisfies the
“2-Efficiency” property. In essence, this property says that, for each pair of nodes u, v P V , if
you consider them to be a single node vu (note that v and u are not merged, but they appear in
each coalition together) then the Banzhaf index-based betweenness centrality of vu equals the
sum of the Banzhaf index-based betweenness centralities of u and v.
Proposition 4. The Semivalue-based betweenness centrality is the exact solution to Problem 1
and Problem 2, where each set S Ď V of size |S| “ k ą 0 is chosen with probability
PDpV, kq 1p|V |k q .
Proof. To observe it, we transform formula (2.5) as follows:
φSEMI pV, νq “
ÿ
1ďkď|V |
PDpV, kq 1`|V |´1
k´1
˘ ÿ
SĎV|S|“k
viPS
pvpSq ´ vpSztviuqq, (5.2)
where PDpV, kq “ pk´1
`|V |´1
k´1
˘
.
The analysis of the above equation leads to the following. Each set vi P S Ď pV ztviuq such
that |S| “ k is chosen with probability PDpV, kq, and each group of equal size is chosen with
equal probability, i.e., PDpV, kq ¨ 1p|V´1|k´1 q . 
In our motivating scenario of measuring systemic importance of financial institutions, with
the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality we are able to assume an arbitrary probability
distribution on the size of the bankrupting institution.
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Also the Semivalue-based between centrality can be normalized to the interval r0, 1s in the
same manner as Shapley value-besed betweenness centrality. To this end, one needs to compute:
cSpviq
2 maxviPV cbpviq
` 1
2
In the following subsections, we provide formal analysis of the Shapley value-based
betweenness centrality and the more-general Semivalue-based betweenness centrality.
5.3.4. A Look at Marginal Contribution for the Shapley Value
The centrality of a node is measured by computing a weighted average of its marginal
contribution to the group-betweenness centrality of all subsets of nodes in the graphs. In this
subsection, we show how to compute this weighted average efficiently.
To this end, we will use Definition 6. More specifically, given a graph G and some vertex
v P V pGq, we would like to compute the expected marginal contribution of this vertex to the set
of vertices Ppipvq that precede v in a random permutation of all vertices of the graph. We focus
in our analysis on three exhaustive cases, where the marginal contribution is positive, negative,
or neutral, respectively.
First, let us consider positive contributions, and let us focus on some particular shortest path
p which contains vertex v. Recall that we denote by σst the number of shortest paths between
vertices s and t. Furthermore, we denote by σstpvq the number of shortest paths between vertices
s and t that each pass through vertex v, where t ‰ v ‰ s (recall that every such path is said to
be controlled by v). Every path in σstpvq has a positive contribution to the coalition Ppipvq via
vertex v if and only if the path is not controlled by (i.e., does not pass through) any vertex from
the set Ppipvq. In this case, the positive contribution equals 1σst . The necessary and sufficient
condition for this to happen can be expressed by Ψppq X Ppipvq “ H, where Ψppq is the set of
all vertices lying on the path p, including endpoints.
Now, let us introduce a Bernoulli random variable Bv`,p which indicates whether vertex v
makes a positive contribution to the set Ppipvq through shortest path p. Thus, we have:
Er 1
σst
B`v,ps “ 1σstP rΨppq X Ppipvq “ Hs,
where P r¨s denotes probability, and Er¨s denotes expected value. In other words, we need to
know the probability of having v precede all vertices from Ψppqztvu in a random permutation
of all vertices in the graph.
Theorem 2. Let K be a set of elements such that |K| “ k. Furthermore, let L and R be two
disjoint subsets of K, and let |L| “ l and |R| “ r. Now, given some element x P K, where
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x R LYR, and given a random permutation pi P ΠpKq, the probability of having every element
in L before x, and every element in R after x, is:
P r@ePLpipeq ă pipxq ^ @ePRpipeq ą pipxqs “ 1pl`1qpl`r`1r q
Proof. Let us first count the number of ways in which a permutation pi P ΠpKq can be
constructed such that the following condition holds: @ePLpipeq ă pipxq ^ @ePRpipeq ą pipxq.
Specifically:2
— Let us choose l ` r ` 1 positions in the permutation. There are ` k
l`r`1
˘
such choices.
— Now, in the first l chosen positions, place all the elements of L. Directly after those, place
the element x. Finally, in the remaining r chosen positions, place all the elements of R. The
number of such line-ups is: l!r!.
— As for the remaining elements (i.e., the elements of KzpLYtxuYRq), they can be arranged
in the permutation in pk ´ pl ` r ` 1qq! different ways.
Thus, the number of permutations satisfying our condition is:
`
k
l`r`1
˘
l!r!pk ´ pl ` r ` 1qq! “ k!pl`1qpl`r`1r q .
Finally, since we have a total of k! permutations, the probability that one of them satisfies
our condition is given by equation (5.3). 
Based on Theorem 2, we can obtain the probability of an event in which the vertex v lies
on the path p and precedes all the other vertices from this path in a random permutation of all
vertices in the graph G. Now, by setting K “ V pGq, L “ H and R “ Ψppqztvu, we obtain the
desired probability: 1|Ψppq| . Thus:
Er 1
σst
B`v,ps “ 1σst|Ψppq| . (5.3)
Having discussed the first case, where marginal contributions are positive, let us now discuss
the second case, where the marginal contribution of vertex v to set Ppipvq is negative. This
happens when path p ends or starts with v (w.l.o.g. we consider v as the end point). Specifically,
if coalition Ppipvq already controls path p (which includes vertex v), then not only is there no
value added from v becoming a member of this coalition, but there is a negative effect of this
move. In particular, the group betweenness centrality assumes that a set of vertices S controls
only those paths with both ends not belonging to S. Therefore, when v becomes a member of
2 We thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this formulation of the proof.
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coalition Ppipvq, its negative contribution through path p equals ´ 1σsv , where σsv denotes the
number of paths that start with s and end with v.
Next, we analyse the probability of such a negative contribution of vertex v. Observe that
if the marginal contribution is negative, then p must end with v. However, the opposite does
not necessarily hold, i.e., if p ends with v then the marginal contribution of v is not necessarily
negative; it could also be neutral. Based on this, in order to compute the probability of a negative
contribution, we will start by focusing on the complementary event where v makes a neutral
contribution to the set Ppipvq, as this simplifies the computational analysis. This complementary
event happens if and only if either vertex s—the starting point of path p—belongs to set Ppipvq,
or the path p is not controlled by any of the vertices in Ppipvq. Formally:
s P Ppipvq _ pΨppq X Ppipvqq “ H.
Based on this, we can introduce a Bernoulli random variable Bv´,p indicating whether vertex v
makes a negative contribution through path p to set Ppipvq as follows:
Er´ 1
σsv
B´v,ps “ ´ 1σsv p1´ P rs P Ppipvq _ pΨppq X Ppipvqq “ Hsq.
Again, one can show with the combinatorial arguments presented in Theorem 2 that this
probability is P rΨppq X Ppipvq “ Hs “ 1|Ψppq| . Furthermore, due to symmetry, we have:
P rs P Ppipvqs “ 12 . Finally, from the disjointness of the aforementioned complementary events,
we have:
Er´ 1
σsv
B´v,ps “ 2´ |Ψppq|2σsv|Ψppq| . (5.4)
Recall that our analysis was divided into three exhaustive cases, where the marginal
contribution is positive, negative, or neutral. Having dealt with the first two cases, it remains to
deal with the case of neutral marginal contribution. Since this case does not affect the expected
marginal contribution of v to Ppipvq, we simply disregard it during the computation.
Next, let us compute the expected marginal contribution, by aggregating the cases of positive
and negative contributions. To this end, let Bst be the set of all shortest paths from s to t, and
analogously let Bstpvq Ď Bst be the set of shortest paths from s to t that pass through vertex v.3
Now, using the expected value of the Bernoulli random variables (5.3) and (5.4) we are able
to compute the Shapley value of vertex v, which is the expected marginal contribution of v to
Ppipvq, as:
3 Note that σst “ |Bst| and σstpvq “ |Bstpvq|.
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φSVv pV pGq, νq “
ÿ
s‰v‰t
ÿ
pPBstpvq
Er 1
σst
B`v,ps `
ÿ
s‰v
ÿ
pPBsv
Er´ 1
σst
B´v,ps
“
ÿ
s‰v‰t
ÿ
pPBstpvq
1
σst|Ψppq| `
ÿ
s‰v
ÿ
pPBsv
2´ |Ψppq|
2σsv|Ψppq| . (5.5)
Interestingly, the above equation provides insight into the Shapley value-based betweenness
centrality, which is a combination of two factors. Firstly, the left sum resembles the standard
betweenness centrality, but scaled by the number of vertices that belong to each shortest path.
Secondly, the right sum resembles the closeness centrality,4 but with distances measured as the
number of vertices on the shortest paths.
5.3.5. A Look at Marginal Contribution for the Semivalue
We start our analysis by rewriting equation (5.2) as:
φSEMIv pV, νq “
ÿ
1ďkď|V |
PDpV, kqEk´1,vr¨s, (5.6)
where Ek´1,vr¨s is the expected marginal contribution of vertex v to a random coalition of
size k ´ 1. So, analogously to the previous subsection, we need to analytically compute the
probability that the node v contributes to a coalition through a shortest path p. Again, here we
only focus on the case of positive contribution and the case of negative contribution, since the
neutral case has no impact on the expected marginal contribution. We will denote by Sk´1 Ď V
a random coalition of size k ´ 1 uniformly drawn from the set tS Ď V ztvu : |S| “ k ´ 1u.
Firstly, we consider positive contributions. In what follows, let us focus on some particular
shortest path p which contains vertex v. This path has a positive contribution to the coalition
Sk´1 through v if and only if it is not controlled by (i.e., does not pass through) any vertex
from set Sk´1. In this case, the positive contribution equals 1σst . The necessary and sufficient
condition for this to happen can be expressed by ΨppqXSk´1 “ H, where Ψppq is the set of all
vertices lying on the path p including endpoints.
Now, let us introduce a Bernoulli random variable BS`k´1,v,p which indicates whether vertex
v makes a positive contribution through path p to set Sk´1. Note that, if |V | ´ Ψppq ă k ´ 1
then the probability of this event equals 0. Otherwise, we have:
4 Recall that closeness centrality assigns to each vertex v the value of
ř
u
1
dpu,vq .
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Er 1
σst
BS`k´1,v,ps “
1
σst
P rΨppq X Sk´1 “ Hs “ 1
σst
`|V |´Ψppq
k´1
˘`|V |´1
k´1
˘
“ p|V | ´Ψppqq!p|V | ´ kq!
σstp|V | ´Ψppq ´ k ` 1q!p|V | ´ 1q! , (5.7)
where P r¨s denotes probability, and Er¨s denotes expected value. In other words, we need to
know the probability of having random set Sk´1 containing v and not containing any vertex
from Ψppqztvu.
Having analysed the case of positive contribution, we now move on to the case of negative
contribution. This happens when the path p ends with v and is controlled by the set Sk´1, i.e., p
passes through at least one of the nodes in Sk´1, where v R Sk´1. As in the previous subsection,
we will simplify the analysis by focusing on the complementary event in which the marginal
contribution is neutral. Observe that v makes a neutral contribution to set Sk´1 through a path
p P Bsv if and only if either vertex s—the end point of path p—belongs to the set Sk´1, or the
path is not controlled by any of the vertices in Sk´1. Formally:
s P Sk´1 _ pΨppq X Sk´1q “ H.
Based on this, we can introduce a Bernoulli random variable BS´k´1,v,p indicating whether that
vertex v makes a negative contribution through path p to set Sk´1. Now if |V | ´Ψppq ě k ´ 1,
we obtain the following expression:
Er´ 1
σsv
BS´k´1,v,ps “ ´
1
σsv
p1´ P rs P Sk´1 _ pΨppq X Sk´1q “ Hsq
“ ´ 1
σsv
´
1´` k ´ 1|V | ´ 1` p|V |´Ψppqq!p|V | ´ kq!p|V |´Ψppq´k`1q!p|V |´1q!˘¯
“ k ´ 1
σsvp|V |´1q `
p|V |´Ψppqq!p|V | ´ kq!
σsvp|V |´Ψppq´k`1q!p|V |´1q!q´
1
σsv
. (5.8)
On the other hand, if |V | ´Ψppq ă k ´ 1, we obtain the following expression:
Er´ 1
σsv
BS´k´1,v,ps “
k ´ 1
σsvp|V |´1q ´
1
σsv
. (5.9)
Now, let us compute the expected marginal contribution, by aggregating the cases of positive
and negative contributions. To this end, recall that Bst is the set of all shortest paths from s to t,
and, analogously, Bstpvq Ď Bst is the set of shortest paths from s to t passing through vertex v.
Now, using the expected value of Bernoulli random variables (5.7), (5.8) and (5.9) we are able
to compute the Semivalue of vertex v by using equation (5.6):
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φSEMIv “
ÿ
0ďkď|V |´1
PDpV,k`1q
´ÿ
s‰v‰t
ÿ
pPBstpvq
Er 1
σst
BS`k,v,ps`
ÿ
s‰v
ÿ
pPBsv
Er´ 1
σst
BS´k,v,ps
¯
“
ÿ
1ďkď|V |
PDpV, kq˜
ÿ
s‰v‰t
ÿ
pPBstpvq
|V |´Ψppqěk´1
p|V |´Ψppqq!p|V |´kq!
σstp|V |´Ψppq´k`1q!p|V |´1q!
`
ÿ
s‰v
´ k ´ |V |
|V |´1 `
ÿ
pPBsv
|V |´Ψppqěk´1
p|V |´Ψppqq!p|V | ´ kq!
σsvp|V |´Ψppq´k`1q!p|V |´1q!
¯¸
. (5.10)
While the closed-form formulas (5.10) and (5.5) allow us to efficiently compute in
polynomial time the Shapley value-based and Semivalue-based betweenness centralities,
respectively, in the following section we introduce algorithms that perform this computation
even more efficiently.
5.4. Algorithms to Compute the Shapley Value and Semivalue based
Betweenness Centralities
Generally speaking, given a graph G, computing the Shapley value takes Op2|V pGq|q time (to
consider all subsets of V pGq). To circumvent this major obstacle, we proposed formulas (5.5)
and (5.10) to compute in polynomial time the Shapley Value and the Semivalue, respectively.
To speed up the computation even further, we propose in this section four algorithms:
1. Algorithm SVB computes the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality given an
unweighted graph;
2. Algorithm SB computes the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality given an unweighted
graph;
3. Algorithm WSVB computes the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality given a
weighted graph;
4. Algorithm WSB computes the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality given a weighted
graph.
We also show in this section how the above algorithms can be easily adapted to work on
directed graphs. Interestingly, we show that Algorithm SVB has the same complexity as the
best known algorithm to compute the standard betweenness centrality (due to Brandes, 2001).
Our algorithms are based on a general framework proposed in this chapter, which generalises
Brandes’ framework [Brandes, 2001].
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This section is structured as follows. Section 5.4.1 introduces our generalisation of Brandes’
framework for unweighted graphs. Building upon it, Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 introduce
Algorithm SVB and Algorithm SB, respectively. After that, in Section 5.4.4, we introduce our
generalisation of Brandes’ framework for weighted graphs. Finally, Sections 5.4.5 and 5.4.6
introduce Algorithm WSVB and Algorithm WSVB, respectively.
5.4.1. The Framework for Unweigthed Graphs
In order to compute the standard betweenness centrality for all nodes, a naïve algorithm would
first compute the number of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes, and then for each node
v sum up all pair-dependencies, which are defined as σstpvq
σst
. This process takes Op|V |3q time.
Brandes [2001] proposed an algorithm to improve this complexity by using some recursive
relation. This algorithm runs in Op|V | ¨ |E|q time, and requires Op|V | ` |E|q space.
Next, we propose a framework that generalises Brandes’ algorithm. We start by defining
pair-dependency as:
δs,tpvq “ σstpvq
σst
fδpdps, tqq, (5.11)
which is the positive contribution that all shortest paths between s and t make to the assessment
of vertex v. The value of the function fδ depends solely on the distance between s and t. For
instance, if we set fδ “ 1dps,tq we obtain the distance-scaled betweenness centrality introduced
by Borgatti and Everett [2006].
Next, we define one-side dependency as:
δs,¨pvq “
ÿ
tPV
δs,tpvq, (5.12)
which is the positive contribution that all shortest paths starting in vertex s make to the
assessment of vertex v. Now, building upon the recursive equation proposed by Brandes [2001],
we obtain the following:
δs,¨pvq “
ÿ
w: pv,wqPE
dps,wq“dps,vq`1
σsv
σsw
ˆ
fδpdps, wqq ` δs,¨pwq
˙
. (5.13)
Using the above equation, we can compute what we call the parameterised betweenness
centrality cfg for a vertex v by iterating over all other vertices and summing their contributions
as follows:
cfgpvq “
ÿ
s‰v
ˆ
δs,¨pvq ` gδpdps, vqq
˙
, (5.14)
where the value of the function gδ depends solely on the distance between s and v.
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Algorithm 11: PBC—a general framework to compute the parametrised betweenness
centrality in unweighted graphs
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq, functions: fδ and gδ
Data: queue Q, stack S for each v P V and some source s
dps, vq : distance from v to the source s
Predspvq : list of predecessors of v on the shortest paths from source s
σsv : the number of shortest paths from s to v
δs,¨pvq : the one-side dependency of s on v
Output: cfgpvq parametrised betweenness centrality for each vertex v P V
1 foreach v P V do cfgpvq Ð 0;
2 foreach s P V do
3 foreach v P V do
4 Predspvq Ð empty list; dps, vq Ð 8; σsv Ð 0;
5 dps, sq Ð 1; σss Ð 1; enqueue sÑ Q;
6 while Q is not empty do
7 dequeue v Ð Q; push v Ñ S;
8 foreach w such that pv, wq P E do
9 if dps, wq “ 8 then
10 dps, wq Ð dps, vq ` 1; enqueue w Ñ Q;
11 if dps, wq “ dps, vq ` 1 then
12 σsw Ð σsw ` σsv; append v Ñ Predspwq;
13 foreach v P V do
14 δs,¨pvq Ð 0;
15 while S is not empty do
16 pop w Ð S;
17 foreach v P Predspwq do
18 δs,¨pvq Ð δs,¨pvq ` σsv
σsw
pfδpdps, wqq ` δs,¨pwqq;
19 if w ‰ s then
20 cfgpwq Ð cfgpwq ` δs,¨pwq ` 2gδpdps, wqq;
21 foreach v P V do
22 cfgpvq “ cfgpvq
2
;
Now, we are ready to introduce our generalised framework, PBC (see Algorithm 11)
for computing the parametrised betweenness centrality in unweighted graphs. More
specifically, this framework modifies Brandes’ approach and computes the betweenness
centrality parametrised by two functions: fδ and gδ. All lines that differ from the original
Brandes’ algorithm were highlighted.
Firstly, in lines 6 - 12, the algorithm calculates both the distance and the number of shortest
paths from a source s to each vertex. These lines are exactly the same as in the original
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algorithm introduced by Brandes. While executing these lines, for each vertex v, all directly
preceding vertices occurring on shortest paths from s to v are stored in memory. This process
uses Breadth-First Search [Cormen, 2001] which takes Op|V |q time and Op|V | ` |E|q space. In
the second step (lines 18 and 20), the algorithm uses formula (5.14) to calculate the contribution
of the source s to the value of our betweenness centrality for each vertex that is reachable from
the source. This step also takes Op|V |q time and Op|V | ` |E|q space. Only lines 18 and 20 and
additionally line 21 differ from the original Brandes algorithm.
As visible in formula (5.14), in an undirected graph, each path is considered twice. Thus,
at the end of the algorithm, in line 21, we halve the accumulated result. In line 20, we multiply
the influence of the function gδ by two, because the influence of each source even in undirected
graphs is considered only once. Finally, we note that it is very easy to adopt Algorithm 11 to
directed graphs. To this end, we remove the loop from line 21 and halve the contribution of the
vertex s from line 20, which now should look as follows:
20 : cfgpwq Ð cfgpwq ` δs,¨pwq ` gδpdps, wqq;
So, for directed and undirected graphs, the algorithm runs in Op|V | ¨ |E|q time, and requires
Op|V | ` |E|q space.
5.4.2. The Algorithm for the Shapley Value-based Betweenness Centrality for
Unweighted Graph
In this subsection we will construct an efficient algorithm for computing the Shapley
value-based betweenness centrality for unweighted graphs. Specifically, in such graphs, the
number of vertices on the shortest path between s and t is equal to the distance between s and
t, denoted as dps, tq.5 In other words, we have: |Ψppq| “ dps, tq. Based on this, it is possible to
simplify (5.5) as follows:
φSVv pV pGq, νq “
ÿ
s‰v‰t
ÿ
pPBstpvq
1
σstdps, tq `
ÿ
s‰v
ÿ
pPBsv
2´ dps, vq
2σsvdps, vq
“
ÿ
s‰v
ˆÿ
t‰v
σstpvq
σstdps, tq `
2´ dps, vq
2dps, vq
˙
. (5.15)
The above equation provides the same insight as equation (5.5) but for specific unweighted
graphs. By transforming the second element of the inner sum 2´dps,vq
2dps,vq “ 1dps,vq ´ 12 we find that,
in unweighted graphs, the Shapley value using group betweenness centrality as a characteristic
function is in fact the sum of the distanced scaled betweenness centrality (introduced by
5 For notational convenience, we assume the distance between two vertices to be the number of vertices on
the shortest path between them (not the number of edges), e.g., dps, sq “ 1.
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Algorithm 12: SVB SV-based betweenness centrality
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq
Output: φSVv SV-based betweenness centrality for each vertex v P V
1 fδpdq Ð 1d ;
2 gδpdq Ð 2´d2d ;
3 PBCpG, fδ, gδq
Borgatti and Everett, 2006) and the closeness centrality, shifted by half. Additionally, the above
equation allows us to compute the Shapley value-based betweenness centrality in Op|V |3q, but
this result will be improved further.
Now, we adopt the framework presented in the previous subsection in order to accommodate
equation (5.15). We simply need to set fδ “ 1dps,tq and set gδ “ 2´dps,vq2dps,vq . This way, we can
use our general framework—PBC, see Algorithm 11—to compute the Shapley value-based
betweenness centrality in Op|V ||E|q. This method is presented in Algorithm 12.
5.4.3. The Algorithm for the Semivalue-based Betweenness Centrality for Unweighted
Graphs
We will follow the same reasoning as in the previous subsection. Specifically, since in
unweighted graphs it holds that |Ψppq| “ dps, tq, we can transform equation (5.10) into:
φSEMIv pV pGq, νq“
ÿ
1ďkď|V |
PDpV, kq˜
ÿ
s‰v‰t
ÿ
pPBstpvq
|V |´dps,tqěk´1
p|V |dps, tqq!p|V |´kq!
σstp|V |´dps, tq´k`1q!p|V |´1q!
`
ÿ
s‰v
´ k ´ |V |
|V |´1 `
ÿ
pPBsv
|V |´dps,vqěk´1
p|V |´dps, vqq!p|V | ´ kq!
σsvp|V |´dps, vq´k`1q!p|V |´1q!
¯¸
“
ÿ
1ďkď|V |
PDpV, kq
˜ ÿ
s‰v‰t
|V |´dps,tqěk´1
σstpvqp|V |´dps, tqq!p|V | ´ kq!
σstp|V |´dps, tq´k`1q!p|V | ´ 1q!
`
ÿ
s‰v
|V |´dps,vqěk´1
´ p|V |´dps, vqq!p|V | ´ kq!
p|V |´dps, vq´k`1q!p|V |´1q!
¯
` k ´ |V |
¸
. (5.16)
Our framework can be easily adopted to deal with the Semivalue; all we need to do is to
set:
fδ “
$’’&’’%
p|V |´dq!p|V |´kq!
p|V |´d´k`1q!p|V |´1q! if |V | ´ dps, tq ě k ´ 1
0 if |V | ´ dps, tq ă k ´ 1
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Algorithm 13: SB Semivalue-based betweenness centrality
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq
Output: φSEMIv Semivalue-based betweenness centrality for each vertex v P V
1 fδpdq Ð if |V | ´ d ě k ´ 1 then p|V |´dq!p|V |´kq!p|V |´d´k`1q!p|V |´1q! else 0 gδpdq Ð fδpdq ` k´|V ||V |´1 ;
2 for k Ð 1 to |V | do
3 PBCpG, fδ, gδq ;
4 foreach v P V do
5 φSEMIv Ð PDpV, kqcfgpvq;
and set gδ “ fδ ` k´|V ||V |´1 . This way, we can use equation (5.16) along with our general
framework—PBC, see Algorithm 11—to compute the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality
for unweighted graphs in Op|V |2|E|q time. The pseudo code is provided in Algorithm 13.
5.4.4. The Framework for Weighted Graphs
While the focus of the previous subsections was on unweighted graphs, in this subsection we
show how to generalise our framework to deal with weighted graphs. In particular, we consider
one of the most popular semantics of weighted graphs, where the weight λpv, uq of the edge
between v and u is interpreted as the distance between v and u . Thus, unlike the case with
unweighted graphs, where |Ψppq| “ dps, tq, in the case of weighted graphs this equality does
not necessarily hold.
To introduce our generalised framework, we need additional notation. Let Tstris : i P
t1, . . . , |V |u be the number of shortest paths between s and t that contain exactly i vertices. The
array Tst uniquely determines the polynomial Wst with terms Tstrisxi. We define the following
operations on Tst:
— Shifting: TÑst and TÐst increase and decrease the indices of all values of the array by one,
respectively. This takes Op|V |q time.
— Adding: Tsv‘Tsu is the operation of adding two polynomialsWsv andWsu. It takesOp|V |q
time. We will denote by
À
the sum of a series of polynomials.
— Multiplying: Tsv b Tvt is the operation of multiplying two polynomials Wsv and Wvt. This
takesOp|V | log |V |q time using the polynomial multiplying algorithm from [Cormen, 2001].
— Resetting: Tsv Ð 0 is an operation that assigns 0 to each cell in Tsv.
Next, we will show how the above operations allow us to tackle two algorithmic problems:
(i) how to count all shortest paths and (ii) how to derive the recursive relation in order to compute
one-side dependency. We start by considering the first of those problems, i.e., counting the
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shortest paths. Here, we will use the following relation:
Tsv “
à
u: dps,uq`λpu,vq“dps,vq
TÑsu . (5.17)
Using Dijkstra’s algorithm [Cormen, 2001], as well as equation (5.17), we can compute Tst
for every pair of nodes s and t. If vertex u immediately precedes vertex v on some shortest path
from source s, all shortest paths stored in Tsu extended by vertex v are part of the set of shortest
paths stored in Tsv. This procedure takes Op|V |2|E| ` |V |2 log |V |q time.
Secondly, in order to count all paths passing through a given node v, we will introduce the
following relationship, where Tstpvq is an array defined just like Tst except that it only counts
the shortest paths between vertices s and t that pass through v:
Tstpvq “ pTsv b TvtqÐst “ Tsv b TÐvt . (5.18)
The above equation can be interpreted as follows. Every path stored in the array Tsv can be
extended by every path stored in the array Tvt. The outcome of this operation, which is in fact
the multiplication of the two polynomials Wsv and Wvt, gives us information about all shortest
paths from s to t passing through v. The vertex v is counted twice. To avoid duplicate counting,
we shift the result of multiplication to the left, which effectively reduces the number of nodes
in each path by one.
In weighted graphs the pair-dependency limited to the shortest paths consisting of i nodes
is defined as follows:
δ˚s,tpvqris “ Tstpvqrisσst fδ˚piq. (5.19)
This limited pair-dependency measures the influence of all shortest paths between s and t
consisting of i nodes on the evaluation of vertex v. The value of the function fδ˚ depends
solely on the number of nodes lying on the shortest paths between s and t.
Taking all possible values of i into consideration, we obtain the pair-dependency in weighted
graphs:
δ˚s,tpvq “
|V |ÿ
i“1
δ˚s,tpvqris, (5.20)
which is the positive contribution that all shortest paths between s and t make to the assessment
of vertex v,
The definition of one-side dependency is similar to the one presented earlier in
Subsection 5.4.1, except that we replace δ with δ˚:
δ˚s,¨pvq “
ÿ
tPV
δ˚s,tpvq. (5.21)
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This is the positive contribution that all shortest paths starting with vertex s make to the
evaluation of vertex v. The version of equation (5.21) that only considers the shortest paths
containing exactly i nodes each is:
δ˚s,¨pvqris “
ÿ
tPV
δ˚s,tpvqris, (5.22)
Now, we are able to infer the recursive relation for weighted graphs:
δ˚s,¨pvqris “
ÿ
w: pv,wqPE
dps,wq“dps,vq`1
Tsvris
σsw
ˆ
fδ˚pi` 1q ` δ˚s,¨pwqri` 1s
˙
. (5.23)
Using the above equation, we are able to compute a parametrised betweenness centrality for
weighted graphs cf˚g. More specifically, for a vertex v, we compute cf˚gpvq by iterating over all
other vertices and summing their contributions. More formally:
c˚fgpvq “
ÿ
s‰v
|V |ÿ
i“1
ˆ
δ˚s,¨pvqris ` Tsvrisσsv gδ˚piq
˙
, (5.24)
where the value of the function gδ˚ depends solely on the number of nodes lying on the shortest
paths between s and v.
Now, we are ready to introduce our general framework, namely WPBC (see Algorithm
14) to compute the parametrised betweenness centrality in weighted graphs. All lines that
differ from the original Brandes’ algorithm were highlighted. In lines 3 - 12 the algorithm uses
Dijkstra’s algorithm [Cormen, 2001] to traverse the graph and count all shortest paths from the
source s. In these lines it essentially differs from Brandes algorithm, because it uses polynomial
arithmetic to count paths and number of nodes lying on these paths. Next, in lines 18 and 20,
which also differ from Brandes’ framework, we implemented the recursive formula (5.23).
Algorithm 14 runs in Op|V |2|E| ` |V |2 log |V |q time and requires Op|V |2q space.
Furthermore, this algorithm (just like Algorithm 11) can be easily adapted to directed graphs.
5.4.5. The Algorithm for Shapley Value-based Betweenness Centrality in Weighted
Graphs
In this subsection we will construct an efficient algorithm for computing the Shapley
Value-based betweenness centrality for weighted graphs. We will use the notation introduced
in the previous subsection, and transform equation (5.5) into:
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Algorithm 14: WPBC—a general framework to compute the parametrised betweenness
centrality in weighted graphs
Input: weighted graph G “ pV,Eq, with weight function λ : E Ñ R`
Data: priority queue Q with key dpq, stack S
dps, vq : the distance from s to v
Predspvq : the list of predecessors of v on the shortest paths from source s
σsv : the number of shortest paths from s to v
δs˚,¨pvqris : one-side dependency of s on v
T rissv : the number of shortest paths from s to v containing i vertices
Output: cf˚gpvq parametrised betweenness centrality
1 foreach s P V do
2 foreach v P V do Predspvq Ð empty list; dps, vq Ð 8; σsv Ð 0;
dps, sq Ð 1; σss Ð 1; Tssr1s Ð 1; enqueue sÑ Q;
3 while Q is not empty do
4 extract v Ð Q with minimal dps, vq; push v Ñ S;
5 foreach w such that pv, wq P E do
6 if dps, wq ą dps, vq ` λpv, wq then
7 dps, wq Ð dps, vq ` λpv, wq;
8 insert{update w Ñ Q with dps, wq;
9 σsw Ð 0; Tsw Ð 0; Predspwq Ð empty list;
10 if dps, wq “ dps, vq ` λpv, wq then
11 σsw Ð σsw ` σsv; Tsw “ Tsw ‘ TÑsv ;
12 append v Ñ Predspwq;
13 foreach v P V do
14 δs˚,¨pvq Ð 0;
15 while S is not empty do
16 pop w Ð S;
17 foreach v P Predspwq do for iÐ 1 to |V | ´ 1 do
18 δ˚s,¨pvqris Ð δ˚s,¨pvqris ` Tsvrisσsw
ˆ
fδ˚pi` 1q ` δ˚s,¨pwqri` 1s
˙
;
19 if w ‰ s then for iÐ 1 to |V | do
20 c˚fgpwq Ð c˚fgpwq ` δ˚s,¨pwqris ` 2Tswrisσsw g
˚
δ piq;
21 foreach v P V do c˚fgpvq “
cf˚gpvq
2
;
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Algorithm 15: WSVB Weighted SV-based betweenness centrality
Input: weighted graph G “ pV,Eq, with weight function λ : E Ñ R`
Output: φSVv weighted SV-based betweenness centrality for each v P V
1 fδ˚ piq Ð 1i ;
2 gδ˚ piq Ð 2´i2i ;
3 WPBCpG, λ, fδ˚ , gδ˚ q
φSVv pV pGq, νq “
ÿ
s‰v
ˆÿ
t‰v
|V |ÿ
i“1
Tstpvqris
σst i
`
|V |ÿ
i“1
Tsvrisp2´ iq
2σsv i
˙
. (5.25)
The framework for weighted graphs (introduced in Section 5.4.4) can be used to compute
(5.25). All we need is to define fδ˚ piq “ 1i and gδ˚ piq “ 2´i2i . By doing so, we can use our
general framework—WPBC, see Algorithm 14—to compute the weighted Shapley value-based
betweenness centrality for all nodes in Op|V |2|E| ` |V |2 log |V |q. This method is presented in
Algorithm 15.
5.4.6. The Algorithm for Semivalue-based Betweenness Centrality in Weighted Graphs
In this subsection we use our framework for weighted graphs, namely WPBC (see
Algorithm 14), to compute the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality for weighted graphs.
To this end, we can transform equation (5.10) into:
φSEMIv pV pGq, νq“
ÿ
1ďkď|V |
PDpV, kq˜
ÿ
s‰v‰t
|V |´iěk´1ÿ
i“1
Tstpvqrisp|V |´ iq!p|V |´kq!
σstp|V |´ i´k`1q!p|V |´1q!
`
ÿ
s‰v
´ k ´ |V |
|V |´1 `
|V |´iěk´1ÿ
i“1
Tsvrisp|V |´ iq!p|V | ´ kq!
σsvp|V |´ i´k`1q!p|V |´1q!
¯¸
. (5.26)
Our framework can be easily adopted to deal with Semivalues; all we need is to set:
f˚δ piq “
$’’&’’%
p|V |´iq!p|V |´kq!
p|V |´i´k`1q!p|V |´1q! if |V | ´ i ě k ´ 1
0 if |V | ´ i ă k ´ 1
and set gδ˚ “ fδ˚ ` k´|V ||V |´1 . This way, we can use our general framework for weighted graphs,
namely WPBC (see Algorithm 14) to compute the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality in
Op|V |3|E| ` |V |3 log |V |q time. The pseudo code is presented in Algorithm 16.
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Algorithm 16: WSB Weighted Semivalue-based betweenness centrality
Input: weighted graph G “ pV,Eq, with weight function λ : E Ñ R`
Output: φSEMIv weighted Semivalue-based betweenness centrality for v P V
1 fδ˚ piq Ð if |V | ´ i ě k ´ 1 then p|V |´iq!p|V |´kq!p|V |´i´k`1q!p|V |´1q! else 0 gδ˚ piq Ð fδ˚ piq ` k´|V ||V |´1 ;
2 for k Ð 1 to |V | do
3 WPBCpG, λ, fδ˚ , gδ˚ q ;
4 foreach v P V do
5 φSEMIv Ð PDpV, kqcf˚gpvq;
5.5. Simulations
So far, we argued that centrality measures based on Semivalues in general, and on the Shapley
value in particular, can help analyse networks in situations where simultaneous incidents may
occur. Furthermore, we presented polynomial time algorithms to compute both the Shapley
value-based and Semivalue-based betweenness centralities, for weighted graphs as well as
unweighted graphs. This section provides an empirical evaluation of the above contributions.
In particular, Section 5.5.1 compares our centrality measures against standard betweenness
centrality, in a scenario where simultaneous node failures are simulated. In particular, we
compare the effectiveness of both measures when tackling Problem 3. Section 5.5.2 evaluates
the running time of our algorithms, and compares them against the Monte Carlo method—the
only available alternative in the literature.
We carry out our experiments on weighted and unweighted random scale-free graphs, which
are created using the preferential attachment mechanism introduced by Barabási and Albert
[1999]. We also carry out experiments on two real-life network: (1) the email communication
networks introduced by Guimerà et al. [2003], which contains 1133 nodes and 5451 edges, and
(2) the neural system of C. elegans studied by Watts and Strogatz [1998], which contains 297
nodes and 2359 edges.
5.5.1. Evaluating our Centrality Measure
In this subsection, we compare the node ranking obtained by the Semivalue-based betweenness
centrality against the node ranking obtained by standard betweenness centrality. Note that, by
this evaluation, we also implicitly evaluate our Shapley value-based betweenness centrality, as
it is a special case of the Semivalue-based one.
To this end, let us consider the scenario of network vulnerability (see Section 5.3.1 for more
details). The comprehensive work by Holme et al. [2002] examines how different strategies
of attack on the network affect its performance. In more detail, the authors studied how
removing the nodes with the highest betweenness centrality affects communication throughout
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the network. They found that, in random scale-free networks, removing the nodes with the
highest betweenness centrality causes an exponential decay in network performance. Here,
performance is measured as the average distance between nodes—an important measure used,
e.g., in the seminal paper of Albert et al. [2000] on network vulnerability to attacks and random
node failures.
The literature closely related to the work done by Holme et al. [2002] is about network
vulnerability analysis based on three-stage Stackelberg games [Stackelberg, 1952]. In a
nutshell, two opponents, an interdictor and an operator, try to maximize their gains. In the first
stage, the operator fortifies the network by choosing the nodes that should be fully protect. Next,
the interdictor performs an attack, which involves removing a limited number of unfortified
nodes. Finally, the operator acts on the network in order to fulfill its objectives, e.g., he can
travel between two nodes, or send some load between nodes. The interdictor can be human or
can be of a different nature such as a natural disaster or a random failure of nodes. In such
cases one can assume worst-case scenarios (Murphy’s Law) [Smith and Lim, 2008], or some
stochastic model of interdictor attacks [Cormican et al., 1998]. The instance of Stackelberg
games closely related to this problem is called Shortest Path Interdiction. In such games the
interdictor attempts to remove k edges in order to maximize the distance between two nodes s
and t. This problem is proven to be NP-hard [Ball et al., 1989]. However, Malik et al. [1989]
proposed an effective approximation algorithm and Corley and Sha [1982] solved this problem
in polynomial time for the special case where k “ 1.
In this subsection we follow the Holme’s line of research. We study the resilience of a
network against random failures, where we assume that the level of protection of each node is
determined based on its ranking. In order to carry out our experiment, we first need to agree
on the way in which the functionality of the network will be measured. To this end, we use the
average inverse geodesic measure (IGM), which was used by Albert et al. [2000] and Holme
et al. [2002]. This measure captures the notion of average distance between nodes in a network,
and is given by the following formula:
IGMpV,Eq “
ÿ
vPV
ÿ
v‰uPV
1
dpv, uq .
Our experiment consists of two phases. The first involves generating random graphs and
computing node cardinal rankings. This phase involves the following steps:
1. Generate an unweighted random scale-free graph containing 160 nodes, in which the
average node degree is
?
160.6
2. Set the interval ra, bq, which means that the number of nodes that will be simultaneously
exposed to failure is between a (inclusive) and b (exclusive).
6 We also experimented with alternative values; the results exhibited similar trends.
92
In
ve
rs
e 
G
eo
de
sic
 M
ea
su
re
 (IG
M)
Maximal Allowable Failure Size (parameter b)
The Semivalue-based betweenness
The full protection
 2⋅10-5
 4⋅10-5
 1⋅10-4
 3⋅10-4
 7⋅10-4
 2⋅10-3
 4⋅10-3
 1⋅10-2
 3⋅10-2
 6⋅10-2
 2⋅10-1
 0  15  30  45  60  75  90  105  120  135  150
Figure 5.3: The blue line plots the difference in performance between the Semivalue-based
measure and the standard betweenness centrality on random graphs, where a “ 1 and b “
2, . . . , 160, and where the protection strategy is set to protect nodes with probability 1
rpvq2 .
The confidence interval is set to 75%. The rightmost point of the plot (where the interval is
r1, 160q) represents the special case where the Semivalue-based measure happens to be identical
to the Shapely value-based measure. The red line depicts the performance of the full protection
strategy. The y-axis is in logscale.
3. Compute two rankings of nodes. The first is based on standard betweenness centrality. The
second is based on Semivalue-based betweenness centrality with probability distribution:
PDpV, kq “
#
1
b´a if k P ra, bq
0 otherwise.
The second phase of the experiment involves the following steps:
1. Protect each node v P V . The level of protection of each node is determined based on its
position in the ranking, e.g., if a node is ranked first, then it is the most important node and
so will have the highest level of protection. We study two approaches to nodes protection.
The first one assigns to each node in the ranking the specific power of protection. More
formally, if we denote by rpvq the position of node v in ranking r, then node v is protected
with probability 1
rpvq2 . The second one is to fully protect the top 10% of nodes in the ranking.
93
2. Choose randomly a set of nodes S Ď V , which will be exposed to failure.7 Here, the
number of nodes that are exposed to failure is chosen uniformly at random from the range
ra, bq. Likewise, out of all subsets that have exactly this number of nodes, the subset S is
chosen uniformly at random.
3. Using the first approach implies that v will fail with probability 1´ 1
rpvq2 . Using the second
one indicates that each node v P S will fail if rpvq ă 0.1 ˚ |V |.
Having explained each phase of the experiment, we now explain how the entire experiment
works:
1. Generate 30 random graphs.
2. Set the size of the failure to ra, bq, where a “ 1 and b is running form 2 to 160.
3. For each ra, bq, simulate 5000 simultaneous node failures.
4. Protect nodes depending on the two rankings: standard betweenness centrality and
Semivalue-based betweenness centrality.
5. Compare the average IGM that results from each measure together with confidence interval
of 75%.
6. Compare results to the full protection strategy that will protect all nodes from being
removed.
Figure 5.3 depicts the average difference in IGM between the two centrality measures. On
the plot the blue line is IGMS ´ IGMB, where IGMS is the functionality of the network
when protected according to our centrality measure, while IGMB is the functionality of the
network when protected according to the standard betweenness centrality. The protection
strategy is set to protect each node with probability 1
rpvq2 . The values below zero indicate that
standard betweenness centrality gives better protection to the network, whereas those above
zero indicate that our Semivalue-based centrality gives better protection. As can be seen, when
b is small, the performance of the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality is almost identical to
the standard betweenness centrality. This is expected because our centrality measure, given
the failure interval r1, 2q, is exactly the same as the standard measure. However, as we
increase b, more nodes can fail simultaneously, and so the difference between our measure
and the standard one become more evident. As can be seen, in such cases, our measure
outperforms the standard one in terms of network protection, as more influential nodes (in terms
of maintaining a low average distance throughout the network) are preserved. Note that for the
interval r1, 160q the Semivalue-based centrality is exactly the same as the Shapley value-based
7 In our setting, being exposed to failure does not necessarily imply that the node will fail; this depends on
the level of protection that this node has against failure.
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Figure 5.4: The blue line is the difference in performance between the Semivalue-based measure
and the standard betweenness centrality on random graphs, where a “ 1, . . . , 159 and b “ 160,
and where the protection strategy is set to protect nodes with probability 1
rpvq2 . The confidence
interval is set to 75%. The leftmost point of the plot (where the interval is r1, 160q) represents
the special case where the Semivalue-based measure happens to be identical to the Shapely
value-based measure. The red line depicts the performance of the full protection strategy. The
y-axis is in logscale.
centrality. Additionally, the red line in Figure 5.3 depicts the performance of the full protection
strategy that protects each node from being removed. It is IGMO ´ IGMB, where IGMO is
the functionality of the network when protected according to the full protection strategy, and
IGMB is the functionality of the network when protected according to the standard betweenness
centrality.
Figure 5.4 depicts the same experiment, except that b “ 160 is now constant and a “
1, . . . , 159. As can be seen, for all values of a our measure gives better protection. Again note
that for the interval r1, 160q the Semivalue-based centrality is exactly the same as the Shapley
value-based centrality.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present the repetition of the above two experiments but for the other
protection strategy, where we fully protect top 10% of nodes. The results are somewhat similar,
but the advantage of our measure is less evident. For instance, given a “ 30 in Figure 5.6,
the advantage of our measure is below 7 ¨ 10´5, whereas for the first protection strategy it
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Figure 5.5: The difference in performance
between the Semivalue-based measure and
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a “ 1 and b “ 2, . . . , 100, and the strategy is
to fully protect the top 10% of nodes.
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Figure 5.6: The difference in performance
between the Semivalue-based measure and
the standard betweenness centrality, where
a “ 1, . . . , 99 and b “ 100, and the strategy
is to fully protect the top 10% of nodes.
is above 7 ¨ 10´4. This stems from the fact that the top nodes of the two rankings (i.e., the
Semivalue-based and standard betweenness) are less different than the middle nodes or the
bottom nodes. This is the consequence of the scale-free distribution and existence of powerful
hub nodes that dominate two rankings. Thus, if we protect only the top 10% of nodes, the
difference in performance will be less visible, but our new measure still outperforms standard
betwenneess centrality.
Finally, Figure 5.7 demonstrates that the performance between two specific
Semivalue-based centralities: (1) the Shapley value-based and (2) the Banzhaf-based
does not differ much. That is to say, the two measures can be used interchangeably in this
application.
5.5.2. Evaluating our Algorithms
In this section, the running time of our exact algorithms is compared against that of the Monte
Carlo (MC) sampling algorithm for computing the Shapley value.8 Note that, due to the
exponential number of coalitions in a coalitional game, sampling (as in the MC algorithm) is
the only general-purpose method available in the literature for computing the Shapley value
in reasonable time. Generally speaking, the MC algorithm works by iteratively sampling
permutations of players (or nodes in our case). For each such permutation, pi, and each node v,
the algorithm computes the marginal contribution of v to the coalition consisting of every node
that precedes v in pi. Finally, after several iterations, the algorithm divides the aggregate sum of
8 For a formalisation and a discussion of this algorithm, see [Castro et al., 2009] and [Michalak et al., 2013a],
respectively.
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Figure 5.7: The blue line plots the difference in performance between the Shapley value-based
measure and the standard betweenness centrality, and the red one the difference in performance
between the Baznaf-based measure and the standard betweenness centrality on random graphs,
where a “ 1 and b “ 2, . . . , 100, and where the protection strategy is set to protect nodes with
probability 1
rpvq2 . The y-axis is in logscale.
all marginal contributions for each node by the the number of iterations performed. The time
complexity of this algorithm is OpIter ˆ conq, where Iter denotes the number of iterations
and con denotes the number of operations necessary for computing each marginal contribution.
To optimise con, we implement MC sampling using the fast algorithm for computing group
betweenness centrality presented by Puzis et al. [2007b]. This method guarantees that each
MC iteration takes Op|V |3q time.9 Clearly, the MC sampling is never guaranteed to yield the
exact Shapley values and its performance should be measured by an approximation error. In our
simulations, we compute the average relative error (|1´ approx. valueexact value |) for the value of each node
in the network.
Starting with unweighted graphs, Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 compare the running time
of our exact algorithms against the MC sampling given random networks, and given a real
communication network, respectively. In more detail, Figures 5.8 depicts the average result
9 Note that if we have oracle access to the coalition values (which is a common assumption in the literature),
then con “ 1. However, in our setting we do not make such an assumption. Instead, to obtain the value of a
coalition, we need to compute its group betweenness centrality.
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Figure 5.9: The communication network.
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Figure 5.10: Random graphs with 200 nodes.
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Figure 5.11: The neural system network.
taken over 30 randomly-generated graphs consisting of 500 nodes each, with an average degree
of 25. The shaded area depicts the confidence interval of 75%. As can be seen, the Shapley
value-based betweenness centrality is computed (using Algorithm 12) in 1.2 seconds, while
and Semivalue-based betweenness centrality is computed (using Algorithm 13) in 12.4 minutes.
On the other hand, in order to obtain an admissible average error of 10%, the MC sampling
method takes around 45 hours. Furthermore, obtaining smaller average errors requires an
exponential number of additional operations. Moving on to Figure 5.9, it depicts the results
of the experiment performed on a real email communication network [Guimerà et al., 2003].
As can be seen, Algorithms 12 and 13 take 3.6 seconds and 1.1 hour to compute Shapley
value-based and Semivalue-based betweenness centrality, respectively. In contrast, the MC
sampling is unable to guarantee a better approximation than 15% even after 40 hours.
Having presented our results for unweighted graphs, we now move on to weighted graphs.
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 compare the performance of our algorithms against the MC sampling,
given random networks, and a real neural network, respectively. In more detail, Figure 5.10
depicts the average result taken over 30 randomly-generated graphs consisting of 200 nodes
each, with an average degree of 15. Weights of edges were chosen uniformly at random from
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Standard Group SV-based Efficient Semivalue-based Efficient
centrality centrality centrality computation centrality computation
node Everett and Narayanam and Chapter 4 [Szczepan´ski et al., 2015b]
Borgatti [1999] Narahari (2010)
closeness Everett and Chapter 4 Chapter 4 [Szczepan´ski et al., 2015b]
Borgatti [1999]
betweenness Everett and this chapter this chapter this chapter this chapter
Borgatti [1999]
Table 5.2: Summary of the results obtained in this chapter vs. other contributions in the
literature.
the range r1, 100s. The shaded area depicts the confidence interval of 75%. As can be seen, the
Shapley value-based betweenness centrality is computed (using Algorithm 15) in 16 seconds,
while the Semivalue-based betweenness centrality is computed (using Algorithm 16) in 48
minutes. On the other hand, in order to obtain an admissible average error of 10%, the MC
sampling takes around 4 hours. Moving on to Figure 5.11, it depicts the experiment performed
on a real neural network [Watts and Strogatz, 1998]. As can be seen, Algorithms 15 and 16
take 45 seconds and 4 hours to compute Shaple-value-based and Semivalue-based betweenness
centralities, respectively.
5.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, was proposed an extension of betweenness centrality, based on Semivalues—a
wide and flexible family of solution concepts from coalitional game theory. Our new measure
provides a ranking of individual nodes while taking into consideration the synergies that may
exist in different groups of nodes. The main contributions of this chapter are summarised in
contrast to the literature in Table 5.2.
Despite the fact that Semivalues are, in general, computationally challenging, we
showed that the new measure can be computed efficiently. More specifically, we proposed
polynomial-time algorithms to compute all Semivalue-based betweenness centralities for
weighted graphs as well as unweighted graphs. These include both the Shapley value-based
and Banzhaf power index-based betweenness centralities. Interestingly, our algorithm for
computing the Shapley value-based centrality for the unweighted networks has the same time
complexity as the best known algorithm due to [Brandes, 2001] for computing the standard
betweenness centrality.
We evaluated our algorithms empirically on weighted and unweighted random scale-free
graphs Barabási and Albert [1999] as well as on two real networks. Our algorithms turned
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out to be significantly faster than the Monte Carlo sampling [Castro et al., 2009]—the fastest
alternative from the literature.
We also evaluated our centrality measures in a simulated scenario in which simultaneous
node failures occur. Here, following Albert et al., 2000, and Holme et al.,2002, we quantified
the functionality of the network based on the average inverse geodesic measure. The results
showed that, compared to the standard measure, the ranking obtained by our game-theoretic
network centrality reflects more accurately the influence that different nodes have on the
network functionality.
6. A Centrality Measure for Networks With
Community Structure Based on a Generalization of
the Owen Value
In the previous chapters we presented the game-theoretic centrality measures based on Shaply
value and Semivalues. In this chapter we propose the first measure of node centrality that takes
into account the community structure of the underlying network. To allow for flexible modeling
of community structures, we propose a generalization of the Owen value—a well-known
solution concept from cooperative game theory to study games with a priori-given unions of
players. As a result we obtain the first measure of centrality that accounts for both the value of
an individual node’s relationships within the network and the quality of the community this node
belongs to. We use our measure to evaluate citation networks, where all publications belong to
naturally defined science communities united under journal titles and conference venues.
All technical contributions presented in this chapter were made exclusively by the author of
this dissertation.
6.1. Introduction
Real-world networks frequently have highly complex structures. They can often
be characterized by properties such as heavy-tailed degree distributions, clustering, the
small-world property, etc. Another important characteristics that many real-life networks have
in common is their community structure [Girvan and Newman, 2002, Newman, 2006] (see
Section 2.8). Communities are usually composed of nodes that are more densely connected
internally than with other nodes in the network. For instance, the teachers from a particular
secondary school may form a community within the social network of all teachers in the city.
Similarly, trade links among the European Union countries are usually more intense than their
links with the rest of the world. In addition, certain communities may be considered to be
stronger than others. Secondary schools may vary in reputation, and some trade blocks may be
more important to the global economy than others.
The importance of a community is usually increased when a new, powerful individual joins
it. Conversely, membership in a strong community may boost the importance of an otherwise
weak individual. Quantifying this latter effect is the primary goal of this paper. In other words,
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we are concerned with the problem of analysing the importance (the centrality) of individual
nodes given the underlying community structure of the network.
In this chapter, we use the flexibility offered by the game-theoretic approach to centrality
measures and constructed first centrality measure in the literature that is able to account for
complex community structures in networks. To this end, we model the community structure
as the a priori given coalition structure of a cooperative game. By doing so, we are able to
build a centrality metric by generalizing the Owen value [Owen, 1977]—a well-known solution
concept for cooperative games in which players are partitioned into pre-defined groups.
In our approach, the computation of a node’s power is a two-step process. First, we
compute the importance of the community (if any) that this node belongs to. Next, we compute
the power of the given node within this community. Our generalization of the Owen value,
which we call coalitional semivalues, is a much broader solution concept. In fact, coalitional
semivalues encompass the Owen value as well as all other solution concepts in the literature
that were developed for games with an a priori defined coalition structure of players: the
Owen-Banzhaf value [Owen, 1982], the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value, and p-binomial
semivalues [Carreras and Puente, 2012].
Although, in general, the new centrality introduced in this chapter is #P-complete (and hence
NP-hard), we are able to give a polynomial algorithm to compute it for problem instances where
the value of any group of nodes is determined by their degree centrality [Freeman, 1979] (see
Definition 15). We verify the practical aspects of our algorithm on a large citation network that
contains more than 2 million nodes and links. Our experiments compare three different degree
centralities: group degree centrality [Everett and Borgatti, 1999], the Shapley value-based
degree centrality (see Definition 26), and our new centrality. We show that, unlike others,
our new centrality produces a ranking in which the power of the top nodes significantly differs,
depending on the power of the communities that these nodes belong to.
6.2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the basic notation for coalitional games with coalitional structure
and also we present the Owen value [Owen, 1977]—the most popular extension of the Shapley
value to games with coalitional structure.
6.2.1. The Coalitional Structure
We already know that the coalition is a group of nodes in coalitional game. The coalitions can be
non-overlapping, which mean that player can belong to only one coalition, and overlapping. In
this dissertation we focus on non-overlapping coalitions. The game divided into fixed coalitions
forms a coalitional structure.
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Definition 30 (Coalitional structure). For a given coalitional game g “ pA, νq the coalitional
structure CS “ tC1, C2, . . . , Cmu is the partition of the set A, which implies that H R CS ,ř
CPCS C “ A and @C1,C2PCSC1 ‰ C2 ùñ C1 X C2 “ H.
One of the most important research topics in coalitional games is to find optimal coalitional
structure [Sandholm et al., 1999, Rahwan et al., 2012]. More formally, this problem
known as optimal coalition structure generation involves solving the following equation:
arg maxCS
ř
CPCS νpCq. Unfortunately, this problem is NP-hard [Sandholm et al., 1999].
Coalitional structure is a very similar to community structure defined on graphs
(Definition 18). In this chapter we use this analogy and propose the first measure of node
centrality that takes into account the community structure and that is based on coalitional games
with coalitional structure.
6.2.2. The Owen Value
Coalitional games can be analysed from both the ex ante and ex post perspectives. In the ex ante
perspective, it is not known which coalition will actually form. The Semivalues (Definition 7)
are ex ante since they consider the sum of the marginal contributions of a player to all possible
coalitions without any additional assumptions.
Another approach is to consider a coalitional game from the ex post perspective. In this case
it is already known which coalitions form by the end of the game. In other words, it is known
how the agents have partitioned themselves into a coalition structure. This ex post perspective
is especially appealing for our model where networks are or can be divided into communities.
The most popular extension of the Shapley value (Definition 5) to “ex post”-like situations
was proposed by Owen [1977]. To this end, let us first introduce the concept of the quotient
game νQ. Given the coalitional game pA, νq and coalitional structure CS “ tC1, C2, . . . , Cmu,
we define a new coalitional game, where the coalitions are considered to be individual players:
νQpRq “ ν
ˆď
rPR
Cr
˙
for all R ĎM,
where the set M “ t1, 2, . . . ,mu represents coalitions’ numbers. Note that ŤrPR Cr is a
coalition of coalitions. We will denote such coalition by QR.
We are now ready to define the Owen value. Given pA, νq and CS “ tC1, C2, . . . , Cmu,
the share of the grand coalition’s payoff, νpAq, given to player ai P Cj P CS according to the
Owen value is given by:
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Definition 31 (The Owen Value). In a coalitional game pA, νq with coalition structure CS the
Owen value for a player ai is given by:
φOVi pA, ν,CS q “
ÿ
RĎMztju
1
|M |`|M |´1|R| ˘
ÿ
CĎCjztaiu
1
|Cj|
`|Cj |´1
|C|
˘MCpQR Y C, iq.
Let us examine the above formula more closely. The computation of the Owen value can
be thought of as a two-step process. In the first step, coalitions play the game pM, νQq between
themselves and receive their Shapley values. In the second step, the values of these communities
are, in turn, divided among their members according to the Shapley value of the members.
The Owen value is the unique division scheme that satisfies the following five often desirable
properties: Efficiency, Symmetry, Null player, Additivity, and Component Symmetry [Owen,
1977], which will be discussed more extensively in the next section.
6.3. The Coalitional Semivalue
In this chapter we introduce a generalization of the Owen value, where more general division
schemes—Semivalues—are used as opposed to the Shapley value within the definition of Owen
value. Specifically, we combine formula for Semivalue (Definition 7) with the formula for the
Owen value (Definition 31) and propose coalitional semivalues.
Definition 32 (The Coalitional Semivalue). In a coalitional game pA, νq with coalition
structure CS the Coalitional Semivalue for a player ai is given by:
φCSEMIi pν,CS q “
ÿ
0ďkă|M |
βpkq
ÿ
0ďlă|Cj |
αjplqETk,ClrMCpQTk Y C l, iqs.
where T k is a random set of size k drawn uniformly from the set Mztju, and C l a the random
set of size l drawn uniformly from the set Cjztiu. The function β : t0, 1, . . . , |M |´ 1u Ñ r0, 1s
is a function such that
ř|M |´1
k“0 βpkq “ 1. tαjujPt1,...,|M |u is a family of functions such that
αj : t0, 1, . . . , |Cj| ´ 1u Ñ r0, 1s and ř|Cj |´1k“0 αjpkq “ 1.
Intuitively, β is a probability distribution used to compute φjpM, νQq, and αj is the
probability distribution used to evaluate the players inside a coalition φipCj, νq. Importantly, as
shown in Table 6.1, by adopting various probability distributions, we can obtain the Owen
value [Owen, 1977], as well as all of its modifications proposed to date in the literature:
Owen-Banzhaf value [Owen, 1982], symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value [Amer et al., 2002],
and symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalues [Carreras and Puente, 2012].1
1 We refrain from the axiomatic characterization of the new solution concept as being out of the scope of this
dissertation.
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Table 6.1: Values of α and β for the Owen value and its various extensions.
Solution name βpkq αjplq
Owen value [Owen, 1977] 1|M |
1
|Cj |
Owen-Banzhaf value [Owen, 1982] p
|M |´1
k q
2|M |´1
p|Cj |´1l q
2|Cj |´1
symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value
[Amer et al., 2002]
p|M |´1k q
2|M |´1
1
|Cj |
symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue
[Carreras and Puente, 2012]
pkp1´ pq|M |´1´k
p P r0, 1s
1
|Cj |
6.4. The New Centrality Measure and Its Properties
Let us now introduce the game-theoretic network centrality measure based on coalitional
semivalues:
Definition 33 (The Coalitional Semivalue-based Centrality). The game-theoretic network
centrality for the graph G with community structure CS is a quadruple pG,CS , ψ, φCSEMI q,
where the value of each node v P V is given by φCSEMIv pνG,CS q, where ψpGq “ νG.
This is the first centrality measure that evaluates nodes by taking into account the community
structure of the network. In the next section, we will consider various properties of this new
measure.
The aim of the rest of this section is to translate the properties of various instances
of coalitional semivalues into the properties of the resulting centrality measure. The first
three properties are derived from Null Player, Additivity and Symmetry, respectively. Let
pG,CS , ψ, φq be a game-theoretic network centrality for the graph G with community structure
CS and v P Cj P CS some node from community Cj .
Property 1. If a node makes no contribution to any community then its value is zero:
@CĎV ztvuMCpC, vq “ 0 ùñ φCSEMIv pνG,CS q “ 0.
Property 2. If two group centralities are combined into one νG = ν 1G ` ν2G then
φCSEMIv pνG,CS q “ φCSEMIv pν 1G,CS q ` φCSEMIv pν2G,CS q.
Property 3. If two nodes from the same community v, u P Cj contribute the same value to all
possible communities then they are equally important: @CĎV ztv,uuMCpC, vq “ MCpC, uq ùñ
φCSEMIv pνG,CS q “ φCSEMIu pνG,CS q.
The next property involves the Quotient game:
Property 4. The power of a community is the aggregation of the power of nodes comprising
this community. Formally: φSEMIj pM, νQGq “
ř
vPCj φ
CSEMI
v pνG,CS q.
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Table 6.2: The properties of coalitional semivalue and its various instances.
Solution name P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
coalitional semivalue [this chapter] X X X ˆ ˆ ˆ
Owen value [Owen, 1977] X X X X X X
Owen-Banzhaf value [Owen, 1982] X X X ˆ ˆ ˆ
symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value
[Amer et al., 2002] X X X X ˆ X
symmetric coalitionalp-binomial semivalue
[Carreras and Puente, 2012] X X X X ˆ X
All the solutions, where the power inside the communities is computed using the Shapley
value (due to the Efficiency), have the above property. In the same spirit, it can required that all
the power of the whole network νGpV q is distributed among the nodes:
Property 5. The value of the whole network νpV q is the aggregation of the power of nodes
comprising this network: νGpV q “ řvPV φCSEMIv pνG,CS q.
Our final property is the translation of Component Symmetry. If we define the marginal
contribution of the coalition C to the set of nodes QT as MCpQT , Cq “ νpQT Y Cq ´ νpQT q,
we get:
Property 6. If two communities contribute the same value to all possible groups of
communities then their evaluation is the same: @TĎMzti,juMCpQT , Ciq “ MCpQT , Cjq ùñ
φSEMIi pM, νQGq “ φSEMIj pM, νQGq.
Table 6.2 summarizes properties of the coalitional semivalues.
6.5. Computational Analysis
For many succinctly represented coalitional games, computing the Shapley value is NP-hard (in
fact, it is often #P-complete (see Section 3.3 or [Chalkiadakis et al., 2011]). Naive algorithms to
compute the Shapley value (exhaustively computing the average marginal contribution over all
orderings of players) have exponential running time. Given this, there are two possible research
directions. Firstly, efficient approximate algorithms can be developed. Secondly, classes of
centralities, that have real-life applications and can be computed in polynomial time, can be
defined. In this chapter, we take the latter approach and propose a polynomial time algorithm
for computing coalitional semivalue-based centralities, where the characteristic function—the
value of any group of nodes—is based on their degree. Thus, our method is build upon degree
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centrality — an important method of evaluating nodes in social networks analysis [Freeman,
1979, Everett and Borgatti, 1999, Michalak et al., 2013a].
6.5.1. Weighted Degree Centrality Measure
In this subsection we define a class of cooperative games such that a node’s value is based on
its degree. The weighted group degree centrality of a community C in graph G is defined as
follows:
ψWDpGq “ νWDG pCq “
ÿ
vPNpCq
fpvq, (6.1)
where NpCq is the set of neighbours of C, and f is a parameter that is a polynomially
computable function.
Definition 34 (The Coalitional Semivalue-based Degree Centrality). A game-theoretic
network weighted degree centrality for the graph G with the community structure CS is
a quadruple pG,CS , ψWD, φCSEMI q, where the value of each node v P V is given by
φCSEMIv pνWDG ,CS q.
In the next section we will look more closely at the marginal contributions of nodes in
order to effectively compute their expected value. This, in turn, will let us compute coalitional
semivalues based on weighted group degree centrality in polynomial time.
6.5.2. The Marginal Contribution Analysis
In this subsection we lay the groundwork for the efficient algorithm that will compute coalitional
semivalues for weighted group degree centrality in polynomial time. To this end, we will use
equation from Definition 1. For a given node, v P Cj P CS , the focus will be on computing the
expected value of its marginal contribution: ETk,ClrMCpQTk Y C l, vqs.
We must consider the value of the expected marginal contribution of a node v to the set
QTk Y C l, where T k is a random set of size k, and C l is a random set of size l. Both sets are
drawn uniformly from the sets Mztju and Cjztvu, respectively. We will construct the effective
algorithm in two steps. First, we will decide under what conditions v makes a contribution to
the set QTk Y C l. Second, we will use a combinatorial argument to compute this contribution
for each of the cases distinguished in the first step.
Before we start, we need to introduce the following notation: for the node v P Cj P CS
we define the set of adjacent communities as NCS pvq “ tCi P CSzCj | Ci X Npvq ‰ Hu,
inter-community degree as degCS pvq “ |NCS pvq|, the set of neighbours within a community as
Njpvq “ Npvq X Cj , and intra-community degree as degjpvq “ |Njpvq|.
Theorem 3. The game-theoretic network degree centrality for graph G with community
structure CS for the node v P V can be computed in time polynomial in |V |.
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Proof. In our proof we will use concepts from probability theory. Thus, we will first define
the probability space, which is a triple pΩ,F , P q, where Ω is a sample space containing sets
tQTk Y C lu, T k Ď 2|M |´1 is such that |T k| “ k and C l Ď 2|Cj |´1 is such that |C l| “ l. The
important observation is that |Ω| “ `|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘
. In our model, F is the set of elementary
events (F “ Ω), and P : F Ñ r0, 1s is a probability distribution function such that for each
event A P F we have P pAq “ 1|Ω| .
There are two types of marginal contribution that a node can make. For the first, let us
consider the marginal contribution of a single vertex v to the random set QTk Y C l. When v
joins a coalition C, it can contribute to its value with the help of any vertex u P Npvq if and
only if u is not in C and u is not already directly connected to C. Let us introduce the Bernoulli
random variable Br1sv,u,k,l, which will indicate whether the vertex v makes a contribution through
vertex u to the random set QTk Y C l. Equation (6.1) tells us that this contribution will be fpuq.
Thus, we have:
ErfpuqBr1sv,u,k,ls “ fpuqP rpNpuq Y tuuq X pQTk Y C lq “ Hs,
where P r¨s denotes probability, and Er¨s denotes expected value.
The second type of contribution takes place when vertex v joins a coalition C and takes
away the value fpvq. Such a contribution happens when vertex v is directly connected to the
coalition C. In particular, weighted group degree centrality νDG assumes that the value of a set of
vertices depends only on nodes directly connected to this set, ignoring nodes already inside it.
Therefore, when the node v becomes a member of C and it is not any more directly connected
with it, the value of C is reduced by fpvq. Let us introduce the Bernoulli random variable
B
r2s
v,u,k,l, which will indicate whether vertex v makes a contribution through itself to the random
set QTk Y C l. More formally, we have:
Er´fpvqBr2sv,k,ls “ ´fpvqP rv P NpQTk Y C lqs.
Now, we will move on to the second step of the proof and use a combinatorial argument to
compute P r1s “ P rpNpuq Y tuuq X pQTk Y C lq “ Hs and P r2s “ P rv P NpQTk Y C lqs.
Recall that there are exactly
`|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘
sets QTk Y C l. This is the size of the sample
space. With this in mind, the probability P r1s for u P Npvq, if u, v P Cj can be computed as
follows:
P r1.1s “
`|M |´1´degCS puq
k
˘`|Cj |´1´degjpuq
l
˘`|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘ ,
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otherwise if v P Cj and u P Ci and i ‰ j we have:
P r1.2s “
`|M |´1´degCS puq
k
˘`|Cj |´degjpuq
l
˘`|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘
Finally, for v P Cj and u P Npvq we obtain:
ErfpuqBr1sv,u,k,ls“
$’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’%
0 if u P Cj
and
`
degCS puqą|M |´1
or degjpuq ą |Cj| ´ 1
˘
fpuqP r1.1s if u P Cj
0 if u R Cj
and
`
degCS puqą|M |´1
or degjpuq ą |Cj|
˘
fpuqP r1.2s if u R Cj
(6.2)
In order to compute P r2s we consider a complementary event P r2s “ p1´P rNpvqXpQTkY
C lqq “ Hsq and using the same combinatorial argument as for computing P r1.1s, for v P Cj we
get:
P r2s “ 1´
`|M |´1´degCS pvq
k
˘`|Cj |´1´degjpvq
l
˘`|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘ ,
and consequently we obtain:
ErfpvqBr2sv,k,ls“
$’’&’’%
´fpvq if `degCS puqą|M |´1
or degjpuq ą |Cj| ´ 1
˘
´fpvqP r2s otherwise.
(6.3)
The final formula combines equations (6.2) and (6.3) :
ErMCpQTk Y C l, vqs“
ÿ
uPNpvq
´
ErfpuqBr1sv,u,k,ls
¯
` ErfpvqBr2sv,k,ls
“
ÿ
uPNpvqXCj
fpuq
´`|M |´1´degCS puq
k
˘`|Cj |´1´degjpuq
l
˘`|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘ ¯
`
ÿ
uPNpvqzCj
fpuq
´`|M |´1´degCS puq
k
˘`|Cj |´degjpuq
l
˘`|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘ ¯
´ fpvq
´
1´
`|M |´1´degCS pvq
k
˘`|Cj |´1´degjpvq
l
˘`|M |´1
k
˘`|Cj |´1
l
˘ ¯. (6.4)
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The above formula can be used to compute ETk,ClrMCpQTk Y C l, vqs in polynomial time.
Therefore, the game-theoretic network degree centrality for graph G with community structure
CS can be computed in polynomial time using equation from Definition 32 which ends our
proof. 
6.5.3. Algorithms
Algorithm 17 directly implements expression from Definition 32. The expected value operator
is computed using the final result of Theorem 3: equation (6.4). It computes the game-theoretic
network degree centrality for a given graph G with community structure CS . For the sake of
clarity, we assume in our algorithm that for a ă b we have `a
b
˘ “ 0, and for any a we have
a
0
“ 0.
Algorithm 17: The Coalitional Semivalue-based weighted degree centrality
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq, node v P V , coalition structure CS , functions β and family of
functions tαu
Data: for each vertex u P V and the community v P Cj:
degCS puq - the inter-community degree
degjpuq - the intra-community degree
Output: φCSEMIv coalitional semivalue-based degree centrality
1 φCSEMIv Ð 0;
2 for k Ð 0 to |M | ´ 1 do
3 for l Ð 0 to |Cj| ´ 1 do
4 MCk,l Ð 0;
5 foreach u P Npvq X Cj do
6 MCk,lÐMCk,l` fpuqp
|M |´ 1´ degCS puq
k qp|Cj |´ 1´ degjpuql q
p|M |´1k qp|Cj |´1l q
7 foreach u P NpvqzCj do
8 MCk,lÐMCk,l ` fpuqp
|M |´ 1´ degCS puq
k qp|Cj |´ degjpuql q
p|M |´1k qp|Cj |´1l q ;
9 MCk,lÐ MCk,l ´ fpvq;
10 MCk,lÐ MCk,l` fpvqp
|M |´1´degCS pvq
k qp|Cj |´1´degjpvql q
p|M |´1k qp|Cj |´1l q ;
11 φCSEMIv Ð φCSEMIv ` βpkqαjplqMCk,l;
This algorithm requires some precomputations. For each node u P V we need to calculate
degCS pvq and degjpvq. We can store these values usingOp|V |q space. Provided that it is possible
to check the community of a given node in constant time, we can perform these precomputations
in Op|V | ` |E|q time. In the worst case, the main algorithm works in Op|V |3q time.
Our next observation is that for trivial coalition structures (such as CS “ tAu, or
CS “ tta1u, ta2u, . . . , tanuu) our algorithm computes any weighted degree-based semivalue
in Op|V |2q time. Finally, we would like to note that this algorithm is easily adapted to directed
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Algorithm 18: The Owen value-based weighted degree centrality
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq, node v P V , coalition structure CS , functions β and family of
functions tαu
Data: for each vertex u P V and the community v P Cj:
degCS puq - the inter-community degree
degjpuq - the intra-community degree
Output: φCSEMIv coalitional semivalue-based degree centrality
1 φCSEMIv Ð 0;
2 MC Ð 0;
3 foreach u P Npvq X Cj do
4 MCÐMC` fpuqp1`degCS puqqp1`degjpuqq
5 foreach u P NpvqzCj do
6 MCÐMC` fpuqp1`degCS puqqdegjpuq
7 MCÐ MC` fpuqp1´p1`degjpvqqp1`degCS puqqp1`degjpvqqqp1`degCS puqq ;
8 φCSEMIv Ð φCSEMIv `MC;
6 8 5
10 11
¨ ¨ ¨
1 9
Figure 6.1: The relative power of communities for the first top nodes from the νWDG ptvuq
ranking. The power of the communities of nodes 5, 6 and 8 is significantly smaller than the
power of communities of the other top nodes.
networks. To this end, depending on the new definition of weighted group degree, we need to
replace all instances of degCS puq and degjpuq with their counterparts for directed networks: in
or out degree.
Algorithm 18 is the optimized version of Algorithm 17 to compute Owen value for weighted
degree centrality.
6.6. Simulations
The main aim of this experiment is to compare three rankings created by three different
methods: (i) one that uses weighted degree centrality and evaluates each node v by the number
of neighbours it has (we denote it by νWDG ptvuq); (ii) one with the Shapley value-based degree
centrality (denoted φSVv ); and, (iii) one with the Owen value-based degree centrality (denoted
φOVv ), which evaluates nodes in the context of the communities they belong to and their
respective power. Thus, the first two methods do not account for the existence of the community
structure while the third one does.
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νWDG ptvuq φSVv φOVv
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13....
20....
ą 1000.
Figure 6.2: Three rankings of the top nodes. The OV ranking radically decreases the positions
of the nodes 5, 6 and 8.
The real-life network used for simulations is a citation network that consists of 2, 084, 055
publications and 2, 244, 018 citation relationships.2 This dataset is a list of publications with
basic attributes (such as: title, authors, venue, or citations), and it is part of the project
ArnetMiner being under development by Tang et al. [2008]. All publications extracted from
this dataset were categorized into 22954 unique communities representing journals, conference
proceedings or single book titles using basic text mining techniques. These communities can
be interpreted as scientific groups united under the same topics of interests. In our experiment
we use the directed version of our algorithm and assume that fpvq “ 1
#numer of articles citing v . The
Shapley value-based centrality (the second method) is computed using the polynomial time
algorithm introduced by Michalak et al. [2013a]. The Owen value-based centrality is computed
with the modification of Algorithm 17, in which thanks to the form of the α and β (in Owen
value these discrete probabilities are uniform) the complexity was reduced to Op|V | ` |E|q.
In what follows we focus on the 11 top nodes from the basic ranking νWDG ptvuq. Figure 6.1
shows the relative power of the communities to which these nodes belong. Nodes indexed 5, 6
and 8 belong to significantly less powerful communities than nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11.
Figure 6.2 shows how the position of top nodes selected using νDG ptvuq changes in the φSVv
and φOVv rankings. While for most nodes the perturbations are not so intensive, we observe
2 The database used for these experiments is available under the following link: http://arnetminer.org/citation.
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Table 6.3: The values of different coalitional semivalues.
Solution name / Nodes’s degree 17 16 11 10 9
Owen value 3.51 2.68 1.47 1.37 0.70
Owen-Banzhaf value 2.28 1.38 0.47 0.88 0.01
symmetric coalitional
Banzhaf value 3.51 2.68 1.47 1.37 0.70
symmetric coalitional
p-binomial semivalue (p “ 1
4
) 4.38 3.15 1.65 2.38 1.04
significant downgrade of the position of nodes 5, 6 and 8 in theOVv ranking. This demonstrates
coalitional semivalues-based centrality (in this case the Owen value-based centrality) is able to
recognize that these three nodes belong to much weaker communities.
The rankings of nodes may differ depending which coalitional semivalue we choose. To
illustrate this fact we evaluated top 5 nodes with the highest degree centrality from Zachary
Karate Club Network [Zachary, 1977]. This network consists of 34 nodes divided into two
communities. We observe in Table 6.3 that the ranking created with the Owen value differs
with the one created with Owen-Banzhaf value at the 3rd and 4th positions.
6.7. Conclusions
The centrality metric proposed in this chapter is the first tool that evaluates individual nodes
in the context of their communities. This metric is based on the Owen value—a well-known
concept from coalitional game theory that we generalize by introducing coalitional semivalues.
Our experiments show that the rankings can significantly differ if we account for the power of
the relevant communities that the nodes belong to. If the community of a node is weak, it can
significantly weaken the position of the node in the ranking based on the coalitional semivalue.
It also demonstrates that our polynomial time algorithm is applicable to large data sets.
7. Computational Analysis of a Connectivity Game
on Networks
We study a recently developed centrality metric to identify key players in terrorist organisations
due to Lindelauf et al. [2013]. This metric, which involves computation of the Shapley value
for connectivity games on graphs proposed by Amer and Gimenez [2004], was shown to
produce substantially better results than previously used standard centralities. In this chapter,
we present the first computational analysis of this class of coalitional games, and propose two
algorithms for computing Lindelauf et al.’s centrality metric. Our first algorithm is exact,
and runs in time linear by number of connected subgraphs in the network. As shown in the
numerical simulations, our algorithm identifies key players in the WTC 9/11 terrorist network,
constructed of 36 members and 125 links, in less than 40 minutes. In contrast, a general-purpose
Shapley value algorithm would require weeks to solve this problem. Our second algorithm is
approximate and can be successfully used to study much larger networks.
The contribution of the author of this dissertation covers the complexity analysis and
developing exact and approximate algorithms for computing Lindelauf et al.’s centrality metric.
7.1. Introduction
Despite enormous efforts to tackle terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, many terrorist networks
are growing in size [Shultz et al., 2009]. For instance, the number of core members of Al’Qaeda,
arguably the most infamous terrorist group, is currently estimated to exceed 800, with their
operations spreading over more than 20 countries.
Facing, on the one hand, the increased size of terrorist groups and, on the other hand,
inevitable budget cuts, security agencies urgently require efficient techniques to identify who
plays the most important role within a terrorist network and, therefore, where scarce resources
should predominantly be focused. In this context, a number of authors have proposed using
social network analysis to investigate terrorist organisations (e.g., Carley et al. [2003], Krebs
[2002], Farley [2003], Lindelauf et al. [2013], Ressler [2006]).
Now, the key strength of social network analysis is its bottom-up approach in that
the structure and the functioning of a group is gradually revealed by considering pairwise
relationships between the individuals who create the group (cfr. Ressler [2006]). In this
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context the identification of the key individuals within the network is called a centrality analysis.
Analyst’s Notebook 8 [I2, 2010]—a software package used worldwide by law enforcement and
intelligence agencies—has recently included standard centrality metrics for networks (graphs),
such as degree, closeness and betweenness centralities [Brandes and Erlebach, 2005, Friedkin,
1991]. But the usefulness of these metrics for terrorist networks is limited as they are often
unable to capture the complex nature of these organisations [Lindelauf et al., 2013].
Recently, to address these shortcomings, Lindelauf et al. [2013] developed a more advanced
method specifically designed to measure centrality in terrorist networks. The new method
belongs to a class of so-called Shapley value-based centrality (see Definition 25) and builds
upon the notion of coalitional connectivity games proposed by Amer and Gimenez [2004].
These games are defined on graphs, where a coalition of nodes gets a non-zero value if and
only if the induced sub-graph is connected. Such a game has an appealing interpretation in
our context: it reflects communication capabilities among various groups of terrorists within
the network. Indeed, when applied to the terrorist networks responsible for the 9/11 WTC and
2002 Bali attacks (with 23 and 17 members, respectively), Lindelauf et al. showed that their
method produces qualitatively better results than standard centrality metrics.
Unfortunately, the computational aspects of connectivity games by Amer and Gimenez
have not been studied to date. This means that the current use of Lindelauf et al.’s method
is limited only to small terrorist networks (of 25 members or so) because general-purpose
algorithms for coalitional games have to be applied, which exhaustively search the space of
all possible coalitions. Thus, they are inapplicable to many real-world applications such as the
terrorist networks responsible for the WTC 9/11 attack (from 35 to 63 nodes depending on the
considered type of links between terrorist).
Against this background, we provide in this chapter the first computational analysis of
connectivity games proposed by Amer and Gimenez:
— We prove that computing the Shapley value in connectivity games—including the centrality
metrics of Lindelauf et al.—is #P-Hard.
— We propose a dedicated exact algorithm for computing these centrality metrics. While the
general-purpose Shapley value algorithm requires checking all subsets of vertices in the
graph, our algorithm traverses through (most often) much smaller number of connected
subgraphs. It also has minimal memory requirements.
— We test our algorithm by analysing the aforementioned WTC 9/11 terrorist network with 36
members and 125 identified connections. In this setting, our algorithm returns the solution
within 38 minutes, compared to weeks if a general-purpose approach was applied.
— In order to study even bigger networks, we propose a dedicated approximate algorithm
based on Monte Carlo sampling. By comparing to our exact algorithm, we show that, after
115
a reasonable number of iterations, the approximate algorithm yields a very accurate ranking
of top nodes based on the centrality of Lindelauf et al.
7.2. Related Work
A rapidly growing body of work is directed to the analysis of terrorist organisations using the
methods of social network analysis. A very good introduction to this line of research can be
found in Ressler [2006]. Also worthy of note is the work of Farley [2003], Carley et al. [2003],
and Husslage et al. [2012], who conduct quantitative analysis of the terrorist networks.
Since the work of Grofman and Owen [1982], a number of game-theoretic centrality
measures have been developed either to enrich the existing well-known centralities or as
completely new ones (see Chapter 3). In the terrorist network context, Lindelauf et al. [2009a]
and Lindelauf et al. [2009b] employed the game-theoretic approach to analyze covert networks.
The hardness result presented in this chapter is consistent with other studies of the
complexity of the Shapley value in various settings. For instance, computing the Shapley
value was shown to be #P-Complete for weighted majority games [Deng and Papadimitriou,
1994] and in minimum spanning tree games [Nagamochi et al., 1997]. Aziz et al. [2009]
obtained negative results for a related problem of computing the Shapley-Shubik power index
for the spanning connectivity games that are based on undirected, unweighted multigraphs.
Also, Bachrach et al. [2008] showed that the computation of the Banzhaf index for connectivity
games, in which agents own vertices and control adjacent edges and aim to become connected
to the certain set of primary edges, is #P-Complete. A comprehensive review of these issues,
including some positive results for certain settings, can be found in [Chalkiadakis et al., 2011].
Finally, it should be mentioned that other types of connectivity games have been considered
in the literature. These include vertex connectivity games proposed by Bachrach et al. [2008]
and the spanning connectivity games proposed by Aziz et al. [2009]. The common denominator
of these games is that they are interested in maintaining the connectivity between certain set of
nodes and they further study the ability of each node to affect the outcome of these games. In
particular, the concepts like Banzhaf power index and Shapley-Shubik power index are utilized
to measure the influence of nodes [Bachrach et al., 2008, Aziz et al., 2009].
In the already classic work, Krebs [2002] applied standard centrality measures to determine
the key players in the 9/11 terrorist network. Memon et al. [2008] developed an algorithm based
on the two well known centrality measures from social network analysis to automatically detect
the hidden hierarchy in terrorist networks. Recently, Xu et al. [2009] explored the use of social
network analysis methods to analyze terrorist networks mostly focusing on assigning roles to
actors in the network. Most of the above mentioned work in the literature focus on identifying
key players in the terrorist networks. A complementary approach is proposed by Henke [2009]
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that combines aspects of traditional social network analysis with a novel multi-agent framework
that describes how terrorist groups survive despite the aggressive counterterrorist operations.
7.3. Connectivity Games for Terrorist Networks
Terrorist networks have been recently modeled using a weighted graph, G (Definition 13),
composed of individual terrorists and labeled edges [Carley et al., 2003, Krebs, 2002, Farley,
2003, Lindelauf et al., 2013, Ressler, 2006]. Based on available intelligence, an edge represents,
for instance, a communication link between two terrorists, and the weight of the edge represents
the frequency with which that link is used. Weights can be associated not only with edges
but also with vertices. This, as argued by Lindelauf et al., allows for modeling additional
information that intelligence agencies gather on individuals within the network, such as access
to weapons, financial means, previous experience, and participation in a terrorist training camp.
We will denote the weight of vertex vi P V pGq as γpiq P ΓpGq.
Definition 35 (Vertex-weighted graph). The vertex-weighted graph G “ pV,E, γq is a
simple/directed/weighted graph, with a function γpvq : V Ñ R that evaluates each node. The
value γpvq is called the weight of a node v.
To address the limitations of standard centrality metrics, Lindelauf et al. proposed a new
metric that builds upon connectivity games by Amer and Gimenez [2004]. In these coalitional
games on graphs, all subsets of set V pGq are considered to be possible coalitions of terrorists.
Apart from the empty set, every single coalition is classified as belonging to either the set of
connected coalitions (denoted CpGq) or disconnected coalitions (denoted C˜pGq). We say that
C is connected if between any two nodes in C there exists at least one path of which all nodes
belong to C. Otherwise C is disconnected. Importantly, any two terrorists in a connected
coalition are able to communicate with each other (via a path), whereas in a disconnected
coalition this is not the case. In many connected coalitions, from this point of view, some
nodes play more important role than others, as their removal makes a coalition disconnected.
We will call them pivotal.
Definition 36 (Pivotal node). Given connected coalition C P CpGq, a node vi P C is pivotal to
C iff Cztviu R CpGq.
If such node is removed, the coalition becomes disconnected. In our context, communication
between all terrorists within the subgroup becomes impossible.
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Definition 37 (Connectivity game). The connectivity game is a coalitional game defined on
graph pV, νCq, where the characteristic function is defined:
νCpCq “
$&%1 if C P CpGq0 otherwise.
.
In such a game defined by Amer and Gimenez [2004] every connected coalition is evaluated
to 1, and disconnected coalitions evaluated to 0. Lindelauf et al. extend this definition by
assuming that values of connected coalitions may depend on the network in a variety of ways,
i.e., they can be a function of adjacent edges or nodes, their weights, etc. More formally:
Definition 38 (Lindelauf centrality). The Lindelauf centrality is a game-theoretic centrality
pψf , φSV q, where the representative function ψf is defined:
ψf pGq “ νf pCq “
$&%fpC,Gq if C P CpGq0 otherwise.
.
The exact definition of f depends on the availability of information and analytical needs. For
instance, to analyse the Jemaah Islamiyah network responsible for the 2002 Bali attack in
Indonesia, Lindelauf et al. assume:
fpCq “ |EpCq|ř
pvi,vjqPEpCqλpvi,vjq
, (7.1)
that is f equals the number of edges in the connected coalition C (denoted by EpCq) divided
by their weight.
Lindelauf et al. show that the centrality ranking based on the Shapley value of the
connectivity game is much more effective than degree, closeness and betweenness centralities
in exposing the key players in the Bali attack. In particular, Azahari bin Husin—the network
bomb expert who was considered the “brain” behind the entire operation—is ranked low by
standard centralities but according to Lindelauf et al. metric is among top five Bali terrorists.
Similarly, Feri (Isa)—again ranked low by standard centralities—was, in fact, the suicide
bomber. Lindelauf et al. ranked him third.
For big networks networks, the only feasible approach to compute Shapley value currently
outlined in the literature is Monte-Carlo sampling (see Section 4.4.1). However, this method
is not only inexact, but can be also very time-consuming. For instance, as shown in our
simulations, for a weighted network of about 16,000 nodes and about 120,000 edges, the
Monte Carlo approach has to iterate 300, 000 times through the entire network to produce the
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approximation of the Shapley value with a 40% error margin.1 Exponentially more iterations
are needed to further reduce this error margin.
7.4. Computational Analysis & Algorithms
In this section, we first discuss the complexity of computing the centrality metrics of
Lindelauf et al.. We then present our exact and approximate algorithms.
7.4.1. Complexity
First we show that, even for the simplest definition of the connectivity game, where
@CPCpGqfpC,Gq “ 1, computing the Shapley value in an efficient way is impossible. The main
problem of interest is as follows:
Definition 39 (#CG-SHAPLEY). Given a connectivity game on graph G, where
@CPCpGqfpC,Gq “ 1, we are asked to compute the Shapley value for each node in this graph.
In the first step, let us introduce the following problem:
Definition 40 (#CONNECTED-SPANNING-SUB (#CSS)). Given a graph G, we are asked to
compute the number of connected spanning subgraphs in G.2
This problem is #P-Complete even for bipartite and planar graphs [Welsh, 1997]. We will
use this hardness result to prove #P-Completeness of the following problem:
Definition 41 (#CONNECTED-INDUCED-SUB (#CIS)). Given a graph G, we are asked to
compute the number of connected induced subgraphs in G.
Theorem 4. #CONNECTED-INDUCED-SUB is #P-Complete.
Proof of Theorem 1 We note first that it is possible to check in polynomial time if a given
subgraph is induced and connected. Thus, since a witness can be verified in polynomial time,
this problem is in #P. Now, we will reduce a #CSS instance to #CIS. To this end, given a graph
G “ pV,Eq, we will construct a transformed graph G1 and show that determining the number
of connected induced subgraphs in G1 allows us to easily compute the number of connected
spanning subgraphs in G.
1 See Section 7.5 for the exact definition of the error margin.
2 A connected subgraph F of the given graph, G “ pV,Eq, is called spanning if it contains all nodes from G,
i.e., V pF q “ V pGq.
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Our transformed graph G’ is constructed by adding to each edge in G an extra node. Then,
to each node from original graph G we attach a clique KA with A nodes. This reduction is
shown in Figure 7.1. More formally we define the following graph G1:
V pG1q “V pGq Y tvi : v P V pGq ^ i P t1, . . . , Auu Y
tvu : pv, uq P EpGqu
EpG1q “tpv, uvq : pu, vq P EpGqu Y
tpv, viq : v P V pGq ^ i P t1, . . . , Auu Y
tpvi, vjq : v P vpGq ^ i, j P t1, . . . , Auu ^ i ă ju
Now, we arbitrarily choose some connected induced subgraph F of G1. Either this subgraph
intersects with the original set of vertices V pGq, or it does not. In the latter case, subgraph F is
contained within the single copy of KA and there are exactly |V pGq|p2A ´ 1q such subgraphs.
In the former case, we can define some pseudograph F 1, which consists of the following sets of
vertices and edges:3
V pF 1q “V pF q X V pGq
EpF 1q “tpu, vq : uv P V pF q ^ pu, vq P EpGqu
Note that since F is connected, F 1 also has to be connected. There are exactly 2|V pF 1q|A choices
of F that can give us a particular pseudograph F 1. Now, we can compute:
M “ |V pGq|p2A ´ 1q `
ÿ
F 1
2|V pF
1q|A (7.2)
which denotes the number of induced connected subgraphs in G1.
The crucial observation here is that, if V pF 1q “ V pGq, then F 1 is a connected spanning
subgraph of G. This holds because F is an induced connected subgraph. Now, let N denote the
number of spanning connected subgraphs in G. Then, we can rewrite (7.2) as:
M “ |V pGq|p2A ´ 1q `Np2|V pGq|Aq `
ÿ
F 1:V pF 1q‰V pGq
2|V pF
1q|A (7.3)
In order to compute N we would like to bound the expression X “ M ´ Np2|V pGq|Aq. This
expression is the number of induced connected subgraphs in G1 that do not correspond to any
3 We note that this tuple is not necessarily a properly defined graph, since it can contain some edge pu, vq and
does not contain node v.
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Figure 7.1: The reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.
connected spanning subgraph in G. We have:
0 ď X ď |V pGq|p2A ´ 1q ` 2|V pGq|`|EpGq|2p|V pGq|´1qA
where the number 2|V pGq|`|EpGq| is an upper bound on the number of all subgraphs in G. Now,
we can use these bounds to transform equation (7.3) and to determine the approximation of N :
N “ M
2|V pGq|A
´ X
2|V pGq|A
» M
2|V pGq|A
´ |V pGq| ` 2
|V pGq|`|EpGq|
2A
In order to deal with the expression |V pGq|`2
|V pGq|`|EpGq|
2A
we take A ą logp|V pGq| `
2|V pGq|`|EpGq|q so that this fraction becomes smaller than 1. We note that A is bounded by a
polynomial in the order of the input G. Then, the number of spanning connected subgraphs of
G is the least integer N such that N ě M
2A|V pGq| . This is easy to compute given the number of
connected induced subgraphs F of G1. This completes the proof. l
From Theorem 4, it trivially follows that the next problem is also #P-Complete:
Definition 42 (#CONNECTED-INDUCED-SUB-k (#CIS-k)). Given a graph G, we are asked
to compute the number of connected induced subgraphs of size k in G.
Clearly, if we can find in polynomial time an answer for the #CIS-k problem, we could
efficiently compute #CIS. Now, the #P-Hardness of #CG-SHAPLEY will be shown by the
reduction from #CIS-k:
Theorem 5. #CG-SHAPLEY is #P-Hard.
Proof of Theorem 2: We construct a proof by reduction. In particular, we demonstrate that if
there exists an algorithm for solving #CG-SHAPLEY in polynomial time, then it is possible to
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solve #CIS-k in polynomial time. This contradicts the fact that #CIS-k is #P-complete. Now,
we will reduce #CIS-k to #CG-SHAPLEY.
Let G “ pV,Eq be an arbitrary graph, where |V | “ n and |E| “ m. We extend the set of
nodes of G by a single node v, while the set of edges remains unchanged. In other words, we
obtain a new graph G0 by adding a single node not connected to any node from G. Now, from
the definition of connectivity games, we note that the marginal contribution of the new node v
to any coalition C Ď G is either 0 or ´1. More specifically, it is ´1 if C is connected, and 0
otherwise. Based on this, the Shapley value of node v can be computed as follows, where cGs is
the number of connected induced subgraphs in G that contain exactly s nodes:
φSVv,G0 “ ´
nÿ
s“0
psq!pn´ sq!
pn` 1q! c
G
s
Now, let us consider a new graph Gi constructed by adding to G the set of i nodes in addition
to the node v, while keeping the set of edges just as in G. Analogously to G0, the Shapley value
of v in Gi is:
φSVv,Gi “ ´
nÿ
s“0
psq!pn` i´ sq!
pn` 1` iq! c
G
s (7.4)
This equation holds because each coalition containing more than n nodes is disconnected, and
so the contribution of v to every such coalition is 0. Now, we can build a system of linear
equations using each equation (7.4) from graph Gi, where i P t0, . . . , nu. More precisely, we
need to solve the following equation:»———–
0!n! 1!pn´ 1q! ¨ ¨ ¨ n!0!
0!pn` 1q! 1!n! ¨ ¨ ¨ n!1!
...
... . . .
...
0!p2nq! 1!p2n´ 1q! ¨ ¨ ¨ n!n!
fiffiffiffifl
»———–
cG0
cG1
...
cGn
fiffiffiffifl “
»———–
pn` 1q!φSVv,G0pn` 2q!φSVv,G1
...
p2n` 1q!φSVv,Gn
fiffiffiffifl
that can also be written as Ax “ b.
This equation has a unique solution if and only if the determinant of the matrix A is
non-zero. We can use Theorem 1.1 from [Bacher, 2002] to prove that it is non-zero. Thus,
if we can compute in polynomial time the Shapley value for connectivity games, we would
be able to solve this equation and determine all cGi values. Specifically, we can use Gaussian
elimination, which works in Opn3q time complexity.
We note that the largest possible number in our matrices is n!n!. According to the analysis
in (Proposition 2)[Aziz et al., 2009] it is possible to store such a number in km2plogmq2 bits. It
is shown in (Theorem 4.10) [Korte and Vygen, 2005] that in Gaussian elimination each number
occurring during the algorithm process can be stored in the number of bits quadric of the input
size. This final observation ends our proof. l
122
v1 v2
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a) MCptv6,v7u,v4q“fptv6,v7,v4uq´fptv6,v7uq
v1 v2
v3 v4 v5
v6 v7 v8
b) MCptv1,v3,v7,v8u,v4q“fptv1,v3,v4,v7,v8uq
v1 v2
v3 v4 v5
v6 v7 v8
c) MCptv5,v8u,v4q“´fptv5,v8uq
v1 v2
v3 v4 v5
v6 v7 v8
d) MCptv3,v5,v6,v8u,v4q“0
Figure 7.2: Four ways in which v4 can contribute to a coalition.
7.4.2. Analysis of Marginal Contribitions
In this section, we analyse how node vi P V can marginally contribute to coalition C Ď V ztviu.
Four general cases, depicted in Figure 7.2, can be distinguished:
(a) Node vi can join a connected coalition C P C and the resulting coalition is also connected,
i.e., C Y tviu P C. Here, the marginal contribution is equal to the difference in the value of
C P C caused by the addition of vi:
MCpC, viq “ νf pC Y tviuq ´ νf pCq “ fpC Y tviuq ´ fpCq
(b) Node vi can join a disconnected coalition C P C˜ and the resulting coalition becomes
connected, i.e., C Y tviu P C. Here, vi’s contribution is the whole value of C Y tviu:
MCpC, viq “ νf pC Y tviuq ´ νf pCq “ fpC Y tviuq
(c) Node vi can join a connected coalition C P C˜ and the resulting coalition becomes
disconnected, i.e., C Y tviu P C˜. This means that vi brings down the value of C to 0:
MCpC, viq “ νf pC Y tviuq ´ νf pCq “ ´fpCq
(d) Node vi can join a disconnected coalition C P C˜ and the resulting coalition remains
disconnected, i.e., C Y tviu P C˜:
MCpC, viq “ νf pC Y tviuq ´ νf pCqq “ 0
The key conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that both connected and
disconnected coalitions play a role when computing the Shapley value. This is because a node
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can contribute not only to a connected coalition, but also to a disconnected one (by making it
connected). However, in the further sections, we will show that it is possible to develop an exact
algorithm that only cycles through connected coalitions.
7.4.3. The Basic Algorithm for Connectivity Games
Based on the observation that both connected and disconnected coalitions play a role when
computing the Shapley value, we develop the general-purpose Shapley value algorithm
(GeneralSV presented in Algorithm 19) for computing the Shapley value in connectivity games
defined by Amer and Gimenez. In more details, for each coalition C P 2V this algorithm
considers four aforementioned cases (a), (b) and (c) as outlined in Figure 7.2 in our chapter.
Importantly, for (d), it can be disregarded since the marginal contribution in this case equals 0.
In all of the rest three cases, a node vi can make a non-zero contribution by joining a coalition.
We note that function CheckConnectednesspCq runs in Op|C| ` |EpCq|q.
Algorithm 19: GeneralSV Algorithm for the Shapley value
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq and characteristic function νf
Output: Shapley Value, φSVi pνf q, for each node vi P V
1 foreach vi P V do
2 φSVi pνf q Ð 0;
3 foreach C P 2V do
4 CheckConnectednesspCq;
5 if C P C then
6 foreach vi P NpCq do
7 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ` |C|!p|V |´|C|´1q!|V |! pνf pC Y tviuq ´ νf pCqq
8 foreach vi R NpCq do
9 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ´ |C|!p|V |´|C|´1q!|V |! νf pCq
10 else
11 foreach vi P NpCq do
12 CheckConnectednesspC Y tviuq
13 if C Y tviu P C then
14 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ` |C|!p|V |´|C|´1q!|V |! νf pC Y tviuq
Unfortunately, the use of this algorithm in practice is limited by the number of nodes in the
network. It runs in Opp|V | ` |E|q2|V |q and already for |V | “ 50, the Algorithm 19 has to cycle
through more than 1015 coalitions. In this dissertation, we developed an algorithm that for many
networks is able to compute the SV substantially faster.
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7.4.4. The Faster Algorithm for Connectivity Games
Many real-world terrorist networks are sparse, i.e., |C| ! |C˜| [Krebs, 2002]; thus, if the Shapley
value could be computed only by considering coalitions in C, it would be possible to analyse
much larger terrorist networks. To this end, for each vi P V , let us define the following disjoint
sets of coalitions:
C#i “tC Ď V ztviu : C P C ^ C Y tviu P Cu
C`i “tC Ď V ztviu : C P C˜ ^ C Y tviu P Cu
C´i “tC Ď V ztviu : C P C ^ C Y tviu P C˜u
which correspond to cases (a), (b) and (c) from the previous section. Based on this, the
original formula for Shapley value (Definition 5) can be computed as:
φSVi pV, νf q “
ÿ
CĎV ztviu
|C|!p|V | ´ |C| ´ 1q!
|V |! pνf pC Y tviuq ´ νf pCqq
“
ÿ
CPtC`i YC#i YC´i u
|C|!p|V | ´ |C| ´ 1q!
|V |! pνf pC Y tviuq ´ νf pCqq (7.5)
where case (d), when mcipCq “ 0, is simply omitted. The key idea behind our exact
algorithm to compute the Shapley value in connectivity game (FasterSVCG presented in
Algorithm 20) is to represent the sets C`i and C´i differently, such that C˜ does not appear in the
new representation. As for C#i , it does not depend on C˜, and so there is no need to represent it
differently. In particular, we represent C`i and C´i as follows, where PpCq is the set of agents
that are pivotal to C, and NpCq is the set of neighbours of C:
C`i “tC Ď V ztviu : C Y tviu P C ^ vi P PpC Y tviuqu
C´i “tC Ď V ztviu : C P C ^ vi R NpCqu
Now since C˜ no longer appears in the definitions of C#i , C`i and C´i , it is possible to compute
the Shapley value as in equation (7.5) without enumerating any of the coalitions in C˜. Based
on this, our algorithm enumerates every connected coalition, C P C, and determines for each
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agent vi P C whether Cztviu P C#i or Cztviu P C`i and for vi R C if C P C´i . Note, that we
do not consider the impact of agent vi R C that do not disconnect C because the contribution
of this agent will be calculated for connected coalition C Y tviu as C P C#i . The enumeration
is carried out using Moerkotte and Neumann [2006]’s method—the fastest such enumeration
method in the literature. Its basic idea is that, for each connected coalition C P C, it expands C
by adding to it certain subsets of its neighbours. These subsets are chosen so as to ensure that
no connected coalition is enumerated more than once (see Moerkotte an Neumann [2006] for
more details).
Next, we explain our algorithm. To enhance clarity, for every connected coalition C P C,
we will define three disjoint sets of agents: V #C “ tvi P C : Cztviu P C#i u, V `C “ tvi P C :
Cztviu P C`i u, and V ´C “ tvi P V zC : C P C´i u. If we compute the above sets for every C P C,
then we can compute the Shapley value. Let us take a closer look at the difficulty of computing
those sets for a given C.
— Computing V ´C can be done in Op|V |q time. This is because the agents in V ´C are basically
all those that are not members, nor neighbours, of C.
— Now, to compute V `C , we need to find the pivotal agents in C. This can be computed using
a method “findPivotals” that runs in Op|V | ` |E|q [Alsuwaiyel, 1999].
— Having computed V `C , it becomes easy to compute V
#
C . This is because V
#
C “ CzV `C .
From the above analysis, it is clear that the main difficulty lies in findPivotals. Therefore,
whenever possible, we would like to compute V `C using some other, easier, technique. In
particular, when we expand a connected coalition, C, into another connected coalition C 1 “
C Y S, we try to update the set of pivotal agents, rather than compute it from scratch with
findPivotals. Here, we distinguish between three conditions:
— Condition 1: The cycles in C 1 are exactly like those in C. In this case, the set V `C1 consists
of elements of V `C , expanded by the nodes in C that are connected to S.
— Condition 2: C 1 contains a cycle that is not in C. Here, we need to call findPivotals.
— Condition 3: |C| “ 2. In this case, since we assumed that a singleton is a connected
coalition, none of the two agents in C is pivotal.
The pseudocode of FasterSVCG is presented in Algorithm 20. It is easy to see that it runs in
Opp|V | ` |E|q|C|q.
7.4.5. Approximation algorithm for connectivity games
Our FasterSVCG algorithm is much faster than the GeneralSV, but it is not fast enough to
deal with large networks. In order to provide ranking for larger networks we should use an
approximation algorithms. In this section we provide the new approximation algorithm for
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Algorithm 20: FasterSVCG Faster algorithm for the Shapley value
Input: Graph G“pV,Eq and characteristic function νf
Output: Shapley value φSVi pνf q of each node vi P V
1 X Ð V ; // initialize X, which is only used for Moerkotte & Neumann’s enumeration
2 foreach vi P V do φSVi ppνf q Ð 0;
3 for iÐ |V | to 1 do
4 computeSV ptviu, Npviq, X,XzpNpviq Y tviuq,Hq; X Ð Xztviu
// ------- Next, we define computeSV -------
5 computeSV pC,NC,X, V ´C , V `C q begin
6 X 1 Ð X YNC; // where NC consists of the neighbours of C
7 foreach S Ď pNCzXq ^ S ‰ H do
8 C 1 Ð C; // a new coalition that will be constructed from the old coalition C
NC 1 Ð NCzS; // the neighbours of C1
9 isCycleÐ false;// to indicate whether a new cycle has appeared while
constructing C1
10 foreach v P S do
11 TEMP ÐH; // a temporary set used to compute neighbours of: C1 Y tvu
TEMP2 ÐH; // a set used to compute the pivotal agents in: C1 Y tvu
foreach u P NpSq do
12 if u R pC YNCq then
13 TEMP Ð TEMP Y tuu;
14 else if pisCycle “ falseq ^ pu P C 1q then // condition 1
15 TEMP2 Ð TEMP2 Y tuu;
16 if |TEMP2 | ą 1 then // condition 2
17 isCycleÐ true;
18 C 1 Ð C 1 Y tvu; NC 1 Ð NC 1 Y TEMP ;
19 V ´C1 Ð V ´C1ztvuzTEMP ;
20 if isCycle “ false then // condition 1
21 V `C1 Ð V `C1ztvu Y TEMP2 ;
22 if |C 1| “ 2 then // condition 3
23 V `C1 ÐH;
24 else if isCycle “ true then // condition 2
25 V `C1 Ð FindPivotalspC 1q;
26 foreach vi P C 1 do // update Shapley value
27 if vi P V `C1 then
28 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ` |C
1ztviu|!p|V |´|C1ztviu|´1q!
|V |! νf pC 1q
29 else // deal with the set V #
C1
30 φSVi pνf qÐ φSVi pνf q` |C
1ztviu|!p|V |´|C1ztviu|´1q!
|V |! pνf pC 1q ´ νf pC 1ztviuqq
31 foreach vi P V ´C1 do // update Shapley value
32 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ´ |C
1|!p|V |´|C1|´1q!
|V |! νf pC 1q
33 computeSV pC 1, NC 1, X 1, V ´C1 , V `C1q;
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connectivity games (called ApproximateSVCG) that outperforms the standard Castro et al.
[2009] method. To see discussion about different methods of approximation the Shapley value
see Section 4.4.1.
Our Algorithm 21 is the dedicated application of standard Monte Carlo sampling to
connectivity games. The crucial difference between Castro et al. [2009] method and
ApproximateSVCG is that instead of sampling permutations our algorithm sample coalitions.
The first observation is that during sampling a single set C we can compute two contributions:
one νf pC Y viq ´ νf pCq, and the second νf pCq ´ νf pCztviuq. Generally speaking, in our
algorithm, we will randomly select C and and approximate the φSVi pνf q using the resulting
average. Looking at the equation (7.5) we see that the marginal contributions are calculated
with different weights. Thus, to obtain an unbiased estimator we have to compute marginal
contributions with appropriate probabilities. To this end, we propose the following process
consisting of 3 fazes. In Faze 1, we uniformly select the size of the coalition k P t0, . . . , |V |u.
In Faze 2, we choose a random coalition C of size k and, in Faze 3, for every agent, compute
the marginal contribution of this agent obtained by leaving/entering C. To better explain our
motivation, let us transform the formula for the Shapley value (Definition 5) as follows:
φSVi pνf q “ 1|V |
ÿ
0ďkă|V |
¨ 1`|V |´1
k
˘ ÿ
CĎV ztiu,|C|“k
pvpC Y tviuq ´ vpCqq (7.6)
The similar transformation was already made in equation 5.1, when we used it to compute
efficiently Semivalues.
From the above formula we infer that to obtain an unbiased estimator the sampling method
should satisfy two conditions:
(i) the probability that a marginal contribution to randomly chosen C is obtained from entering
vi to a coalition of size k is equal for every k: 1n`1 ¨ n´kn ` 1n`1 ¨ k`1n “ 1n (n “ |V |);4
(ii) marginal contributions to all coalitions of size k are chosen with the same probability.
For instance consider a pivotal node vi in coalition C of size k ` 1. The expected marginal
contribution when C P C˜ and C Y tviu P C equals 1n`1 ¨
`
1pn´1k´1q
˘ ¨ νf pCq. On the other hand, the
same marginal contribution is obtained from leaving connected coalition C – here expected
value equals 1
n`1 ¨
`
1pn´1k q
˘ ¨ νf pCq. As we won’t consider transfers from the disconnected
coalitions, we have to ensure that expected value from this marginal contribution does not
change, so if we obtain C with the probability 1
n`1 ¨
`
1pn´1k q
˘
we add marginal contribution which
equals νf pCq ¨ p1` n´k`1k q “ νf pCq ¨ pn`1k q.
4 Note that a given marginal contribution appears twice in our process—the first term represents the
probability that we select a coalition of size k without player vi, while the second one—that we select the
corresponding coalition of size k ` 1, with player vi.
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Algorithm 21: ApproximateSVCG Approximation algorithm for the Shapley value
Input: Graph G“pV,Eq and characteristic function νf
Output: Shapley value φSVi pνf q of each node vi P V
1 foreach vi P V do φSVi pνf q Ð 0;
2 for it “ 1 to maxIter do
3 k Ð random number from t0, . . . , |V |u;
4 C Ð random coalition of size k;
5 if !CheckConnectedness(C) then continue;
6 P Ð FindPivotalspCq;
7 foreach vi P CzP do // case (a)
8 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ` |V |`1|C| ¨ pνf pCq ´ νf pCztviuqq
9 foreach vi P P do // case (b)
10 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ` |V |`1|C| ¨ νf pCq
11 foreach vi P pV zCqzNpCq do // case (c)
12 φSVi pνf q Ð φSVi pνf q ´ |V |`1|V |´|C| ¨ νf pCq
13 foreach vi P V do SVipνf q Ð SVipνf q{maxIter;
This technique allows us to compute the marginal contributions of all agents for a randomly
selected coalition C, which in the connectivity games can be performed much faster than
estimating the Shapley value for each player separately [Mann and Shapley, 1962] or by
sampling of a random permutation [Castro et al., 2009], where we have to calculate the marginal
contributions for a sequence of coalitions growing in size.
In the ApproximateSVCG algorithm we merge our technique with the analysis of marginal
contribution presented in Figure 7.2. The pseudo code is presented in Algorithm 21. Line 3
corresponds to Faze 1, where we sample the size of a coalition. Now, we modify Faze 2 in
order to select only connected coalitions (line 5). See that generating a random connected
coalition uniformly will create a biased algorithm. We also modify Faze 3, when we consider
cases (a), (b), and (c) from Figure 7.2 (lines 7-12). The modification of Faze 3 has to be
done due to the following reason: since we no longer consider disconnected coalitions, any
non-zero marginal contribution made to a disconnected coalition have to be transfered to a
corresponding connected coalition (lines 8, 10, and 12). Furthermore, this should be done in a
way that preserves appropriate probabilities (thus, in lines 8, 10, and 12 we multiply marginal
contributions by adequate weights). Finally, we divide the sum of the contributions by the
number of iterations (lines 13). For every sample, algorithm runs in time Op|V | ` |E|q.
7.5. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we empirically evaluate our FasterSVCG algorithm focusing on randomly
generated networks as well as on real-life data from 9/11 terrorists network. We also evaluate
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Figure 7.3: Time performance of both algorithms.
how ApproximateSVCG approximates ranking, by benchmarking it against exact solution
obtained by our algorithm.
The random graphs used in experiments are based on two topologies commonly found in
social networks, and in terrorist organizations in particular [Krebs, 2002, Sageman, 2004]: (i)
scale-free graphs, where the network is generated according to a power law; and (ii) random
trees, which model hierarchical organisations. To construct scale-free graphs, we use the
preferential attachment generation model [Albert et al., 2000], with parameters k “ 2, 3. In this
model, while gradually constructing a graph, every new node vi is linked to k already existing
nodes such that the probability that vi is linked to the node vj is
degreepviqř
j degreepvjq . To construct
trees, every new node is attached to a randomly picked incumbent. Finally, we include in our
analysis (iii) complete graphs, where all coalitions are connected. Although complete graphs
are unlikely to arise in a terrorist network context, they constitute a suitable benchmark for our
simulations. For all the games on random graphs we assume that f is defined as in Lindelauf’s
centrality (Definition 38, equation 7.1).
FasterSVCG: In Figure 7.3, we compare the performance of FasterSVCG to the
general-purpose Shapley value algorithm (called GeneralSV and presented in Algorithm 19).
This latter algorithm does not take into account the structure of the network, so its runtime is
the same for any type of graph. Unlike GeneralSV, FasterSVCG takes advantage of the sparsity
of the network and, consequently, significantly outperforms the benchmark. For instance, for
SFG(k “ 2) and |V | “ 30, FasterSVCG needs only 0.39% of GeneralSV runtime! Naturally,
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the best performance is obtained for tree graphs, where the game over a network of 30 nodes
can be computed in about 3 seconds.
ApproximateSVCG: In Figure 7.4, we evaluate the time performance of ApproximateSVCG.
Importantly, for our purpose of identifying key terrorists, we are mostly interested in the
approximation of the correct Shapley value-based ranking of top nodes, and less in the
approximation of their actual Shapley values. To this end, we evaluate the time required by
ApproximateSVCG to obtain the ranking of the top r
?
ns nodes, with at most one error (i.e.,
one inversion compared to the exact ranking). We present an average time calculated over 500
iterations, each for a randomly selected SFG(k “ 4). ApproximateSVCG returns top nodes
much faster than FasterSVCG—for the graph of 24 nodes the former algorithm runs in 0.25
sec. and the exact one in 72 sec.
Figure 7.5 shows the comparison between the error convergence of the ApproximateSVCG
and the error convergence of random permutation sampling studied by Castro et al. [2009] (see
Algorithm 6). In this experiment we focus on the maximum absolute error of the Shapley
value. It is computed as a percentage of the value of the grand coalition. The plot presents
an average error from over 30 iteration for Krebs’ 9/11 WTC terrorist network with 36 nodes.
Since connected coalitions constitute only only 0.59% of all coalitions, ApproximateSVCG
outperforms Castro’s method. Indeed, after 4 seconds, the average error of ApproximateSVCG
equals 0.029%, while the error for Castro et al. exceeds 0.2%. The absolute error in
ApproximateSVCG converges to zero which indicates that this sampling method is not biased.
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Lindelauf et al. Our analysis
|V | “ 19, |E| “ 32 |V | “ 26, |E| “ 125
1. A. Aziz Al-Omari Z. Moussaoui
2. H. Alghamdi A. Aziz Al-Omari
3. W. Alsheri M. Atta
4. H. Hanjour W. Alshehri
5. M. Al-Shehhi N. Alhazmi
Table 7.1: FasterSVCG allows us to consider the bigger network of WTC 9/11 attack than
Lindelauf et al. which delivers new insights into the leadership structure of this network
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New insight on Krebs’ 9/11 WTC network: In the already classic work, Krebs [2002]
constructed the 9/11 network from publicly available sources and computed standard centrality
metrics to determine the key players in this network. Lindelauf et al. instead used their new
centrality metric and, similarly to the case of the Jemaah Islamiyah’s network, showed that
the Shapley value-based approach delivers qualitatively better insights. However, Lindelauf et
al.’s analysis focuses only on the network of 19 hijackers with 32 relationships, whereas Krebs
reported also a bigger network of 36 nodes and 125 edges (mentioned above) that included
accomplices. With FasterSVCG, we were able to analyse this bigger network as well.
Importantly, the five top terrorists (out of 36) identified by FasterSVCG differ from the top
five terrorists reported by Lindelauf et al. when only the network of 19 terrorist was taken into
account—see Table 7.1. This difference is especially striking with respect to M. Atta, who was
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widely believed to be one of the ring-leaders of the conspiracy [Krebs, 2002] and was positioned
the third place in our computations, but was classified in Lindelauf et al.’s work only on the 6th
place. This clearly shows the importance of developing tools to analyse the biggest possible
networks.
7.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, the new algorithm was proposed to compute the Shapley value for the
connectivity games of Amer and Gimenez defined over arbitrary graphs. These graphs are
used by security services to represent terrorist networks. It was shown that the problem is
#P-Hard. Nevertheless, using the new exact algorithm we were able to analyse in moderate
time the terrorist network responsible for the 9/11 WTC terrorist attacks. Additionally, in this
chapter a new approximate algorithm was proposed that allows for an efficient study of bigger
networks.
8. The Marginal Contribution Networks for
Generalized Coalitional Games
Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games,
in which the value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but
also on the order in which the coalition is formed. This class of games is a useful
abstraction for a number of realistic settings and economic situations, such as modeling
relationships in social networks. To date, two main extensions of the Shapley value have
been proposed for generalized characteristic function games: the Nowak-Radzik [1994] value
and the Sánchez-Bergantiños [1999] value. In this context, the present chapter studies
generalized characteristic function games from the point of view of representation and
computation. Specifically, we make two key contributions. First, we propose the Generalized
Marginal-Contribution Nets that is a fully expressive mechanism that can in natural way
represent generalized characteristic function games. Second, in order to facilitate an efficient
computation, we propose the polynomial algorithms for computing Nowak-Radzik value
and Sánchez-Berganti value. Our representation extends the results of Ieong and Shoham
[2005] and Elkind et al. [2009a] for characteristic function games and retains their attractive
computational properties. Our additional contribution is to use such a representation in order
to compute game-theoretic centrality measures defined using either the Nowak-Radzik value or
the Sánchez-Bergantiños values that extends path betweenness centrality introduced by Puzis
et al. [2007b].
All aforementioned contributions were made exclusively by the author of this dissertation.
8.1. Preliminaries
In this chapter we introduce the basic notation for generalized coalitional games and also we
present two extensions of the Shapley value (Definition 5) to these games.
8.1.1. The Generalized Coalitional Games
For each coalition C P 2NztHu, denote by ΠpCq the set of all possible permutations of the
players in C. Any such permutation will be called an ordered coalition. An arbitrary ordered
coalition will often be denoted as T , while the set of all such coalitions will be denoted T . That
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is, T “ ŤCP2N ΠpCq. A generalized characteristic function νg is a mapping νg : T Ñ R,
where it is assumed that νgpHq “ 0.
Definition 43 (Generalized coalitional game). A generalized coalitional game consists of a
set of players (or agents) A “ ta1, a2, . . . , a|A|u, and a generalized characteristic function
νg : T Ñ R, which assigns to each ordered coalition of players T P T a real value (or payoff)
indicating its performance, where νgpHq “ 0. Thus, the generalized coalitional game gg in
characteristic function form is a pair gg “ pA, νgq.
A game in generalized characteristic function form is a tuple pA, νgq, but will sometimes be
denoted by νg alone. Sometimes, we will write ai instead of paiq for brevity.
In some cases we will refer to the members of an ordered coalition T using their names,
e.g., write T “ pa5, a2, a3q, while other times we may refer to them using a lower case of the
same letter: T “ pt1, . . . , t|T |q, meaning that ti is the ith agent in T . Furthermore, given two
disjoint ordered coalitions, T “ pt1, . . . , t|T |q P T and S “ ps1, . . . , s|S|q P T , we write pT, Sqk
to denote the ordered coalition that results from inserting S at the kth position in T . That
is, pT, Sqk “ pt1, . . . , tk´1, s1, . . . , s|S|, tk, . . . , t|T |q. With a slight abuse of notation, we write
pT, aiqk to denote pT, paiqqk. Furthermore, we write pai, T q, and pT, aiq, to denote the ordered
coalition that results from inserting ai to T as the first player, and the last player, respectively.
Next, we extend the notion of a subset to ordered sets.
Definition 44 (The subset of ordered sets). For any two ordered coalitions S “ ps1, . . . , s|S|q P
T and T “ pt1, . . . , t|T |q P T , we say that T is a subset of S, and write T tĎS, if and only if T
is a subsequence of S, i.e., the following two conditions hold:
— Every member of T is a member of S. More formally:
@ti P T, Dsk P S : sk “ ti.
— For any two players, ti, tj P T , if ti appears before tj in T , then ti also appears before tj in
S. More formally:
@ti, tj P T : i ă j, Dsk, sw P S : k ă w and sk “ ti and sw “ tj.
Following convention, we say that T is a strict subset of S, and write T tĂS (instead of
T tĎS), if the above two conditions are met, and T ‰ S.
8.1.2. The Nowak and Radzik Value
Whereas four axioms defined in Section 2.2 uniquely determine the Shapley value for
characteristic function games, the situation is more complex for generalized games, because
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a player’s marginal contribution (and consequently the null-player axiom) depends on where
the new player in the coalition is placed. In this respect, Nowak and Radzik [1994] developed
an extension of the Shapley value by making perhaps the most natural assumption that the
marginal contribution of a player is computed when this player is placed last in the coalition.
Let us denote this marginal contribution of ai to T P T pNztaiuq in game νg (according to
Nowak and Radzik’s definition) as MCNRpT, aiq. Then:
MCNRpT, aiq “ νgppT, aiqq ´ νgpT q. (8.1)
In what follows, for any ordered coalition, T , let T paiq denote the sequence of players in T that
appear before ai (if ai R T then T paiq “ T ). For example, given T “ pa1, a3, a4, a6q, we have
T pa4q “ pa1, a3q. Using this notation, we have to following definition.
Definition 45 (The Nowak-Radzik value). In a generalized coalitional game pA, νgq the
Nowak-Radzik value (or NR value for short) for a player ai is given by:
φNRi pA, νgq “ 1|A|!
ÿ
TPΠpAq
MCNRpT paiq, aiq “ ErMCNRpT paiq, aiqs. (8.2)
This can be written differently as follows:
φNRi pA, νgq “
ÿ
CĎAztaiu
ÿ
TPΠpCq
p|A| ´ |T | ´ 1q!
|A|! rν
gppT, aiqq ´ νgpT qs. (8.3)
The NR value is the unique value that satisfies the following “fairness” axioms:
Efficiency:
ř
aiPA φ
NR
i pνgq “ 1|A|!
ř
TPΠpAq ν
gpT q.
Null-Player: @ai P A, if νgpT q “ νgppT, aiqq @T P T : ai R T , then φNRi pνgq “ 0.
Additivity: φNRpνg ` ν 1gq “ φNRpνgq ` φNRpν 1gq for any two functions, νg and ν 1g.
8.1.3. The Sánchez and Bergantiños Value
Sánchez and Bergantiños [1999] developed an alternative extension of the Shapley value based
on the definition of the marginal contribution, where, instead of assuming that this player will
be placed last, the authors take the average over all possible positions in which the player can
be placed:
MCSBpT, aiq “ 1p|T | ` 1q
|T |`1ÿ
l“1
rνgppT, aiqlq ´ νgpT qs. (8.4)
Using above, we can introduce the following definition.
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Definition 46 (The Sánchez-Bergantiños value). In a generalized coalitional game pA, νgq
the Sánchez-Bergantiños value (or SB value for short) for a player ai is given by:
φSBi pA, νgq “ 1|A|!
ÿ
TPΠpAq
MCSBpT paiq, aiq “ ErMCSBpT paiq, aiqs. (8.5)
This also can be rewritten differently as follows:
φSBi pA, νgq “
ÿ
CĎAztaiu
ÿ
TPΠpCq
p|A| ´ |T | ´ 1q!
|A|!p|T | ` 1q
|T |`1ÿ
l“1
rνgppT, aiqlq ´ νgpT qs. (8.6)
The SB value is the unique value that satisfies NR’s efficiency and additivity axioms and the
following axioms:
Null-Player If @T P T @l P t1, .., |T | ` 1u : νgppT, aiqlq “ νgpT q, then φSBi pνgq “ 0.
Symmetry If @T P T´ti,ju@l P t1, .., |T | ` 1u : νgppT, aiqlq “ νgppT, ajqlq, then
φSBi pνgq “ φSBj pνgq.
The difference between the NR and SB values is illustrated in the following example:
Example 7. Consider a game with an ordered coalition T ˚ P ΠpAq such that νgpT q “ 1 if
T “ T ˚ and νgpT q “ 0 otherwise. Then, the average value of the grand coalition, taken
over all possible orders, which is 1|A|! , needs to be distributed among the players. Using
the NR value, we get φNRt pAq “ 1|A|! , where at is the last player in the ordered coalition
T ˚, and we get φNRi pAq “ 0 for all ai P Aztatu. In contrast, using the SB value, we get
φSBi pAq “ 1|A|!¨|T 1| “ 1|A|!¨|A| for all ai P A. As can be seen, in this example, the NR value
rewards the last player in the order, whereas the SB value rewards all players equally.
Having introduced the extensions of Shapley value to generalized characteristic function
games, in the following section we consider the issue of representation.
8.2. Representation
In this section we consider the issue of efficient computation of the NR and SB values. Recall
that a straightforward computation of the NR value, using either formulas (8.2) or (8.3), requires
iterating over all ordered coalition. The same holds for the SB value and formulas (8.5) or
(8.6). Now since, for any game of n players, there are
řn
i“1
``
n
i
˘ˆ i!˘ ordered coalitions,
such an approach quickly becomes prohibitive with increasing n.1 To tackle this computational
problem we introduce in this section a compact representation scheme for games with ordered
1 For instance, the size of the generalized characteristic function for n “ 5 is 325, whereas for n “ 10 is
9864100.
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coalitions and evaluate its properties. We take as our starting point the marginal contribution
nets (MC-Nets) representation by Ieong and Shoham [2005] (see Section 2.4) and its extension,
read-once marginal contribution nets (or read-once MC-Nets) by Elkind et al. [2009a] (see
Section 2.5). This representation has a number of desirable properties: it is fully expressive,
concise for many characteristic function games of interest, and facilitates a very efficient
technique for computing the Shapley value. Importantly, our representation, which we call
generalized read-once MC-Nets, also has these desirable properties.
This section is divided into four subsections. In Section 8.2.1, we introduce the generalized
read-once MC-Nets representation to represent generalized characteristic function games
compactly. After that, in Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3, we prove that this representation facilitates
an efficient computation of the NR value and the SB value, respectively. Finally, in Section 8.3,
we present a sample application of generalized read-once MC-Nets to compute game-theoretic
centrality based on the NR and SB values.
8.2.1. Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets
Having presented the MC-Net representation for characteristic function games in Section 2.4
and read-once MC-Net on Section 2.5, we now present our extension of MC-Nets to generalized
characteristic function games. More specifically, we extend the rules so that the formula F on
the left hand side of a rule is applicable to an ordered coalition. We introduce two atomic
formulas:
basic atomic formula (BAF) tam, . . . , anu,
ordered atomic formula (OAF) xai, . . . , ajy.
The ordered coalition T meets a basic atomic formula, denotedFBAF , if all literals occurring
in FBAF belong to T . More formally
T |ù FBAF ðñ @ai P FBAF , ai P T.
Example 8. Let N “ ta1, . . . , a10u and consider T “ pa5, a1, a4, a3, a2q. We have:
T ( ta2, a5u,
T * ta5, a2, a4, a6u.
Now, we introduce an ordered atomic formula, denoted FOAF . This formula is our crucial
extension to MC-Nets; it allows us to fully express the values of all ordered coalitions.
Specifically, the ordered coalition T meets FOAF if all literals occurring in FOAF appear in
T in the same order as in the FOAF formula.
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To state this more formally, let us first introduce the notion of an ordered coalition
corresponding to FOAF . To this end, for every FOAF “ xai, . . . , ajy, the corresponding ordered
coalition of FOAF is simply SOAF “ pai, . . . , ajq. The main difference between the two is
that ai is a literal in FOAF , while it is an agent in SOAF . Now, given a particular FOAF and an
ordered coalition SOAF corresponding to it, the following holds for every T P T :
T |ù FOAF ðñ SOAF tĎT.
In other words, SOAF is a subsequence of T . This has a natural interpretation: when a group of
players joins any coalition in a certain order they contribute to it a certain value. Consider the
following example:
Example 9. Let N “ ta1, . . . , a10u and consider T “ pa5, a1, a4, a3, a2q. We have:
T ( xa5, a3, a2y,
T * xa5, a2, a3y,
T * xa5, a3, a2, a6y.
Now, we are able to formalize our representation which we call the generalized read-once
MC-Nets. Specifically, in this representation, a rule, called generalized read-once rule, is as
follows:
F Ñ V, (8.7)
where V is a real value and the syntax of the generalized formula F is:
A :“ FBAF | FOAF ,
F :“ pFq |  F | F ^ F | F _ F | F ‘ F | A,
and each literal can only appear once in the formula. This generalized formula is a binary
rooted tree with atomic formulas on leafs and internal nodes labeled with one of the following
logical connectives: conjunction (^), disjunction (_) or exclusive disjunction (‘). The logical
connectives have the following standard interpretation:
T (  F ðñ T * F ,
T ( F1 ^ F2 ðñ T ( F1 and T ( F2,
T ( F1 _ F2 ðñ T ( F1 or T ( F2,
T ( F1 ‘ F2 ðñ T ( pF1 _ F2q ^  pF1 ^ F2q.
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Example 10. Let N “ ta1, . . . , a10u and consider T “ pa5, a1, a4, a3, a2q. We have:
T ( pta2, a5u ^ xa1, a3yq _ ta4, a7, a9u,
T * xa4, a5, a3y ‘ pta1u ^  ta2uq.
Definition 47 (Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets). The generalized coalitional game pN, νgq
in the form of Generalized Read-once Marginal Contribution Network is a pair pA,GRq, where
A is a set of players, and GR is a finite set of generalized rules. The value νgpT q of an ordered
coalition T is defined as the sum of all V from the generalized read-once rules that are met by
T . More formally:
νgpT q “
ÿ
GRQFÑV : T |ùF
V . (8.8)
The following example presents a simple application of generalized read-once MC-Nets to
the scheduling problem:
Example 11. Let G “ pV,Eq be a directed acyclic graph representing a task-based domain,
where each vertex in V “ tv1, . . . , vnu represents a task. Each edge pvi, vjq P E illustrates
that task vi has to be completed before task vj . We say that the job is done if all tasks of a
given graph G are completed, in which case we get some revenue. Next we show how each such
graph can be represented by a single generalized read-once rule, where agents represent tasks.
In particular, each formula in the rule represents an edge in G, as follows:
ľ
pai,ajqPE
xai, ajy Ñ revenue of the job defined by G.
An ordered coalition T represents the workforce that can finish tasks in a given order. The total
revenue of T is then equal to the sum of revenues of all jobs feasible by T .
Having defined our representation formally, we now evaluate its properties. We start with
expressiveness:
Proposition 5 (Expressiveness). Every ordered coalitional game can be expressed using
generalized read-once MC-Nets.
Proof. For any arbitrary generalized characteristic function νg, we show how to construct a set
of rules GR such that Equation (8.8) holds for every T P T .
We will use only OAF to define a recursive set starting from singleton sequences and empty
set GR0 “ H. Let SOAF be the ordered coalition corresponding to FOAF , and let |FOAF | be
the size of this formula.
GR1 “
 xaiy Ñ νgppaiqq( @ai P N,
GRn “
 FOAF Ñ νgpSOAF q ´řn´1k“1 řGRkQFÑV : SOAF |ùF V ( @|FOAF | “ n.
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Finally, we get GR “ Ťi GRi. 
In the above proof of Proposition 5, it emerges that only OAFs are necessary in order to
guarantee that the generalized MC-Nets are fully expressive. In the following basic example we
present that in some games the BAF gives us desirable succinctness.
Example 12. Let N “ ta1, . . . , anu be the set of tasks. In order to get profit V , all tasks must
be done in arbitrary chosen order. It is clear that representing this problem using only OAF
requires n! number of formulas:
xa1, . . . , any Ñ V,
...
xan, . . . , a1y Ñ V.
By introducing BAF we can get exponentially more concise notation: ta1, . . . , anu Ñ V .
It is worth making some observations about the conciseness of our representation scheme.
Our rule-based representation scheme is ultimately based on propositional formulae, and the
use of these formulae is ultimately to define a Boolean function. The use of propositional
formulae to define Boolean functions is very standard: a very fundamental result in the theory of
propositional logic is that any Boolean function of n Boolean arguments can be represented by a
propositional formula in which the variables correspond to these arguments. For many Boolean
functions, it might be possible to obtain compact propositional formulae to represent them, but
crucially, this will not always be possible; some Boolean functions will require formulae of
size exponential in the number of variables (see, e.g., Boppana and Sipser [1990]). It is in fact
trivial to produce examples of characteristic functions whose representation in our framework
is exponentially more succinct than explicitly listing the value of every coalition, but from the
above discussion, it also follows that our representation cannot guarantee compactness in all
cases. Finally, note that in the worst case, we can represent a characteristic function with one
rule for every possible input, which essentially corresponds to the idea of listing the value of
every coalition. Thus, in the worst case, our representation scheme is no worse than simply
listing the value of every input. More formally:
Corollary 1 (Conciseness). Compared to the generalized function game representation,
generalized read-once MC-nets are at least as concise, and for certain games exponentially
more compact.
8.2.2. Computing the Nowak-Radzik Value with Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets
In this subsection, we discuss the computational properties of the generalized read-once
MC-Net representation with respect to calculating the Nowak-Radzik value (i.e., the NR value).
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We start our computational analysis with some observations about atomic formulas. First,
observe that all players occurring in some FBAF are indistinguishable. Furthermore, taking into
account that each player can appear in at most one formula, φNR will assign to these players the
same values. The case of FOAF is different. Here, the NR value for all players except the last
one is zero (see Example 7).
Algorithm 22: (COMP_NR) Computing the Nowak-Radzik value
Input: N “ ta1, . . . , anu, pF1 Ñ V1q, . . . , pFr Ñ Vrq
Output: φNRi for all ai P N
1 for ai P N do φNRi Ð 0; for j Ð 1 to r do
2 mÐ |Fj|;
3 pA,B,T,Fq Ð ShNR; // the Pseudo code of ShNR is in Appendix B
4 foreach ai P XFj do
5 if Dk Ak,i ‰ 0 then
6 vi Ð 1m!
řm´1
k“0 pm´ k ´ 1q!Ak,i;
7 else if Dk Bk,i ‰ 0 then
8 vi Ð ´ 1m!
řm´1
k“0 pm´ k ´ 1q!Bk,i;
9 else
10 vi Ð 0;
11 φNRi Ð φNRi ` Vj ¨ vi;
Theorem 6. Given a generalized coalitional game pN,GRq, Algorithm 22 computes the
Nowak-Radzik value (φNRi for all ai P N ) in polynomial time.
Proof. We start by introducing necessary notation, some of which is in the pseudo code of
Algorithm 22. For each formula F , we denote by XF the sets of players occurring in F , and
by |F | the size of XF , and by TF the set of all ordered coalitions within the set XF , i.e.,
TF “ ŤCĎXF ΠpCq. For all ai P XF and k P t0, . . . , nu, we define the following quantities:
Ak,ipFq “ |T P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T * F , pT, aiq ( Fq|,
Bk,ipFq “ |T P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T ( F , pT, aiq * Fq|,
TkpFq “ |T P TF : |T | “ k, T ( F |,
FkpFq “ |T P TF : |T | “ k, T * F |.
The first quantity Ak,ipFq is the number of ordered coalitions from TF of a given size k (i.e.,
containing k players) to which the addition of player ai at the end of the coalition causes the
formula F to become satisfied. In contrast, the second quantity Bk,i is the number of coalitions
to which adding player ai causes the formula F to become unsatisfied. The last two quantities,
TkpFq and FkpFq, count the number of ordered coalition being satisfied, and not satisfied,
respectively, by the formula F . These quantities can be computed recursively as follows. Let
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us first focus on the case where F is an atomic formula. This case can be divided further into
two cases:
— F “ ta1, . . . , aru: Here, Ak,i “ pr ´ 1q! if k “ r ´ 1 and i P XF , otherwise Ak,i “ 0. Bk,i
always equals 0. Tk “ r! if k “ r, otherwise Tk “ 0. Finally, Fk “ k! if k ă r, otherwise
Fk “ 0.
— F “ xa1, . . . , ary: Here Ak,i “ 1 if k “ r ´ 1 and i “ r, otherwise Ak,i “ 0. Bk,i always
equals 0. Tk “ 1 if k “ r, otherwise Tk “ 0. Finally, Fk “ k! ´ Tk if k ď r, otherwise
Fk “ 0.
Having discussed the case where F is an atomic formula, we now consider the case where
F contains logical connectives. If such a connective involves two subformulas F1 and F2, then
we know that ai can appear in F1 or F2, but not in both. We also know that logical connectives
used in the generalized read-once MC-Nets are symmetric, so we will consider only one case,
ai P F1; the other is analogous.
In our analysis, for every two disjoint ordered coalitions, T1 and T2, we define a conflation
of T1 and T2 as an ordered coalition T such that (1) every agent in T appears in T1 or T2, and
(2) the order of the agents in T1 is retained in T , and the order of those in T2 is also retained in
T . The set of every conflation of T1 and T2 will be denoted T1 ˆ T2. More formally:
T P T1 ˆ T2 ðñ XT “ XT1 YXT2 ^ T 1tĂT ^ T2tĂT,
where XT denotes a set of players in T . We note that if T1 ( F and XF X T2 “ H then
T ( F@T P pT1 ˆ T2q.
Proposition 6. Two ordered coalitions T1 and T2 can be conflated in
`|T1|`|T2|
|T2|
˘
ways.
Proof. Consider an sequence of |T1| ` |T2| empty slots, where each slot can take an agent. Out
of all these slots, choose any |T2| slots, and place in them the agents from T2 while retaining
their order. As for the remaining slots, place in them the agents from T1 while retaining their
order. Clearly, every choice of the |T2| slots results in a unique conflation, and every conflation
can be constructed by exactly one such choice of the |T2| slots. The number of conflations is
then
`|T1|`1`|T2|´1
|T2|
˘
. 
Next, we show how to compute Ak,i,Bk,i, Tk and Fk. We will do this for each of the possible
logical connective (i.e.,  , ^, _ and ‘) separately:
— F “  F1: In this case, the negation swaps quantities as follows. For all i and k we have
Ak,ipFq “ Bk,ipF1q, Bk,ipFq “ Ak,ipF1q, TkpFq “ FkpF1q, and FkpFq “ TkpF1q.
— F “ F1 ^ F2. In this case, let T P T1 ˆ T2, where T1 P ΠpXF1q, |T1| “ s and
T2 P ΠpXF2q, |T2| “ k ´ s. We have pT, aiq ( F if and only if pT1, aiq ( F1 and
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T2 ( F2. In this case, T * F if and only if T1 * F1. Consequently, using Proposition 6 we
get:
Ak,i “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘As,ipF1qTk´spF2q.
Furthermore, we have T ( F if and only if T1 ( F1 and T2 ( F2. Additionally in this case
we have: pT, aiq * F ô pT1, aiq * F1. Consequently,
Bk,i “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘Bs,ipF1qTk´spF2q.
Eventually, for Tk and Fk, we have:
Tk “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘TspF1qTk´spF2q,
Fk “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘pFs`F1qFk´spF2q ` FspF1qTk´spF2q ` TspF1qFk´spF2q˘.
— F “ F1 _ F2. In this case, let T P T1 ˆ T2, where T1 P ΠpXF1q, |T1| “ s and
T2 P ΠpXF2q, |T2| “ k ´ s. We know that T * F if and only if T1 * F1 and T2 * F2.
Furthermore, in this case it holds that pT, aiq ( F ô pT1, aiq ( F1. Thus,
Ak,i “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘As,ipF1qFk´spF2q.
Analogously, we have pT, aiq * F if and only if pT1, aiq * F1 and T2 * F2, and in this
case it holds that: T ( F ô T1 ( F1. Consequently,
Bk,i “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘Bs,ipF1qFk´spF2q.
Finally, for Tk and Fk, we have:
Tk “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘pTs`F1qTk´spF2q ` FspF1qTk´spF2q ` TspF1qFk´spF2q˘,
Fk “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘FspF1qFk´spF2q.
— F “ F1 ‘ F2: Let T “ T1 ˆ T2 such that T1 P ΠpXF1q, |T1| “ s and T2 P ΠpXF2q, |T2| “
k´s. Now, the ordered coalition T can contribute to Ak,i in two ways. Firstly, when T1 ( F1
and T2 ( F2 and pT1, aiq * F1. Secondly, when T1 * F1 and T2 * F2 and pT1, aiq ( F1.
Thus:
Ak,i “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘pBs,ipF1qTk´spF2q ` As,ipF1qFk´spF2qq,
Bk,i “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘pBs,ipF1qFk´spF2q ` As,ipF1qTk´spF2qq,
Tk “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘pTspF1qFk´spF2q ` FspF1qTk´spF2qq,
Fk “ řks“0 ` kk´s˘pTspF1qTk´spF2q ` FspF1qFk´spF2qq.
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The above four quantities are computed recursively in the function ShNR which is invoked
in line 4 of Algorithm 22 (the pseudo code of ShNR can be found in Appendix A).
Note that Tk and Fk are only used to compute Ak,i and Bk,i, which are then used in lines 6
and 8 of Algorithm 22 to compute φNR. Having proved the correctness of computing Ak,i and
Bk,i, it remains to prove that the way they are used in lines 6 and 8 correctly computes φNR.
It suffices to prove this for a single rule F Ñ 1, as the extension to multiple rules is straight
forward in the MC-Net representation. To this end, some player ai can contribute to any ordered
coalition T counted in Ak,i, or Bk,i (one of these quantities is zero), if it appears in a random
permutation right after the players from T . The remaining players not occurring in T can be
arranged in pm´ k ´ 1q! ways (we have |XF | “ m). In case ai contributes to Ak,i, we have
φNRi “ 1m!
řm´1
k“0 pm´ k ´ 1q!Ak,i.
In the second case ai contributes to Bk,i; we get
φNRi “ ´ 1m!
řm´1
k“0 pm´ k ´ 1q!Bk,i.
These are exactly lines 6 and 8 of Algorithm 22. This concludes the proof of correctness of
Algorithm 22. In terms of runtime, it is clear from the pseudo codes (in Algorithm 22 and
Appendix B) that the total number of operations is polynomial in the number of agents. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 6. 
8.2.3. Computing the Sánchez-Bergantiños Value with Generalized Read-Once MC-Nets
In this subsection, we discuss the computational properties of the generalized read-once
MC-Net representation with respect to calculating the Sánchez-Bergantiños value (i.e., the SB
value). We start our computational analysis with some observations about atomic formulas.
First, observe that all players occurring in some FBAF are indistinguishable. Furthermore,
taking into account that each player can appear in at most one formula, φSB will assign to these
players the same values. Similarly, for the case ofFOAF , the SB value is the same for all players
due to the symmetry axiom (see Example 7).
Note that the SB value involves a different notion of marginal contribution. Whereas computing
quantities Tk and Fk remains the same, we need to redefine Ak,i and Bk,i.
Ak,i,lpFq “ |T P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T * F , pT, aiql ( Fq|,
Bk,i,lpFq “ |T P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T ( F , pT, aiql * Fq|.
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The first quantity Ak,i,lpFq is the number of ordered coalitions of a given size k for which
adding player ai on position l causes F to become satisfied. Bk,i,l is the number of coalitions in
which adding the player ai on position l causes F to become unsatisfied.
Algorithm 23: (COMP_SB) Computing the Sánchez-Bergantiños value
Input: N “ ta1, . . . , anu, pF1 Ñ V1q, . . . , pFr Ñ Vrq
Output: φSBi for all ai P N
1 for ai P N do φSBi Ð 0; for j Ð 1 to r do
2 mÐ |Fj|;
3 pA,B,T,Fq Ð ShSBpFjq; // the Pseudo code of ShSB is in Appendix B
4 foreach ai P XFj do
5 if Dk,l Ak,i,l ‰ 0 then
6 vi Ð 1m!
řm´1
k“0
1
k`1
řk`1
l“1 pm´ k ´ 1q!Ak,i,l;
7 else if Dk,l Bk,i,l ‰ 0 then
8 vi Ð ´ 1m!
řm´1
k“0
1
k`1
řk`1
l“1 pm´ k ´ 1q!Bk,i,l;
9 else
10 vi Ð 0;
11 φSBi Ð φSBi ` Vj ¨ vi;
Theorem 7. Given a generalized coalitional game pN,GRq, Algorithm 23 computes the
Sánchez-Bergantiños value (φSBi for all ai P N ) in polynomial time.
Proof. As for Tk and Fk, the computation is exactly the same as in the proof of Theorem 6.
Therefore, we only need to show how to calculate Ak,i,l and Bk,i,l in polynomial time. We will
start from atomic formulas:
— F “ ta1, . . . , aru: In this case Ak,i,l “ pr ´ 1q! if k “ r ´ 1, i P XF and l P t1, . . . , ru,
otherwise, Ak,i,l “ 0. On the other hand, Bk,i,l “ 0 for all k, i and l.
— F “ xa1, . . . , ary: Here Ak,i,l “ 1 if k “ r ´ 1, i P XF and l “ i, otherwise Ak,i,l “ 0. On
the other hand, Bk,i,l is always equal to 0.
In the next part of proof we will use following proposition.
Proposition 7. The number of conflations of two ordered coalitions T1 and T2 such that s
players from T2 go before the l-th member of T1 equals
`
l`s´1
s
˘`p|T1|´l`1`1q`p|T2|´sq´1
|T2|´s
˘
.
Proof. Simply use combination with repetition twice. 
Next, we show how to compute Ak,i,Bk,i for each of the possible logical connective (i.e.,  , ^,
_ and ‘) separately. We will assume that ai P XF1 .
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— F “  F1: Here, the negation causes a swap between sets. That is, we have Ak,i,lpFq “
Bk,i,lpF1q and Bk,i,lpFq “ Ak,i,lpF1q for all k, i, l.
— F “ F1^F2: Let T “ T1ˆT2, where T1 P ΠpXF1q, |T1| “ s and T2 P ΠpXF2q, |T2| “ k´s.
We have pT, aiql ( F if and only if pT1, aiqm ( F1 for each m ď l when l´m members of
coalition T2 go before the m-th member of coalition T1 during the conflation operation and
T2 ( F2. In this case, T * F if and only if T1 * F1. Consequently, using Proposition 7 we
get:
Ak,i,l “ řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘As,i,mpF1qTk´spF2q.
Furthermore, we have T ( F if and only if T1 ( F1 and T2 ( F2. Additionally in this case
it holds that: pT, aiql * F ô pT1, aiqm * F1 for m ď l, when l ´m members of coalition
T2 go before the m-th member of coalition T1 during the conflation operation and T2 * F1.
Again, using Proposition 7 we get:,
Bk,i,l “ řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘Bs,i,mpF1qTk´spF2q.
— F “ F1 _ F2: Once again let T “ T1 ˆ T2, where T1 P ΠpXF1q, |T1| “ s and
T2 P ΠpXF2q, |T2| “ k ´ s. We know that T * F if and only if T1 * F1 and T2 * F2.
Furthermore, in this case it holds that pT, aiql ( F ô pT1, aiqm ( F1 for m ď l. Thus,
Ak,i,l “ řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘As,i,mpF1qFk´spF2q.
Analogously, we have pT, aiql * F if and only if pT1, aiqm * F1 for m ď l when l ´ m
members of coalition T2 go before the m-th member of coalition T1 during the conflation
operation, and T2 * F2. Furthermore, in this case it holds that: T ( F ô T1 ( F1.
Consequently,
Bk,i,l “ řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘Bs,i,mpF1qFk´spF2q.
— F “ F1 ‘ F2: Let T “ T1 ˆ T2 such that T1 P ΠpXF1q, |T1| “ s and T2 P ΠpXF2q, |T2| “
k ´ s. Now, the ordered coalition T can contribute to Ak,i,l in two ways. Firstly, when
T1 ( F1 and T2 ( F2 and pT1, aiqm * F1. Secondly, when T1 * F1 and T2 * F2 and
pT1, aiqm ( F1, so
Ak,i,l “ řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘`Bs,i,mpF1qTk´spF2q ` As,i,mpF1qFk´spF2q˘.
Bk,i,l “ řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘`Bs,i,mpF1qFk´spF2q ` As,i,mpF1qTk´spF2q˘.
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The above two quantities (together with Tk and Fk ) are computed recursively in the function
ShSB which is invoked in line 4 of Algorithm 23 (the pseudo code of ShSB can be found in
Appendix B).
Note that Tk and Fk are only used to compute Ak,i,l and Bk,i,l, which are then used in lines
6 and 8 of Algorithm 23 to compute ShSB . Having proved the correctness of computing Ak,i,l
and Bk,i,l, it remains to prove that the way they are used in lines 6 and 8 correctly computes
ShSB . It suffices to prove this for a single rule F Ñ 1, as the extension to multiple rules is
straight forward in the MC-Net representation. To this end, some player ai can contribute to
any ordered coalition T counted in Ak,i,l, or Bk,i,l, if it appears in a permutation right after the
pl´ 1qth player from T . The remaining players (i.e., those not belonging to T ) can be arranged
in pm´ k ´ 1q! ways (we have |XF | “ m). In case ai contributes to Ak,i,l, we have
φSBi “ 1m!
řm´1
k“0
1
k`1
řk`1
l“1 pm´ k ´ 1q!Ak,i,l.
In the second case, when ai contributes to Bk,i,l, we get
φSBi “ ´ 1m!
řm´1
k“0
1
k`1
řk`1
l“1 pm´ k ´ 1q!Bk,i,l.
These are exactly lines 6 and 8 of Algorithm 23. This concludes the proof of correctness of
Algorithm 23. In terms of runtime, it is clear from the pseudo codes (in Algorithm 23 and
Appendix B) that the total number of operations is polynomial in the number of agents. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 7. 
Finally, it is worth making a few remarks about the problem of generating a representation
of a game in our framework. We know that given a representation of a game in our framework,
we can for example compute the NR and SB values in polynomial time. But how hard is it to
come up with a representation of a game in our framework?
Suppose we are given a black box representation of a characteristic function, i.e., an oracle
for the function that can be queried in unit time to determine the value of any ordered coalition.
Then, it is not hard to see that it will require time exponential in the number of players to produce
a representation of it in our framework. This is because we cannot avoid having to query the
oracle for the value of every possible ordered coalition, and there are clearly exponentially many
of them.
Another obvious question is whether other representations can easily be “translated” to
our representation. Here, we have better news. For example, a representation of a game in
Ieong and Shoham’s MC-Nets representation can be transformed into our representation in
polynomial time: MC-Net rules correspond directly to rules in our framework requiring only
basic atomic formulae (BAFs). In the same way, the subgraph representation introduced by
Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] (which is, in fact, a special case of the MC-Net representation)
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can also be translated into our framework in polynomial time. Each edge of the graph translates
to a rule with a BAF containing only two players.
It is worth noting that we are not aware of any other attempts in the literature to develop
representations for generalized coalitional games. If such were developed, then it would be
interesting to consider the problem of translating between representations.
8.3. Computing Generalized Game-Theoretic Betweenness Centrality
As mentioned in the introduction, it is possible to use the game-theoretic solution concepts,
including the Nowak-Radzik and Sánchez-Bergantiños values, to measure centrality of nodes
in networks [del Pozo et al., 2011]. In this section, we show how to extend the classic notion
of betweenness centrality to generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality which builds
upon generalized characteristic function games and the NR and SB values. After that, we show
that it is possible to use generalized read-once MC-Nets to compute the new centrality in time
polynomial in the number of shortest paths in the network.
While betweenness centrality (Definition 16) is focused on the role in the network played by
individual nodes, and group betweenness centrality (Definition 22) is designed to measure the
power of the set of nodes, the measure proposed by Puzis et al. [2007b] captures the notion of
the sequences of nodes. Their measure, called path betweenness centrality, evaluates sequences
of nodes and counts the proportion of shortest paths that traverse along a given sequence of
nodes in an appropriate order. Formally:
Definition 48 (Path betweenness centrality). Given a graph G “ pV,Eq, we define the set
of all ordered coalitions of nodes in the graph, i.e., T “ ŤCP2V ΠpCq. The path betweenness
centrality of the ordered group of nodes T is defined as a function cpb : T Ñ R such that:
cpbpT q “
ÿ
sRT
tRT
σstpT q
σst
, (8.9)
where σst denotes the number of all shortest paths from s to t and σstpT q is the number of
shortest paths from s to t passing through all nodes from T (if s P T or t P T then σstpT q “ 0)
such that the order of visited nodes is maintained (for path p we have T tĎp).
Similarly to other game-theoretic extension of classic centrality measures recently
considered in the literature (see Section 3.2), the above function, that assigns values to all
ordered groups (coalitions) of nodes, can be considered to be a value function, i.e., in our case,
149
the generalized characteristic function. Now, the NR and SB values computed for this function
become the generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality.2
Definition 49 (Generalized representation function). A generalized representation function
is a function ψg : G Ñ V gG that maps every graph G “ pV,Eq onto a generalized cooperative
game pNA, νgGq P V gG with A “ V .
Now, solution concepts like Nowak-Radzik and Sánchez-Bergantiños values can be used in
the network setting by applying them to the characteristic function that a network represents.
Definition 50 (Generalized Game-theoretic centrality measure). Formally, we define a
generalized game-theoretic centrality measure as a pair pψg, φq consisting of a representation
function ψg and a solution concept φ.
Definition 51 (Generalized Game-theoretic Betweenness Centrality). The generalized
game-theoretic betweenness centrality is a pair pψgB, φq, where ψgBpGq “ cpb is the path
betweenness centrality, the value of each node v P V is given by φvpcpbq, and φ is the
Nowak-Radzik value (φNR) or Sánchez-Bergantiños value (φSB ).
In the previous chapters we have shown that some game-theoretic centrality measures can
be computed in polynomial time in the size of the network, i.e., in the number of nodes and
edges. While in the literature there is no such a positive result for the generalized game-theoretic
betweenness centrality, we will now show that it is possible to compute it in time polynomial
in the number of shortest paths in the network and with the help of our generalized read-once
MC-Nets.
In particular, given a network G “ pV,Eq, Algorithm 24 builds, for each shortest path in
the network, a corresponding generalized read-once rule. More specifically, after initialization,
we iterate over all shortest paths in the network. For each shortest path, in line 7, we initialize
the formula F with ordered atomic formula corresponding to the sequence of all the nodes on
the path. Next, in line 8, we add a conjunction that ensures that no other nodes can appear in an
ordered coalition that satisfies our formula.
The size of the set GR constructed by this algorithm equals to the number of shortest paths
in the graph and can be exponential in the number of vertices. However, in many graphs we
have |GR| ! T , which makes this algorithm much more efficient than computing this measure
directly using equation (8.3) or equation (8.6) for φNR and φSB , respectively.
2 We note that the game-theoretic betweenness centrality was introduced in Chapter 5 but this measure does
not account for the order of players.
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Algorithm 24: Computing the generalized game-theoretic betweenness centrality
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq, path betweenness centrality cpb, game solution φ
Output: φv for all v P V
1 for v P V do φv Ð 0; GRÐH; // initialize the set of generalized read-once formulas
2 for v P V do
3 for u P V do
4 SP Ð shortestPathspv, uq; // compute using a BFS algorithm all shortest paths
from v to u
5 for pv, . . . , uq P SP do
6 F Ð xv, . . . , uy;
7 F Ð F ^ tV zXFu;
8 V Ð cpbppv, . . . , uqq;
9 GRÐ GRY pF Ñ V q;
10 if φ ““ φNR then
11 COMP_NRpGRq; // use Algorithm 22
12 else if φ ““ φSB then
13 COMP_SBpGRq; // use Algorithm 23
8.4. Conclusions
Generalized characteristic function games are attracting increasing interest in the literature due
to their manifold potential applications. In this chapter we considered both the representation
and computational aspects of these games. In particular, building upon the state-of-the-art
read-once MC-Nets for the Shapley value by Elkind et al. [2009a], we proposed the first
computationally-convenient formalism to model games with ordered coalitions. Moreover,
our Generalized Marginal-Contribution Nets representation allows to compute effectively
the Nowak-Radzik and Sánchez-Bergantiños values. Finally, we proved the usefulness of
such representation by constructing efficient algorithm to compute generalized game-theoretic
betweenness centrality.
9. Summary and Potential Extensions
In this dissertation, we developed 10 and analyzed additional 5 efficient algorithms computing
different coalitional game solutions on graphs (the most important of them were presented
in Table 9.1). These positive results in the domain of networks involved three fundamental
centrality metrics: degree, closeness and betweenness. The game-theoretic solution concepts,
such as the Shapley value, or Nowak-Radzik value, computed for these three measures gave us
the new class of centrality metrics—the game-theoretic centrality measures.
In Chapter 4, two algorithms were introduced: Algorithm 1 for Shapley value-based degree
centrality and Algorithm 4 for Shapley value-based closness centrality. Both algorithms can
be easily applied to weighted and unweighted graphs. In this chapter we also presented
three generalizations of these two measures. Additionally, Algorithm 1 was an inspiration for
Szczepan´ski et al. [2015a], who computed efficiently on networks Interaction Index based on
degree centrality.
In the next Chapter 5 four algorithms were introduced to compute different version of
game-theoretic betweenness centrality. Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 15 compute Shapley
value-based betweenness centrality for weighted and unweighted networks, respectively. The
another two Algorithms 13 for unweighted and Algorithms 16 for weighted graphs are an
implementation of Semivalue-based betweenness centrality.
Owen value-based degree centrality was introduced in Chapter 6 together with two
polynomial time algorithms. Firstly, in Algorithm 17 the general method for computing
Coalitional Semivalue-based centrality measure was introduced. Secondly, in Algorithm 18
we introduced the faster method to compute Owen value-based degree centrality, which was an
optimization of Algorithm 17 to calculate this particular Coalitional Semivalue.
The contribution of this dissertation not only consists of positive results. In particular,
in Chapter 7 it was proven that computing Shapley value for connectivity games is #P-hard.
However, against this negative results the Algorithm 20 was developed to compute Shapley
value much faster than the brute force approach for connectivity games. This algorithm allows
us to study much bigger real-life networks, and also was an inspiration for developing even
faster methods to analyze connectivity games and graph-restricted games [Skibski et al., 2014,
Michalak et al., 2015a].
In the last Chapter 8 the new representation of generalized coalitional games was
introduced. Importantly, we developed two algorithms that in time polynomial in the
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size of the representation computes the Nowak-Radzik value (Algorithms 22) and the
Sánchez-Bergantiños value (Algorithms 23). Based on this representation the Algorithm 24
was introduced to compute Nowak-Radzik value-based and Sánchez-Bergantiños value-based
betweenness centrality.
Apart from computational results, it was experimentally shown that game-theoretic
centrality measures were useful to analyze scale-free and real-life networks. In Chapter 5, the
extensive simulations showed that game-theoretic betweenness centrality was a better measure
to protect network against simultaneous nodes failures than the standard betweenness centrality.
The experiments performed on scientific citation network in Chapter 6 suggested that Owen
value-based weighted degree centrality could be successfully used to evaluate the significance
of publications, while taking into account the importance of journals and conference venues.
Speaking more generally, the importance of a single node stems not only from its individual
power, but also from the power of community it belongs to. Owen value-based centrality
measure is the first measure in literature that takes this fact into account.
In Chapter 7 a terrorist network was analyzed with a centrality build upon connectivity
games. In particular, our algorithm proposed in this chapter allowed to analyze real-life WTC
9/11 terrorist network with 36 members and 125 identified connections.
There are a number of directions for future work. Table 9.1 presents our main computational
results vs. the gaps in the literature. For instance it is still an open question if it is possible to
compute Owen value-based betweenness centrality in polynomial time? Such measure would
find interesting applications to analyze financial institution networks, in which many institutions
form strictly collaborating conglomerates. As can be seen from Table 9.1 there are more open
questions regarding computation aspects of the game-theoretic centrality measures.
In this dissertation we analyzed three types of coalitional games: the standard games, games
with coalitional structure, and generalized coalitional games. Nevertheless, there are still other
classes of coalitional games, such as games with either positive or negative externalities [Yi,
1997, Michalak et al., 2009], that have been extensively studied in game theory and that may
yield interesting results when applied to network centrality.
It is also interesting to analyse the properties of game-theoretic network centralities
constructed on solution concepts from cooperative game theory other than the Shapley value,
or Semivalues. In particular, more general solution concepts such as the core [Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994] or the nucleolus [Schmeidler, 1969] could be also used as a centrality metric.
There are several other potential directions for future work. Firstly, it would be interesting
to extend the algorithms proposed in this thesis to streaming graphs [Green et al., 2012]. The
challenge here is to efficiently re-compute the centralities and update the ranking of nodes after
each change in the structure of the network, i.e., after adding/removing some nodes and/or
edges. Secondly, we are keen to develop polynomial-time algorithms for the most specific
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Standard centrality degree centrality closeness centrality betweenness centrality
Shapley value-based centrality Algorithm 1 Algorithm 4 Algorithm 12
Semivalue-based centrality [Szczepan´ski et al., 2015b] Algorithm 13
Owen value-based centrality Algorithm 18 [Tarkowski et al., 2016] unknown
Coalitional Semivalue-based centrality Algorithm 17 [Tarkowski et al., 2016] unknown
Nowak-Radzik-based centrality unknown unknown Algorithm 24p˚q
Sánchez-Bergantiños-based centrality unknown unknown Algorithm 24p˚q
p˚qThis algorithm does not run in polynomial time.
Table 9.1: Summary of the 7 algorithms for game-theoretic centrality measures presented in this
dissertation. The above table shows also gaps in the literature regarding other computational
results.
variation of centralities analyzed in this dissertation, such as routing betweenness centrality
[Dolev et al., 2010] built upon betweenness centrality. Finally, we would like to identify various
axiomatic systems that each uniquely characterize our centrality measure. Such an axiomatic
approach is common in the literature on cooperative game theory, and we believe it would be
interesting to follow a similar approach to analyse centrality measures in general, and ours in
particular.
Furthermore, our contribution on representation can be extended in various directions, two
of them seem particularly interesting. On the one hand, it would be interesting to consider
representation formalism other than MC-Nets, such as Algebraic Decision Diagrams [Aadithya
et al., 2011, Sakurai et al., 2011], to model generalized characteristic function games. On the
other hand, it is worth analyzing if our representation can produce algorithms that compute
generalized game-theoretic centrality measures build upon degree and closness centralities.
Finally, it would be worth developing a more formal and general approach that would
allow us to construct coalitional games defined over networks that correspond to other known
centrality metrics or even entire families of them. Such an approach would involve developing
a group centrality first and then building a characteristic function of a coalitional game upon it.
Of course, while developing new centrality metrics based on coalitional games, one should keep
in mind computational properties of the proposed solutions. Although we were able to obtain
satisfactory computational results for a number of games, the computation of the game-theoretic
network centrality may become much more challenging for more complex definitions of the
characteristic function.
Appendix A. Main Notation Used in the
Dissertation
Graphs/Networks
V “ tv1, v2, . . . v|V |u The set of nodes.
E “ te1, e2, . . . e|E|u The set of undirected (two-elements sets) or directed (two-elements ordered pairs) edgese “ pvi, vjq.
G “ pV,Eq The simple graph, where E is set of undirected edges.
G “ pV,Eq The directed graph, where E is set of directed edges.
G “ pV,E, λq The weighted graph with weight function: λpv, uq : E Ñ R.
G “ pV,E, γq The weighted graph with weights on nodes: γ : V Ñ R.
Npvq The neighbors of the node v, that is: tu : pv, uq P Eu.
degpvq Degree of the node v, degpvq “ |Npvq|.
NpCq The neighbors of the set of nodes C Ď V , i.e. ŤviPC NpviqzC.
EpCq The set of edges within set of nodes C: EpCq “ tpu, vq P E : u, v P Cu.
degpCq The degree of the set C, i.e. degpCq “ |NpCq|.
distpv, uq The distance between two nodes: v and u.
distpC, vq The distance between two nodes: v and set of nodes C: distpC, vq “ minuPC distpu, vq.
cd, cb, cc : V Ñ R The degree, betweeness and closeness centrality, respectively.
cgd, cgb, cgc : 2
V Ñ R The group degree, group betweeness and group closeness centrality, respectively.
C Ď V A community C.
CS “ tC1, C2, . . . C|CS |u The community structure.
σst The number of shortest paths between s and t.
σstpvq The number of shortest paths between s and t passing through the node v.
σstpCq The number of shortest paths between s and t passing through at least one node from C.
Coalitional Games
A “ ta1, a2, . . . a|A|u The set of players/agents.
ν : 2A Ñ R The characteristic function.
g “ pA, νq A coalitional game g in a characteristic function form.
C Ď A A coalition C.
ΠpCq The set of all orders (permutations) of players in C.
MCpC, aiq The marginal contribution of player ai to coalition C.
φipA, νq A solution concept for a player ai in coalitional game pA, νq.
φipAq Shorter notation for φipA, νq.
φSVi pA, νq The Shapley value for a player ai in coalitional game pA, νq.
φSEMIi pA, νq The Semivalue for a player ai in coalitional game pA, νq.
ψ : G Ñ V The representation function (G is the set of all graphs, and V the set of all coalitional
games).
pA,Rq The coalitional game in the form of Marginal Contribution Network.
δij The difference between φipNq ´ φipN´jq and φjpNq ´ φjpN´iq.
Coalitional Games with Coalitional Strcuture
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CS “ tC1, C2, . . . C|CS |u The coalitional structure.
φOVi pA, ν,CSq The Owen value for a player ai in coalitional game pA, ν,CSq with coalitional structure
CS .
φCSEMIi pA, ν,CSq The Coalitional Semivalue for a player ai in coalitional game pA, ν,CSq with coalitionalstructure CS .
Generalized Coalitional Games
T An ordered coalition.
T “ ŤCP2N ΠpCq The set of all ordered coalitions.
νg : T Ñ R A generalized characteristic function.
gg “ pA, νgq A generalized coalitional game in characteristic function form.
pT, T 1qk The ordered coalition that results from inserting T 1 at the kth position in T .
pT, aiq the ordered coalition that results from inserting ai at the end of T .
pA, νgq A coalitional game in a generalized characteristic function form.
T paiq An ordered coalition made of all predecessors of player ai in T .
φSBi pN, νgq The Sánchez-Bergantiños value of player ai in game pN, νgq.
φNRi pN, νgq The Nowak-Radzik value of player ai in game pN, νgq.
vNRg pCq The Nowak-Radzik value of coalition C (i.e., 1|C|! ¨
ř
TPΠpCq. ν
gpT q).
MCNRpT, iq νgppT, aiqq ´ νgpT q.
MCSB pT, iq 1p|T |`1q
ř|T |`1
l“1 rνppT, aiqlq ´ νpT qs.
pN,GRq generalized coalitional game represented by generalized MC-net
Game-theoretic Network Centralities
νG : 2
V Ñ R The characteristic function defined on graph.
g “ pN, νGq A coalitional game g in a characteristic function form defined on graph.
Other
Er¨s The expectation operator.
pz ^ z1q Ñ V Basic MC-Nets z positive literals, z1 positive literals,.
F Formula
FBAF “ tam, . . . , anu basic atomic formula (BAF)
FOAF “ xai, . . . , ajy ordered atomic formula (OAF)
xa1i , . . . , afj y upper indices indicate positions in formula/ordered coalition
F1 ‘ F2 exclusive disjunction
T ( F ordered coalition T meets or satisfies formula F
T * F ordered coalition T does not meet or satisfy formula F
XF set of players occurring in F
TF ŤtΠpCq : C Ď XFu
T1 ˆ T2 conflation of two ordered coalitions
Ak,ipFq |tT P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T * F , pT, aiq ( Fqu|
Bk,ipFq |tT P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T ( F , pT, aiq * Fqu|
TkpFq |tT P TF : |T | “ k, T ( Fu|
FkpFq |tT P TF : |T | “ k, T * Fu|
TkpFq |tT P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T * F , pT, aiql ( Fqu|
Bk,i,lpFq |tT P TF : |T | “ k, ai R T, T ( F , pT, aiql * Fqu|
Appendix B. The Recursive Functions
Algorithm 25: ShNRpFq
Input: Formula F
Output: Quantities pA, B, T, Fq
begin
if F “ ta1, . . . , aru thenpA, B, T, Fq Ð p0, 0, 0, 0q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF do
if k “ r ´ 1 then Ak,i Ð pr ´ 1q!
end
if k “ r then Tk Ð r! Fk Ð k!´ Tk;
end
end
else if F “ xa1, . . . , ary thenpA, B, T, Fq Ð p0, 0, 0, 0q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
if k “ r ´ 1 then Ak,r Ð 1 if k “ r then Tk Ð 1 Fk Ð k!´ Tk;
end
endelse if F “  F1 then
pA1, B1, T1, F1q Ð ShNRpF1q;
pA, B, T, Fq Ð pB1, A1, F1, T1q;
end
else if F “ F1 ^ F2 then // We assume that @iPXF i P F1, the second situation is analogous.pA1, B1, T1, F1q Ð ShNRpF1q;
pA2, B2, T2, F2q Ð ShNRpF2q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF do
Ak,i Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘A1s,iT2k´s
Bk,i Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘B1s,iT2k´s
end
Tk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘T1sT2k´s
Fk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pF1sF2k´s ` F1sT2k´s ` T1sF2k´sq
end
endelse if F “ F1 _ F2 then
pA1, B1, T1, F1q Ð ShNRpF1q;
pA2, B2, T2, F2q Ð ShNRpF2q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF do
Ak,i Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘A1s,iF2k´s
Bk,i Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘B1s,iF2k´s
end
Tk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pT1sT2k´s ` F1sT2k´s ` T1sF2k´sq
Fk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘F1sF2k´s
end
endelse if F “ F1 ‘ F2 then
pA1, B1, T1, F1q Ð ShNRpF1q;
pA2, B2, T2, F2q Ð ShNRpF2q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF do
Ak,i Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pB1s,iT2k´s ` A1s,iF2k´sq;
Bk,i Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pB1s,iF2k´s ` A1s,iT2k´sq;
end
Tk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pT1sF2k´s ` F1sT2k´sq;
Fk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pT1sT2k´s ` F1sF2k´sq;
end
end
end
.
.
.
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Algorithm 26: ShSBpFq
Input: Formula F
Output: Quantities pA,B,T,Fq
begin
if F “ ta1, . . . , aru thenpA,B,T,Fq Ð p0, 0, 0, 0q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF , l P t1, . . . , ru do
if k “ r ´ 1 then Ak,i,l Ð pr ´ 1q!
end
if k “ r then Tk Ð r! Fk Ð k!´ Tk;
end
end
else if F “ xa1, . . . , ary thenpA,B,T,Fq Ð p0, 0, 0, 0q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF do
if k “ r ´ 1 then Ak,i,i Ð 1
end
if k “ r then Tk Ð 1 Fk Ð k!´ Tk;
end
endelse if F “  F1 then
pA1,B1,T1,F1q Ð ShSB pF1q;
pA,B,T,Fq Ð pB1,A1,F1,T1q;
end
else if F “ F1 ^ F2 then // We assume that @iPXF i P F1, the second situation is analogous.pA1,B1,T1,F1q Ð ShSB pF1q;
pA2,B2,T2,F2q Ð ShSB pF2q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF , l P t1, . . . , ru do
Ak,i,l Ð řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘A1s,i,mT2k´s;
Bk,i,l Ð řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘B1s,i,mT2k´s;
end
Tk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘T1sT2k´s;
Fk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pF1sF2k´s ` F1sT2k´s ` T1sF2k´sq;
end
endelse if F “ F1 _ F2 then
pA1,B1,T1,F1q Ð ShSB pF1q;
pA2,B2,T2,F2q Ð ShSB pF2q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF , l P t1, . . . , ru do
Ak,i,l Ð řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘A1s,i,mF2k´s;
Bk,i,l Ð řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘B1s,i,mF2k´s;
end
Tk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pT1sT2k´s ` F1sT2k´s ` T1sF2k´sq
Fk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘F1sF2k´s
end
endelse if F “ F1 ‘ F2 then
pA1,B1,T1,F1q Ð ShSB pF1q;
pA2,B2,T2,F2q Ð ShSB pF2q;
for k P t0, . . . , ru do
for i P XF , l P t1, . . . , ru do
Ak,i,l Ð řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘pB1s,i,mT2k´s ` A1s,i,mF2k´sq;
Bk,i,l Ð řks“0 řs`1m“1 ` l´1l´m˘` k´l`1k´l`m´s˘`B1s,i,mF2k´s ` A1s,i,mT2k´s˘;
end
Tk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pT1sF2k´s ` F1sT2k´sq;
Fk Ð řks“0 ` kk´s˘pT1sT2k´s ` F1sF2k´sq;
end
end
end
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